Unity in diversity?
European and national identities in respect to cultural diversity
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With its working paper series “Glocal governance and democracy” the Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne provides the opportunity to present conceptual ideas, normative debates and empirical findings regarding current political transformations of the modern state system. The term “glocalization” addresses key transformations in respect to levels of governance and democracy – multiplication and hybridization. These features can also be observed in the processes of horizontal interpenetration and structural overlaps among territorial units (transnationalization), in new forms of steering with actors from the private, the public and the non-profit sector (governance), in the interferences among functional regimes and discourses and in emerging new communities and networks between metropolitan centres and peripheries on various scales. One of our core themes is migration and its consequences for development, transnational integration and democracy. A second field of research and discussion is governance and democracy in functionally differentiated and multi-level systems.

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Abstract
The relationship between national and European identity is contested. Citizens differ widely in the extent of simultaneous identification with Europe and the nation. Specific ways to construct national identity might be more prone than others to allow for the simultaneous development of a European identity. The country context may influence threat perceptions and thereby the extent of dual identification. One threat exerted by European integration may come from Europe’s immense cultural diversity. This paper asks whether the national way of framing ‘us-them’ relations concerning intra-state ‘others’, such as cultural minorities and immigrants, influences the compatibility of identification on both levels. The analysis is based on a conceptual differentiation between different ways to frame national identity, namely an ethnic, republican, multi-cultural and liberal idealtype. These types are expected to trigger different consequences for the compatibility with a European identity, namely a nationalist, multi-national or post-national approach towards the European Union. This theoretical framework is empirically analysed with the help of Eurobarometer data from 1999 to 2009 in the 15 and later 27 member states. Attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigrants allow classifying the countries according to the dominant frame of national identity construction. The results are set in relation to the extent of dual identification in each member state and indeed show an interesting pattern. The more liberal countries show the highest compatibility of both identities, republican nations have mixed results, but also an ethnic national identity does not necessarily inhibit European identification.

Keywords: European identity, dual identification, models of national identity, acceptance of cultural diversity
Introduction

While the European Union aims for ‘unity in diversity’, it is not yet clear what actually unites European citizens except for institutional and economic cooperation. The lack of a ‘European demos’ is usually decried. Still, there are signs of a considerable sense of identification with Europe. At the same time we are more and more aware that the emergence of a European identity does not necessarily mean the disappearance of national attachments. While identification with Europe is increasing among elites and ordinary citizens alike (Risse 2004: 270), attachment to one’s country has remained strong and relatively stable (Citrin and Sides 2004: 169). The social psychological insight that individuals hold multiple identities (Brewer 1993; 2001) is as true in the political as in the social realm. Study after study has affirmed that it is possible and not at all unusual for citizens to identify with several territorial communities simultaneously – to feel, for example, strongly Catalan, Spanish, and European at the same time (Llera 1993; Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; on multiple identities in Belgium see e.g., Billiet et al. 2003; in general: Bruter 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; 2008; Kaina 2009; Laffan 1996; Marks 1999).

Yet are we witnessing a uniform trend across all member states? Given the prevalence of the nation-state as arena of public discourse and as frame of shared representations for collective identities, it comes as no surprise that citizens in member states differ widely in the extent to which they simultaneously identify with Europe and the nation (Citrin and Sides 2004: 168; Fuchs, Guinaudeau, and Schubert 2009: 102). What influences the emergence of multiple identities or the coexistence of national and European identities? Are specific ways of constructing national identity more amenable than others to the simultaneous development of a European identity? These questions touch upon the subtle ways in which national identity is framed and politically mobilized in relation to European integration (Bruter 2003; Carey 2002; Fuchs, Gerhards, and Roller 1995; Hermann, Brewer, and Risse 2004; Kriesi et al. 1999; Marcussen et al. 1999; McLaren 2001; 2002; Mols et al. 2009; Risse 2001; on Britain: Usherwood 2002; on Denmark: Buch and Hansen 2002). Countries vary widely in this respect, not at least because debates over European integration may be more or less politicized in different states. In some contexts, national identity may exist alongside, or even reinforce a sense of European identity and support for European integration. In others, national identity is mobilized around the contested claim that the EU threatens national institutions, weakens the national community, and undermines national sovereignty (Risse 2001). Political events

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1 For the sake of simplicity, I employ a restricted understanding of Europeans in this article only encompassing citizens of the European Union.
2 For example, referenda on membership in the EU or on EU treaties and their campaigns increase the salience of European issues and limit the capacity of political parties and leaders to control the debate (Leduc 2001).
and discourse may – or, in some countries, may not – construe for individuals that national identity is contradictory with support for European integration. In short, national identity is profoundly shaped by politics’ (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 24).

A similar story can be told about perceptions of European integration as representing a cultural or economic threat. McLaren (2002) stresses that opposition to European integration taps into deep-seated fears.² Yet, the salience of such fears varies widely across countries. The links between fears and perceptions of European integration is not automatic but mobilized during political conflicts. In short, national identities as well as cultural and economic fears are interpreted and constructed differently in diverse national contexts (Marks and Hooghe 2003: 25). A main source of insecurity may be Europe’s immense cultural diversity. As McLaren puts it, ‘(a)ntipathy toward the EU is not just about cost/benefit calculations or about cognitive mobilization (…) but about fear of, or hostility toward, other cultures’ (2002: 553).³ The question of how to cope with cultural differences is one of the central challenges of European integration. Each member state has its own approach and experience in this respect on the national level. The way cultural diversity is dealt with is a good indicator of the way national identity is constructed in a specific political community. This becomes evident in the ways ethnic minorities – which emerged either out of historical processes of nation-building, or as a result of growing international migration – are included. Given the obvious cultural heterogeneity of the European Union, the inclusion of cultural ‘others’ into national identities may impact people’s identification with ‘Europe’.

Bearing all this in mind, this paper sets out to answer the following empirical question: Are differences between member states in the compatibility of national and European identities related to the ways respect for cultural diversity figure into a society’s understanding of its national community? Determining factors which influence the compatibility of national and European level identities is crucial for sketching the possible trajectory of the EU with regard to the identity dimension of integration. I hypothesize that the dominant way of framing ‘us-them’ relations on the national level with regard to intra-state ‘others’ like cultural minorities or immigrants influences this compatibility; that is, the way the national community is constructed with respect to cultural diversity within a country influences citizens’ readiness to identify with a broader community characterized by high cultural diversity such as Europe. This hypothesis is grounded on the assumption that the relation between different identities is influenced by the way each is constructed. For the

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² In general, emotional commitments can be extremely powerful in shaping views towards political objects, particularly when other cognitive frames of reference do not apply transparently (Chong 2000).
³ McLaren (2002) offers an instructive analysis of the degree to which citizens fear cultural diversity and cultural degradation as a result of European integration.
national level, there is a long tradition of distinguishing different types of nationalism and construction of national identity (see e.g. Castles 1995; Greenfeld 1999; Kymlicka 1999). These conceptual differentiations have also been discovered and discussed empirically (see Brubaker 1992; Shulman 2002) and their impact on other orientations, such as political tolerance (Weldon 2006) or transnational orientation of migrants (Koopmans and Statham 2003), investigated. Referring back to this literature, the conceptual framework of this paper distinguishes between four different models of national community: an ethnic, a republican, a multi-cultural, and a liberal one. I hypothesize that these models correspond to a rather non-compatible nationalist, a conditionally compatible multi-national, and a highly compatible post-nationalist approach to European identity.

