The Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX):
A Tool for Assessing the Electoral Inclusiveness of Democracies with Respect to Immigrants
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With its working paper series “Glocal governance and democracy” the Institute of Political Science at the University of Lucerne provides the opportunity to present conceptual ideas, normative debates and empirical findings regarding current political transformations of the modern state system. The term “glocalization” addresses key transformations in respect to levels of governance and democracy – multiplication and hybridization. These features can also be observed in the processes of horizontal interpenetration and structural overlaps among territorial units (transnationalization), in new forms of steering with actors from the private, the public and the non-profit sector (governance), in the interferences among functional regimes and discourses and in emerging new communities and networks between metropolitan centres and peripheries on various scales. One of our core themes is migration and its consequences for development, transnational integration and democracy. A second field of research and discussion is governance and democracy in functionally differentiated and multi-level systems.

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Abstract

Today democratic nation-states are confronted with populations that consist not only of sedentary residents, but also of immigrants. For these democracies to retain full legitimacy, it is imperative that long-term immigrant residents are also included into the demos, so that all those who are subjected to national laws can take part in creating them. Treating this consensus in democratic theory as a normative benchmark, in this paper we develop the nucleus of a quantitative tool for the comparative evaluation of democracies with respect to their electoral inclusiveness toward immigrants. We specify the underlying concept of electoral inclusiveness by taking into account both de jure and de facto meanings as its fundamental dimensions as well as access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement as the two mechanisms leading to inclusion. For measurement, we combine existing indicators such as indices of the inclusiveness of naturalization laws with original indicators such as the percentage of enfranchised non-citizens among all long-term immigrant residents. Aggregated according to our normative framework, the resulting Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX) shows that in most of the 22 European countries under scrutiny the electoral inclusiveness with respect to immigrants is far away from what it should be according to normative theories of democracy. This is true independent of whether we look at the laws and regulations of these democracies or whether we evaluate how well they actually function. Hence, we can diagnose a substantial democratic deficit with respect to electoral inclusion across Europe. However, in both dimensions there are significant differences among European democracies; and we find that alien enfranchisement is not used as a substitute for access to citizenship. We conclude by indicating how our evaluative tool could be expanded or modified.

Keywords: migration, democracy measurement, democracy assessment, democratic theory, political inclusion, electoral inclusion, suffrage, voting rights, access to citizenship, naturalization, alien enfranchisement, concept formation, democratic deficit
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1 Introduction and overview

Today democratic nation-states are confronted with a population that not only consists of sedentary inhabitants, but also of immigrant residents. For these democracies to retain full legitimacy, it is imperative that the latter group is also included into the demos, so that all subjected to national laws can take part in creating them. Treating this consensus in democratic theory as a normative benchmark, in this paper we develop the nucleus of a quantitative tool for the comparative assessment of democracies in respect to the inclusion of immigrants (more precisely: of long-term residents with a migration background), for which we use the shortcut label Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX). Furthermore, we apply this tool in a first step to 22 European democracies and reveal that most countries’ inclusiveness in respect to immigrants is far away from what it should be according to normative theories of democracy, and this is true independently of whether we look at the laws and regulations of these democracies or whether we evaluate how well they actually function in including immigrants.

We want to stress from the beginning that our goal is to evaluate democracies and therefore, we deduce the standards that we apply for the empirical assessment from normative democratic theory. Since there exists no agreed upon single normative theory of democracy, we draw on the most important strands – liberalism and republicanism (including some sub-strings). Furthermore, within our first attempt to develop a normative standard for assessing

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1 This paper stems from a background of research-oriented teaching at University of Lucerne in that it is based on a seminar paper written by Samuel D. Schmid and Andrea Blättler in close collaboration with their supervisor Prof. Dr. Joachim Blatter within the course of their studies, and was then jointly developed further. In the long process leading to this working paper we had the chance to present our project at different occasions and got a lot of helpful feedback and suggestions. In this sense, we especially want to thank (in alphabetical order) Jean-Thomas Arrighi, Rainer Bauböck, Daniel Bochsler, Karima Bousbah, Marc Bühlmann, Sergiu Gherghina, Robert E. Goodin, Reinhard Heinisch, Marc Helbling, Fran Meissner, and Luicy Pedroza. Furthermore we would like to thank Eva Granwehr for her most helpful support in formatting this working paper.

2 The IMIX aims primarily to answer the question how good democracies are in respect to the inclusion of immigrants; the selection of indicators and the conceptual architecture are geared to fulfill this goal. Nevertheless, the data can be used to answer the following question, as well: how much and how do democracies include immigrants? Answers to this question will provide the necessary data for the dependent variable if we are primarily interested in the following questions: how can we explain the different levels of inclusiveness among democracies or the existence of different forms of inclusiveness? Nevertheless, those who want to use the IMIX not for evaluative but for explanatory purposes have to be aware that the way we operationalized and measured “inclusiveness” as well as our way of aggregation might not be the most adequate for