To test this hypothesis, the empirical part of the paper takes a comparative perspective in several respects: First, it offers a comparison over time, namely the development of dual identification from 1994 to 2009. Second, it includes a comparison between countries and groups of countries, such as the 15 old member states compared to the 10 new member states. These results will be set in relation to the different conceptions of national community. Using Eurobarometer data, I classify the member states according to their citizens’ orientations towards cultural diversity and immigrants and analyse the extent of identification on the national and European level in these countries.

**Theoretical framework**

**Different models of national identity**

In contrast to the times of loosely integrated empires, nation-states usually build their authority on an underlying political community. A sense of community or national identity is considered to be important to ensure efficacy and stability of a political system (Easton 1975). Yet, identity is a contested concept (for more details see Schlenker-Fischer 2009: 27-34). In general, a collective, political, or cultural identity does not consist simply of the sum of its single identities, but is the result of a collective process; individuals define themselves as a group with reference to a third party. Collective identity thus has a relative and dialectic nature which is usually underlined by the need for demarcation. Boundaries divide the factual diversity of interaction processes and social relations, marking inside from outside, stranger from commoner, friend from foe (see Barth 1969). Boundary drawing automatically involves processes of inclusion and exclusion – the construction of in- and out-groups (Tajfel 1978, 1982). The building of collective identity is also about shared representations of a group, an active process of creating an image of what the group stands for and how it would like to be
seen by others. Collective identities therefore usually represent the achievement of collective efforts to define cognitively what the members have in common and to locate the boundaries of the collectivity. They further signify that this cognitive operation has been endowed with emotional meaning.\(^5\) This underlines the widely accepted insight that collective identities are socially constructed. Yet, how exactly they are constructed is of crucial importance.

National identity is a collective identity which takes many different forms. Scholars of nationalism have commonly argued that (a) there are many different traits that can provide the foundation for national unity and identity, and that (b) nations differ in the mix of the traits that form the basis of their unity and identity. The distinction between civic, political, or territorial on one hand and ethnic or cultural nations on the other hand is one of the most widely employed conceptual building blocks in the study of nationalism. This distinction, dating back to the beginning of the last century (Meineke 1907/1970; see also Kohn 1944), is basically based on different access to the national community, either following a territorial principle (ius soli) or a descent based one (ius sanguinis) (e.g. Brubaker 1992; Ignatieff 1993). Yet many scholars already have criticized this dichotomy as being too simple (Greenfield 1999; Brubaker 1999). The main problem with the civic/ethnic dichotomy is that it collapses too much in the ethnic category.\(^6\)

In order to overcome this dichotomy, it proved fruitful to combine the cultural rights dimension of the multiculturalism debate with the formal criteria for access to citizenship (Castles and Miller 1993; Castles 1995; Kleger and D’Amato 1995; Smith and Blanc 1996; Safran 1997). Generally, these authors have come up with three types of citizenship regimes. In the same line Greenfeld (1999), for example, differentiates a collectivistic-ethnic, a collectivistic-civic and an individualistic-civic type of nationalism.\(^7\) However, if we have two dimensions, one – ethnic versus civic – defining the formal criteria of access, and another – assimilationist versus multicultural – defining the cultural obligations which such citizenship entails, we end up with four, not three models (see Koopmans and Kriesi 1997; Koopmans and Statham 2000). In addition, it is conceptually not convincing to subsume all kinds of pluralism in one model. While citizenship entails the set of rights, duties and identities linking

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\(^5\) Collective identity formation is thus an essential part of community-building which is additionally a matter of collective agency. That is why the concept captures a critical conjunction of social identity and collective actions in the political arena. See Brewer (2001: 119) as well as Schlenker-Fischer (2009: 67-82) on political community.

\(^6\) Nielsen (1999) and Kymlicka (1999) note that it is a mistake to equate ethnic with cultural nationalism, because they differ according to their openness to outsiders. Nieguth (1999) similarly calls for unpacking the dichotomy, since ancestry, race, culture, and territory are analytically distinct bases for national membership.

\(^7\) These models can also be paralleled by different codes of collective identity construction, namely primordial, traditional and universalistic ones (see Giesen 1999; Schlenker-Fischer forthcoming).
citizens to the nation-state, I will concentrate on the construction of such identities and their differentiation into four models in the following (see Figure 1).

The first, ethnic model, ties membership in the political community to race and common ancestry, implemented in a ‘ius sanguinis’ rule for acquisition of citizenship rejecting the territorial principle. Thus migrants and their descendants are denied access to the political community, or at least such access is made very difficult. If the political community is additionally conceived in collectivistic terms, this conception of the nation also leads to a conviction that the dominant ethnic group’s culture should be promoted and its values and traditions implemented in the institutional order without recognizing cultural differences, because the state is conceived as an entity of and for a particular group and a group’s ethnic identity is expressed through its culture. Even though in principle assimilation is not possible since newcomers without the right ancestry can never be full-fledged members of the national community (Shulman 2002: 561), a more pragmatic view at least expects that those immigrants who are already on the territory have to assimilate to the dominant culture in order to secure social cohesion. Thus, Koopmans and Statham (2000: 21) call this approach ‘ethnic-assimilationism’.

The second, republican model still conceives of the political community in collectivistic terms. Based on a sense of common societal foundations this still implies many non-political cultural commonalities, especially a common heritage, traditions and language as well as a strong in-group identity marked by solidarity and identification with a commonly held conception of the good life, at least in the public sphere. But this model is not based on common descent. The boundaries are permeable, thus outsiders and minorities can become members by gradual assimilation subscribing to a common will based on the specific traditions and habits of the community in question and the state promotes this process in its education and language policies. Diversity can thus be included in a limited way. This approach is exemplified in the old idea of a ‘melting pot’ which provides for easy access to citizenship, but requiring from migrants a high degree of assimilation in the public sphere, giving little or no recognition to their cultural difference. Koopmans and Statham call this combination ‘civic republicanism’.

The third, liberal model also provides for easy formal access to the political community but has a less collectivistic notion of it, or an explicitly political one, and thus

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8 For further details of a similar typology see Schlenker-Fischer 2009: 151-159.
9 While classic republicans conceive of the political community in similar ways emphasizing involvement in politics as the ideal form of life (e.g. Arendt 1958), communitarians follow in their footsteps, but usually stress more the cultural aspects of political communities (Walzer 1983; Taylor 2002).
explicitly endorses cultural diversity. This is the case if democratic systems subscribe to more universalistic codifications of collective identity emphasizing neutrality and principles of abstract justice as the common ground. Such liberal conceptions of political community are founded on the values of individual autonomy and equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971) and build community primarily upon legal principles, not on any general ethnocultural way of life (see Habermas 1994). Thus empirically national unity and membership in the nation derive from attachment to a common territory, citizenship, belief in the same political principles or ideology, respect for political institutions and equal political rights. Strictly liberal convictions lead in the cultural sphere to a laissez-faire approach in which the state should be as culturally neutral as possible and should promote individual, not collective, rights. A second option is a more active policy of multiculturalism in which the state recognizes collective rights and promotes the maintenance of minority cultures.

Although many include all kinds of pluralism in such a civic model – Koopmans and Statham call it ‘civic pluralism’ – it is conceptually more stringent to differentiate a liberal model of national identity based on individual rights from a more outspokenly multi-cultural one which expects the state to follow more active policies of multiculturalism, thus to recognize collective rights and to promote the maintenance of subnational cultures. This conception might even be based on common ancestry of multiple ethnic groups which nevertheless are tied together in one political system as was the case in classic empires or federations of states with weak control structures. Political power and governance is largely shaped by the local and cultural particularities of subnational units. Thus group rights are fundamental for this kind of community construction, a corpus of cultural rights is added to civic, political, and social rights. When these group rights include considerable rights to self-determination such a strongly multi-cultural national community comes close to consociational ideas (Lijphart 1977) and a largely segregated coexistence of various groups.

Figure 1 locates these four models of national identity depending on their specific combination of the two dimensions ‘inclusion into the national community’ and ‘acceptance of cultural diversity’ (see also Koopmans and Statham 2000: 21).

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10 The specific way of implementing universalistic values serves as an identification pole, captured in the term ‘constitutional patriotism’.

11 With a negative connotation if the majority’s ethnicity dominates, Koopmans and Statham name this fourth approach ‘ethnic segregationism’. Unfortunately the data which will be analysed later on does not allow for this last differentiation.
In contrast to these ideal types, empirical collective identities, such as national or European identities, are always a unique combination of these elements. Still, their relative importance presumably makes a difference in the ways individuals and groups relate to other identities. Recognising this might help to move beyond the rather simple statement that individuals hold multiple social identities to the more interesting question of how exactly these multiple identities relate to each other. People generally learn to balance their multiple memberships and roles (Stryker 1980). Still, individual strategies to manage multiple identities depend on the configuration of collective identities to each other since they demand attention, commitment, and active support (Peters 1993: 12).

The intersection of different levels of identity can be conceptualized in at least three ways (Herrmann and Brewer 2004: 8): they are either separate or exclusive, cross-cutting or overlapping, or nested or embedded, conceived of as concentric circles like a Russian Matruska doll. An empirical example are federal political systems (Haller 1999: 271), which can also be expanded to include one more level, thus to feel attachment on the local, regional, national and European level. Risse (2002; 2004) adds a fourth way of relating different collective identities, the marble-cake model. This implies that they can also be inseparably mixed with one another.

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12 The possibility of separating out identities pertaining to different domains or spheres of life is inherent in the liberal idea of differentiating between the private and the public sphere. Cultural matters and identities are assumed to belong to the private domain, while in the public realm only political interests and identities are appropriate and legitimate. However, in the real world social and political identities are seldom neatly separable and conflicts of interests or loyalty regularly emerge.

13 Usually it is assumed that in a large pluralistic society multiple criss-crossing of social identities have a stabilising effect (see e.g. Lipset 1959), however if the claims of the different groups one belongs to are incompatible, the management of combined identities becomes more problematic and strenuous (Brewer 2001: 122).

14 Neofunctionalists in particular hoped that the creation of a superordinate common identity would promote tolerance and foster better relations among national subgroups (Deutsch 1954; Haas 1964).

15 One example is the development of the national identity in Germany after the end of World War II. It seems to be typical for Germans that their attachment to the German nation includes feeling attached to Europe and that their self-understanding as Germans simultaneously comprises elements of being European (Risse 2004: 252).
Legally, national belonging is embedded within European belonging which is institutionalized in the conception of European citizenship according to which every citizen of a nation-state that is a member of the European Union is automatically a European citizen. Yet, it is another question if this is also the case in the heads of people, if their conceptions of identification on these different levels are compatible with one another or not. Since each model of national identity prescribes different commonalities and boundaries we can formulate different expectations in respect to the European level.

**Expectations for the European level**

These models were developed with reference to national political communities and their treatment of cultural diversity. Yet the argument here proposes that they trigger different consequences for the way European identity is conceived of. The republican as well as the individualistic liberal approach to political community on a European level would be inclusive. Republican inclusivity, however, would be considerably more limited. It would admit newcomers to the European Union, but envisage their membership as contingent upon their cultural similarity to the older member states which would make them integrable into the overarching European project. However, since the republican frame places high importance on self-determination, a dominance of this frame on the national level would entail a widespread scepticism towards any supra-national integration projects – especially as long as there are not equivalent prospects for self-determination on this higher level. Under these conditions ‘Europe’ would entail leaving national sovereignty as far as possible untouched. Intrusion by the Union would be minimal, justified only when there is no conflict with national priorities. This would be a multi-national conception of the EU, thus following the same logic as a strongly multi-cultural model on the national level based on territorial coexistence of various subunits. By way of contrast, a liberal approach would conceive of the EU as a civic entity based on post-national, liberal values. This would imply that the inclusion of any country subscribing to these values is possible. Abstracting from cultural values in this way, such a vision is close to interpreting European integration as one step towards the dawn of an autonomous world citizenship, towards a universal status of all humankind (e.g. Soysal 1994). Finally, given the cultural diversity which characterizes Europe it is hard to imagine one single common descent as in the ethnic model to predominate on the European level. Still, we cannot preclude from the outset that people might nevertheless think of Europe as a community of Europeans united by common descent and far reaching cultural commonalities.
Official European policy is strongly guided by a liberal approach. The EU is, after all, a self-proclaimed civic community which respects and promotes its cultural diversity. The fundamental values basic to the whole project of European integration are essentially universalistic.\textsuperscript{16} This, in turn, makes the Union open to new members. At the same time political decisions are taken on the European level only after respecting the subsidiarity rule. Thus the competences of member states are safeguarded as far as possible, respecting traditional modes of community construction. In order to enhance the self-proclaimed aim of ‘unity in diversity’ the European Union employs symbols that represent the cultural diversity of its member states that are nonetheless united. This is exemplified in the flag which includes a star for each original member state, and the anthem mentioning Europe’s cultural diversity. Thus, on the policy level, a multi-national as well as post-national approach to European identity is propagated and it is an open empirical question which of them is more widespread among the European public.

The way collective identities are constructed does not have to be the same on different territorial levels. This study is nevertheless based on the assumption that constructions at the national level impact the potential for identification on the European level. Refering to the aforementioned models of national identity I posit the following hypotheses:

(1) To frame national level unity in ethnic terms is already difficult given the diversity of most polities. At the European level then, it is hardly thinkable. Thus, if identification with a political community is based on common descent and cultural diversity rejected on the national level, the obvious cultural diversity within the EU will be rejected as well. Such a framing of national identity is therefore presumed to be linked to anti-European sentiments or a lack of European identification. Both identities exclude one another and a nationalist approach to European identity is probable.

(2) A republican as well as a multi-cultural way of constructing the national identity is not threatened by European integration so long as national boundaries are respected as an expression of such collectives. This means in the first case to respect the strong republican will of self-determination and in the second to respect the commonly negotiated compromises reached on the national level. For the European level this entails to conceive of a Europe of fatherlands united by a limited extent of political integration and respecting national particularities. Since this is a strong condition to be fulfilled, I hypothesize that in such a multi-national approach to European identity national and European identities are conditionally compatible.

\textsuperscript{16} For example, after long discussions no reference to God was included in the draft for a EU constitution.
(3) If the national identity is framed in liberal terms, collective identities on different territorial levels are most likely to be compatible, since the universalistic foundation of individualistic values is compatible with a post-national conception of political community at the European level. Thus, if both national and European level identifications subscribe to this logic, they are likely to be most compatible, with the former nested in the latter. These hypotheses are illustrated in Figure 2.

**Figure 2: Hypothesized approaches to European identity and its compatibility with national identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Models of national identity</th>
<th>Approaches to European identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republican (assimilation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethn (domination)</td>
<td>Multi-cultural (segregation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist (no compatibility)</td>
<td>Multi-national (conditional compatibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal (abstraction)</td>
<td>Post-national (high compatibility)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Empirical Analysis**

*Dual identification over time*

While it was originally contested whether simultaneous identification with Europe and the nation is possible, research in recent years repeatedly showed that this is indeed possible without necessary trade-offs (Diez Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001; Bruter 2003; Citrin and Sides 2004; Duchesne and Frognier 1995; 2008; Laffan 1996; Marks 1999). Analysing the development over the last ten years, we can even state that not only a vast majority, namely almost three quarters (73 per cent) of Europe’s population manifest this dual identification today, but also that there has been an impressive increase in dual identification in the past decade (see Figure 3).\(^{17}\) This trend was coupled with a decrease in exclusive national identity from 31 percent in 1999 to 20 percent in 2009, when meanwhile 27 member states were included in the surveys.\(^{18}\)

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\(^{17}\) For a development of identification with the nation and Europe since 1992 in Europe as well as in single nation-states see Kaina (2009: 59-62), who uses a more cognitive self-description indicator (‘In the near future, do you see yourself as…’).\(^{18}\) Unfortunately the wording of the question changed in 2009. Instead of asking about feelings of attachment to the nation and Europe, now the extent one is feeling European or the respective nationality is asked. Yet, since both questions focus on emotional identification in a similar way, the numbers are, in my opinion, comparable.
The increase in dual identification is especially noteworthy since one might have expected the opposite given the often cited crisis which European integration faces since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in several countries. It is also remarkable from the specific point of view adopted in this paper: with the accession of meanwhile 12 new member states, cultural diversity within the EU has increased considerably. Yet, in spite of this heightened diversity, obviously for a majority of Europeans identification with their own nation and with Europe are not mutually contradictory, but complementary identities which they are able to support simultaneously. Overall, the high degree of simultaneous emotional identification with Europe in an either post-national or multi-national variant is remarkable.

Yet, is this a universal trend similar in all European countries? If we compare the six founding members with the average of the 15 old member states and the 12 new member states, dual identification in the former is repeatedly higher than in any other group of countries. Interestingly, the then candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania were very attached to Europe in 2004, an enthusiasm which had considerably decreased 5 years later after their accession. In contrast, the 10 new member states which accessed the EU in 2004 show considerably more dual identification five years after their accession, even slightly overtaking the average of the EU 25 (see Appendix, Figure 6). Yet the most striking differences are revealed when we look at individual countries. Again in 2009, dual identification ranges from 79 per cent in Luxembourg to 47 per cent in Great Britain with all other countries inbetween.¹⁹ This wide range of variation calls for explanation. I will show in

¹⁹ Great Britain is notoriously known for its little attachment to Europe. Interestingly, similar rates of dual identification are even found in the non-members Turkey and Croatia, where also almost half of the population manifest dual identification with Europe and their nation.
the following whether we find certain patterns related to the way national identity is constructed in respect to cultural diversity. For this purpose I will first classify the countries.

**Models of national identity in the 15 old member states**

It is important to reiterate that the models of national identity discussed above are ideal types which on one hand serve to frame national identity and which, on the other, concretely inspire different institutions and policies towards immigrants and cultural diversity (and vice versa). Consequently, in order to measure and distinguish types of nationhood, scholars repeatedly opted for interpreting a state’s policies (Castles 1995; Kleger and D’Amato 1995; Safran 1997; Weldon 2006). Inferring national identity from state policies concerning such issues as citizenship, cultural assimilation, treatment of minorities, and immigration has the problem that these policies embody the views of a very narrow segment of the state’s population: the political elite in power at the time the policies were enacted. Yet, the proper understanding of the nation-state and expectations tied to citizenship are contested in every country. Another problem is that state policies also reflect concerns other than national identity. This is especially true for immigration policies, which are many times also influenced by economic or social concerns. This leads to an even more serious problem inasmuch as we assume there are straightforward relationships between institutions and policies on one hand, and orientations and identification patterns on the other. Though this macro-micro link has been found to exist on many occasions, I opt for a more direct path to shed light on the relationship between different orientations and patterns of identification.

Accordingly I do not classify countries by their official citizenship regime and cultural policies but by the orientations of citizens towards cultural diversity and immigrants. This means that citizens’ mode of identification with the nation-state is observed from the specific perspective of how they relate to the ‘other’. In accordance with the theoretical framework developed above, these orientations are assessed by measuring the approach towards cultural diversity via the population’s evaluation of multi-cultural society and their insistence on cultural conformity of migrants as well as the inclusion into the national community via attitudes towards immigration and integration policies. Though individual characteristics such as education, age as well as general outlook in life usually influence such attitudes, the difference these factors make are still smaller than those between countries (see Eurobarometer 2007: 68-71). This further strengthens the argument that the distribution of such attitudes on the national level creates a specific context for other orientations such as identification processes.
Now, what does this context in Europe look like? To start with I first analyse the 15 old member states in 2003. The data suggests that overall there is not much resistance to multi-culturalism in these European societies. Nearly two-thirds of respondents (65 per cent) evaluate cultural diversity as positive and almost half (49 per cent) consider it added-value to their country’s strength. However, a vast majority (81 per cent) insist that immigrants should adapt to the nation’s customs. At the same time, just over a fourth (28 per cent) thinks minority groups in general should have to give up their cultural habits. Impressively, a fifth (21 per cent) would even favor that all immigrants including their children would be sent back. Still, on average, there is little opposition to granting civil rights to legal migrants. Two-thirds (66 per cent) of the Europeans surveyed think migrants should have equal rights and a comparable majority (70 per cent) believes more legal help should be given to immigrants to ease the process of integration into their new society.

Factor analysis corroborates that the seven indicators just mentioned indeed represent two separate attitude dimensions which are in line with the theoretical framework developed above. The first dimension captures attitudes towards cultural diversity including the extension of rights to minorities and immigrants. The second dimension represents the way inclusion into the national community is conceived of depending on the extent to which assimilation is expected from immigrants (Table 1).

### Table 1: Two dimensions of national identity construction with respect to cultural diversity (factor analysis, EU15, 2003)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of cultural diversity</th>
<th>F1 loadings</th>
<th>F2 loadings</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal immigrants should have the same rights as nationals</td>
<td>.699</td>
<td>-.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The country should do more to help immigrants integrate</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>-.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural diversity is good for society</td>
<td>.707</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural diversity adds to the country’s strength</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion into national community (assimilation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In order to be accepted, minorities must give up their culture</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities are so different, they are never fully accepted</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All immigrants including their children should be sent back</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.662</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Extraction method: Principal Component Analysis; Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization
a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Number of cases: 16 082, Missing cases: listwise deletion
For exact wording of the indicators see Appendix 1.


The conceptual argument that the prevailing model of national identity in a country can be classified along these dimensions is strengthened by the close overlap which exists between these two dimensions and those identified by Koopmans and Statham (2000: 21f). Thus,
constructing indices for each dimension, the first expresses the extent to which cultural diversity is accepted and the second the extent to which inclusion into the national community is tied to assimilation. Forming a two-dimensional space, this allows comparing the average attitudes of a country’s population and classifying them accordingly. In this respect, the dimensions combine in different ways as specified in the discussion on the different models of national identity developed above: (1) an ethnic frame of national identity is characterized by a rejection of multi-cultural society, integration policies, and rights for minorities. It is also associated with high expectations of assimilation, thus with difficult inclusion into the national community. (2) In contrast, a republican frame of the national identity evaluates multi-cultural society and integration policies more positively, though also expects assimilation. (3) The liberal concept is characterized by a positive evaluation of multi-cultural society and integration policies, while assimilation is not expected. Unfortunately the data does not allow detecting the outspokenly multi-cultural frame of national identity since there are no attitudes towards explicite group rights included. Figure 4 shows the location of countries according to the respective combination of means in this two-dimensional space, those with a predominantly liberal national identity in the upper right corner (high acceptance of cultural diversity without expecting assimilation), those with a republican one in the upper left corner (acceptance of cultural diversity and at the same time high expectations of assimilation), and those where an ethnic frame prevails in the lower left corner (least acceptance of cultural diversity and high expectations of assimilation).
Respondents in countries that are typically classified as ethnic nations – Germany, Austria and Belgium – do in fact display orientations which correspond to this primordial way of framing national identity. Greece is another country where respondents overwhelmingly reject cultural diversity. Historically a country of emigration, Greece today is experiencing a considerable influx of immigrants. The issue has accordingly gained in social and economic salience in the last decade (Fakiolas and King 1996). This is because the country was generally believed to be ethnically homogeneous, and its citizens were not used to the idea of permanently settled non-European foreigners (Blinkhorn and Veremis 1990). Interestingly, the Brits manifest a very similar exclusive stance on cultural diversity and assimilation to the one of the Greeks. This contradicts the country’s liberal reputation. However, one has to keep in mind the high degree of multi-culturalism already attained in British society, due to its past as an Empire and its liberal entry policies for citizens of the Commonwealth as well as for workers from new member states. Nevertheless, its position here does not justify any other classification than as ‘ethnic’.

Vertovec (1999), for one, speaks of ‘super-diversity’, above all in London.
France together with the two Iberic countries and Ireland show a republican pattern, as one might have expected. The Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, and Denmark) together with Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Italy form the group of liberal countries. Most of them are known for their liberal stance on multiculturalism, except for Italy which shows the least acceptance of cultural diversity in this group. Still, expectations of assimilation are also low here. The orientations of citizens in the other countries are consistent with their countries’ official liberal frame of national community, the Netherlands once being the prototype of multiculturalism.

Almost the same data is available three years before, and the analysis shows that the localisation of countries only slightly changes (see Appendix, Figure 7). In comparison to the year 2000, the majority in Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy became slightly more restrictive on this issue in 2003 which could be related to the heightened salience of immigration and integration issues in all three countries. Yet, there is only one country which has to be differently categorised in 2000, namely Spain, which is then more liberal than three years later. This might be explained by the large influx of immigrants to this country which was until only recently itself an emigration country. Yet overall, the classification of all other countries seems to be quite robust comparing these two time spots. This further legitimizes to interpret these attitudes as expressions of the prevailing and underlying frame of national identity in respect to cultural diversity.

According to my hypotheses I would expect low compatibility of national and European identity, thus a nationalist approach to the European Union in ethnic countries, a multi-ethnic approach or conditional compatibility in republican framed countries and the highest compatibility of both identities or a post-national approach to the EU in liberal countries. As we can see in Table 2, on average, this is indeed the case. Taken together, the group of liberal countries shows with 70 percent the highest percentage of dual identification, compared to 64 per cent in the republican group and 58 per cent in the ethnic group. Thus there is strong evidence that a relationship between the models of national identity and the compatibility of national and European identity indeed exists.
Table 2: Correlates of dual identification (EU 15, 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of national identity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dual identification (%)</th>
<th>Spearman’s Rho</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>.41**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>.33**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>.21**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>.35**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>.22**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>.27**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>.39**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>.42**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>.30**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (two-sided).
Dual identification: simultaneous attachment to Europe and the nation, Q47: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to a) your city/town/village b) your region c) your country d) Europe?” (“Very attached” and “Fairly attached” to (c) and (d)).

Most citizens who identify with Europe without compromising on their national identity live in liberal countries. In fact, they seem to be accustomed to dual identification with the nation and Europe as both identification patterns covariate strongly. This pattern is most pronounced in Luxembourg, Sweden, Denmark, and Italy. Thus, the expectation regarding liberal countries is quite strongly confirmed. That is, in countries where there is the greatest receptivity to cultural diversity, we find the strongest compatibility between national and European identities. Here is considerable room for a post-national community based on liberal, individualistic values. Yet, the Netherlands are an exception to this rule. Dutch citizens, living in one of the founding states of the EU, show suprisingly little dual identification and thus contradict my hypothesis.

The hypothesis regarding the republican model likewise seems to be fairly well confirmed. Countries classified in this way have, as expected, a mixed record. The republican emphasis on emotional aspects of national belonging and its more communitarian orientation appears to extend to European identity, if only in some cases and in a limited manner. The question of whether or not a republican outlook translates into a high degree of identification with the European Union most probably depends on how the relationship between the nation and the EU is imagined. Since the image of the European Union is not included in this
analysis, we do not know precisely how republican frames are projected onto European identity. But we can assume that a multi-national community for the EU level is imagined or the republican national identity is embedded in a post-national European identity.

The results are least in line with the hypothesis for the group of countries classified as ‘ethnic’ which is internally also the least consistent group. Dual identification of citizens in this group ranges from 67 to 47 per cent. Greece and Great Britain seem to support the hypothesis that ethnic nations are adverse to the prospect of a more multi-cultural political community at the European level. As expected, here correlations are very low, and a nationalist approach to the European Union prevails. Yet, Austrian, German and Belgian citizens with strong national identification do not show resistance towards a European identity but manifest with two thirds relatively high levels of dual identification. The high compatibility in these countries shows that as such, an exclusive framing of national identity does not automatically bring about impasse between national and European level identifications. Yet again it is an open question how the European political community is imagined. It is possible that different codes are applied to the different, i.e., national and European levels. A more liberal code for the European level could embed a more ethnic one on the national level. Another possibility is that the rejection of outsiders is simply delegated to the higher level of the EU. European identification would then be associated with resistance to non-European multiculturalism, while ethnocentrism on the national level would be paired with Eurocentrism on the European level. Citizens would differentiate between different kinds of immigrants, considering those from other EU- countries as insiders, and those from non-EU countries as outsiders. This hypothesis is in line with the findings of Fuchs and Roller (1995) on Eurocentrism (see also McLaren 2001).

**Models of national identity in the old and new member states**

What about the new member states which accessed the European Union in 2004? Does their inclusion change these results? Attitudes towards minorities and the way the national community is conceived of are also surveyed in 2009, though with slightly different questions. The different indicators again form two dimensions of the phenomenon, with one very similarly assessing the extent of acceptance of cultural diversity and the other measuring the inclusion into the national community, this time via the conditions for access (Table 3), thus coming even closer to Koopmans and Statham’s (2000) conceptualisation.
Table 3: Two dimensions of national identity construction (factor analysis, EU27, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acceptance of cultural diversity</th>
<th>F1 loadings</th>
<th>F2 loadings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups are a cause of insecurity</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>-.168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups increase unemployment in our country</td>
<td>.713</td>
<td>-.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of our country</td>
<td>.570</td>
<td>.296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inclusion into national community (access)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To be (NATIONALITY) means…</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to be born in our country</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to exercise citizens’ rights</td>
<td>-.090</td>
<td>.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to share our cultural traditions</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to be brought up in our country</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to have at least one (NATIONALITY) parents</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…to be Christian</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations. Number of cases: 30 343, Missing cases: listwise deletion
For exact wording of the indicators see Appendix 3.
Source: Eurobarometer Survey 71.3, fieldwork 2009.

Constructing indices from these dimensions gives us one which measures how access to the national community is conceived of, either exclusively on the basis of parentage – which comes closest to the ethnic frame – via Christianity and cultural traditions or more inclusively depending whether one was born or brought up in the country or exercises citizens’ rights (the most civic characteristic of national identity building).21 The other, simply additive index captures the degree to which cultural diversity is accepted, thus similarly to the one used above. High acceptance combined with easy access to the national community characterizes liberal countries, less acceptance with still relatively easy access are features of a republican conception of the national identity, and finally hardly any acceptance of cultural diversity and only very restrictive access to the national community is characteristic for ethnic countries.22 Figure 7 visualizes that the 27 member states in 2009 scatter quite differently in this two-dimensional space.

21 For more details on the construction of this index see Appendix.
22 This operationalisation comes even closer to that of Koopmans and Statham (2000: 21).
In contrast to the classification of the 15 old member states in 2003 above, we see several differences with this classification six years later. The different outcome here shows to which extent exclusion/inclusion processes are always relative phenomena. Compared to the new member states, almost all older ones except Greece show relatively more acceptance of cultural diversity and grant easier access to their national community. We do not find a single new member state among the liberal countries; the majority of the population in most of the new member states construct their national identity in republican terms, three of them even in the most exclusive, ethnic way. The not so far experience of more or less fierce struggles of independence in these countries might help to explain why a majority of the population highly value national boundaries and internal homogeneity.

The different picture here also shows that attitudes towards cultural diversity change over time. Using this operationalisation, Germany where a majority of citizens were very reluctant to accept cultural diversity in 2003, is now situated among the republican countries. This change eventually shows that a majority of Germans is reluctantly, but at last accepting that immigrants should be granted easier access to the national community than a strictly ethnic definition allows for. France – classified republican above – is now among the liberal
countries. This change might be understandable given that both an ethnic and a civic conception of national identity are prominent among the French (see Guinaudeau forthcoming). Specific events or heightened political contestation might cause the balance to tip to the other side. In contrast, Italy became more restrictive and is now classified as republican. This trend towards more exclusive attitudes in Italy already became obvious comparing the data for 2000 and 2003 and is certainly related to the increased salience of the issue of immigration in recent years. Great Britain, Belgium and Austria grant easier access to their national community than one had expected given their high expectations of assimilation in 2003, thus moving them from the ethnic group to the republican one. Yet, whether inclusion into the national community is operationalised via assimilation or access, the majority of Greeks also in 2009 construct their national identity in the most exclusive way, locating them in the ethnic group together with Cyprus, Lithuania and Bulgaria.23

Thus, six years later and with a slightly different operationalisation of inclusion into the national community we find less exclusive national identities in Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium and Austria. Interestingly, in all these countries we also see a considerable increase in dual identification (from 65.5 to 80.4 per cent in Germany, 63.2 to 71.6 in France, 42.9 to 47.2 in Great Britain, 67.5 to 76.9 in Belgium, 63.5 to 76.7 in Austria). In contrast, the country which shows a more exclusive pattern, namely Italy, also reveals less dual identification (74.8 in 2003 and 65.3 in 2009). Thus the detected pattern that the way national identity is constructed with respect to cultural diversity influences the extent of dual identification also seems to hold on the level of individual countries.

Table 4: Correlates of dual identification (EU 27, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model of national identity</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dual identification (%)</th>
<th>Spearman’s Rho</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>.11**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>.13**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>.00n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23 Citizens in Romania and Poland also restrict access to their national community quite strongly, yet nevertheless accept cultural diversity more than ethnic countries. In contrast, the majority in Malta does not make access depend on Maltese ancestry, yet they do not accept cultural diversity. Therefore these countries do not fit into the theoretical models underlying the classification proposed here.
The results concerning the degree of dual identification again show – inspite of the different data and classifications – that, on average, in liberal countries national and European identities go most easily hand-in-hand. In this group a remarkable average of 78 per cent of the people identify with both entities, compared to 71 per cent in republican nations and only 61 per cent in ethnic ones. But of course, also in 2009 we find outstanding outliers to the rule. While the group of liberal countries is quite homogeneous and consistent with the hypothesis this time, the other two groups are more diverse. For one, the results for the group of countries classified as republican are more mixed than in 2003, ranging from 86 per cent of dual identification in Slovakia to 42 per cent in Great Britain (72 to 56 per cent in 2003). The Brits are constantly least likely to identify with Europe; their reluctance towards European integration is fairly known also from other issues. But also for almost half of the Latvians both identities do not go together. This is not only due to a relatively little extent of European sense of belonging in Latvia, but also to the fact that compared to all other Europeans, Latvians are among those who identify the least with their nation. This might be caused by the big Russian minority in Latvia – 37 per cent of the population speak Russian as their first language. Yet again, here we do not know how the European identity is constructed and whether this contributes to its incompatibility with the Latvian national identity.

Among Lithuanians, in contrast, it is very widespread, namely among three quarters of the population, to simultaneously identify with the nation and Europe. This contradicts the hypothesis on ethnic countries to which Lithuania can be counted given the predominantly exclusive national identity construction there. Yet, as before we have two options to interpret

---

** The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (two-sided).

Dual identification: simultaneous national and European sense of belonging, QE4: “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are... 1. European, 2. (nationality)” (“To a great extent” and “Somewhat” to 1. and 2.)


---

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>.34**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>.23**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>.25**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>.05n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>.17**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>-.02n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** Ethnic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>.08**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>.00n.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>.19**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>.09**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

** The correlation is significant on the 0.01 level (two-sided).
this result: either European identity is constructed differently than the national one and thus able to embed it, or the definition of the ‘other’ is relegated to third countries and nationalist outlooks are compatible with Eurocentrism. Thus we find in this re-analysis in 2009 with twelve new member states included some different results; overall, however, the similarities prevail. This reinforces my interpretation that the models of national identity in fact influence to a certain extent the compatibility of national and European identities.

Conclusion

A majority of citizens living in the old and new member states of the European Union identify with the nation-state and Europe simultaneously. More often than not, even strong emotional commitment to the nation-state is compatible with strong commitment to Europe. Therefore, European identity should not be conceptualized in zero-sum terms, as if an increase in European identity necessarily decreases one’s loyalty to national or other communities. Europe and the nation are both ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson 1983) and people can feel that they belong to both without compromising either. Thus we can support other scholars who also found that ‘Country first, but Europe, too’ is the dominant outlook in most EU member states (Citrin and Sides 2004: 173), and a large majority of Europeans does not perceive this as contradictory (Risse 2004: 249; see also Marks and Hooge 2003). This allows to conclude that the European polity does not require a ‘demos’ to replace national identities with a European identity (Risse 2004: 270). Rather, national and European identities can co-exist and complement each other. This can take two basic forms, however, namely identification with a multi-national Europe and identification with a post-national Europe (see also Bellamy and Castiglione 1998). For while the structure of the European political community continues to be framed by multi-national arrangements which afford considerable power to individual member states, ‘Europeanness’ is officially equated by the EU with post-national, civic, and liberal values. Boosting European consciousness of such normative commonalities might help foster the emergence of a European demos (Risse 2004: 270). However, these basically universal norms do not offer much guidance where to draw the boundaries of this post-national entity – and the lack of clear boundaries is perceived as one of the major obstacles for identification with Europe. Depending on the political context, Europe’s ‘others’ are perceived in geographical terms (other regions of the world and their culture, politics, religion, etc.), in historical terms (the continent’s own past of militarism and nationalism), or in social terms (the ‘enemy within’, e.g., xenophobia) (ibid.; see also Checkel et al. 2009; Cederman 2001; Fuchs and Roller 1995; Stråth 2004).
This paper focused upon such social constructions of boundaries with reference to internal ‘others’. The way ‘others’ are perceived fundamentally influences the social fabric of a political community and differs in each member state in light of their respective and unique experiences of nation building. The idea of an ethnic nation has strongly exclusive consequences for immigrants and ethnic minorities; a republican national identity, though more accessible, still exerts considerable assimilation pressure on minorities and immigrants; and liberal nations are supposedly most plural and inclusive. These frames of collective identity offer different references to which political actors and citizens can refer in their political discourse and identification processes. They can also draw on each vision’s symbolic repertoire to frame their understanding of European identity as nationalistic, or as a multination national Europe of fatherlands, or as a post-national European community.

The findings show that the considerable differences between countries in the compatibility of national identities with a European identity (however conceived) are indeed partly related to the way ‘us-them’ relations and cultural diversity are perceived within the national community. More liberal attitudes towards national community in a given country, thus greater openness to cultural diversity and immigrants, appear to accompany stronger identification with Europe and greater compatibility between national and European identities. As expected, a national community constructed in a republican way triggers mixed results depending on conditions which might be differently defined in each country. This variety was even more outstanding in 2009 when the 12 new member states were included in the analysis. The group of ethnically framed countries showed the least consistent results with respect to the hypothesis. While the patterns found in Greece constantly confirm the hypothesis that an ethnic frame of national identity is related to little dual identification, a majority in many other countries reject cultural diversity on the national level but national and European identification still go hand in hand. Thus, an ethnic way of framing national identity does not necessarily make it incompatible with European identity.

This is an interesting result demanding further interpretation. One critique which concerns the overall underlying assumption in this paper might suggest that even though the classification utilized here enables us to grasp the dominant way of framing national identity with respect to cultural diversity, these orientations are not the sole and decisive aspect influencing the way individuals identify with political communities. Factors on other levels are also relevant – on the individual level to be sure, but also on the level of political institutions and with regard to meso-level actors and structures (e.g. parties, national
cleavages, and socio-economic structures). Still, the results confirmed that attitudes towards ‘outsiders’ on the national level correlate to a considerable extent with identification processes on the European level. I would therefore opt for two alternative interpretations of those cases in which national community is ethnically framed but national and European identification are compatible: Either the boundary of the collectivity is simply enlarged to include all EU members as belonging to the same ethnic community, with non-EU immigrants as the ‘other’. Or different construction codes are used for the national and EU levels: an ethnic frame for the national, and a more liberal code for the European level. People do not necessarily construct their collective identities similarly on each level. We cannot, however, address this question conclusively without analyzing the way European identity is constructed. The fact that the European community could be envisaged in a variety of ways – being more or less integrated – may be a factor in the inconsistent results. This is probably even more the case if multiple identities have to be conceived of in a ‘marble cake’ model (Risse 2002) in which the various components of an individual’s identity are seen to mesh and blend into one another. If someone’s self-understanding as a German would inherently contain aspects of Europeanness and an Austrian identity could not be disentangled from European identity, both identities and especially their relationship would have to be analysed differently (e.g. Brusis 2003). Depending on which kind of references are then predominant, either more ethnic or more civic ones, the probability of replacing ethnocentrism with Eurocentrism would be increased with considerable negative consequences for non-European immigrants. Yet the most important implication of this idea is that European identity might mean different things for different people.

As such, it is necessary to further analyze how collective identity is actually constructed on the European level and how such a European Union is imagined in relation to the nation-state. Any country specific results would be revealing and lack thereof would even broaden the possibility of further development in the construction of a European identity. One important avenue for investigation is the analysis of perceptions of difference within and beyond the European Union in order to assess the extent of Eurocentrism. Who is the external as well as internal ‘other’ on the European level? Do Europeans differentiate between immigrants from other member states and those from third countries? Fears about the emergence of an exclusive ‘fortress Europe’ are not unfounded. Yet, most of the evidence in this paper as well as in the literature so far underlines the predominance of a post-national

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25 On the individual level, education, age and socio-economic background are certainly relevant here, but apart from demographics also rationalist aspects, personal experiences with Europeans or other attitudes, such as those towards the EU and towards preserving national sovereignty.
civic way of framing European identity. The emergence of such a post-national political identity might be a precondition for a feeling of belonging to the community of human-beings. It might be optimistic, but not unrealistic to expect that people who already combine national and European identity could add further levels, such as an identity as a responsible world citizen. Thus, the empirical reality that European citizens espouse a multiplicity of identities poses difficulties in terms of research design, but opens spaces for the construction of ever larger and multiple identities.
APPENDIX

Figure 6: Dual identification across groups of member states (percentages)

Questions: 1994: Eb 42 Q22: “In the near future do you see yourself as ...? 1. (nationality) only, 2. (nationality) and European, 3. European and (nationality), 4. European only.” Dual identification: (2) and (3) added. 1999: EB 51 Q13, 2004: Eb 62.0 Q47: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to a) your city/town/village b) your region c) your country d) Europe?” (1. Very attached, 2. Fairly attached, 3. Not very attached, 4. Not at all attached) Dual identification: very and fairly attached to nation (c) and Europe (d). 2009: Eb 71.3 QE4: “Thinking about this, to what extent do you personally feel you are… 1. European, 2. (nationality)” (1. To a great extent, 2. Somewhat, 3. Not really, 4. Not at all) Dual identification: feel European and nationality to a great extent and somewhat.

Wording of the indicators used from the Eurobarometer Survey 59.2 (2003):

For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you…
1. tend to agree, 2. tend to disagree, 3. Don’t know
Q.17.1: It is a good thing for any society to be made up of people from different races, religions or cultures
Q.17.3: (COUNTRY’S) diversity in terms of race, religion or culture adds to its strengths
Q.17.4: In order to be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society, people belonging to these minority groups must give up their own culture
Q.17.12: People belonging to these minority groups are so different, they can never be fully accepted members of (NATIONALITY) society
Q.14.5: Legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as the (nationality)
Q.14.9 (OUR COUNTRY) should do more to help immigrants integrate into (NATIONALITY) society
Q.18.10: All immigrants, whether legal or illegal, even those who were born in (OUR COUNTRY), should be sent back to their country of origin
Table 5: Two dimensions of national identity construction (factor analysis, EU15, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q61 IMMIGRANTS: SAME SOCIAL RIGHTS</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q51 ATT TW MINORITIES: AUTHORITIES ACT</td>
<td>.623</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q59 ATT TW MINORITIES: GOOD FOR SOCIETY</td>
<td>.733</td>
<td>-.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q59 ATT TW MINORITIES: ADDS TO STRENGTHS</td>
<td>.684</td>
<td>.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q61 IMMIGRANTS: EASY BECOME NATURALISED</td>
<td>.590</td>
<td>.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q59 ATT TW MINORITIES: GIVE UP CULTURE</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q59 ATT TW MINORITIES: NEVR FULLY ACCEPT</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q61 IMMIGRANTS: SEND BACK INCL CHILDREN</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Rotation converged in 3 iterations.
Source: Eurobarometer Survey Eb 53.0, fieldwork 2000.

Figure 7: Classification of countries (two-dimensional space, EU 15, 2000)
Wording of the indicators used from the Eurobarometer Survey 71.3 (2009)

QE2 People differ in what they think it means to be (NATIONALITY). In your view, among the following, what do you think are the most important characteristics to be (NATIONALITY)? (max. 3 answers)
1 To be Christian
2 To share (NATIONALITY) cultural traditions
3 To be born in (OUR COUNTRY)
4 To have at least one (NATIONALITY) parents
8 To exercise citizens’ rights, for example voting in (OUR COUNTRY)
9 To be brought up in (OUR COUNTRY)

QH1 For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you 1. tend to agree or 2. tend to disagree (3. it depends).
1 People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (OUR COUNTRY)
3 The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity
4 The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY)
6 We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy

Index: Inclusion into national community (access) (Eb 71.3, 2009)

Recode if mentioned:
Qe2_4 Parentage 1 = mentioned \rightarrow -3
Qe2_1 Be christian 1 = mentioned \rightarrow -2
Qe2_2 Cultural Traditions = 1= mentioned \rightarrow -1
Qe2_3 Place of birth 1 = mentioned \rightarrow 1
Qe2_9 Been brought up 1= mentioned \rightarrow 2
Qe2_8 Citizens right 1 = mentioned \rightarrow 3
Andrea Schlenker-Fischer: Unity in diversity?

References


Andrea Schlenker-Fischer: Unity in diversity?


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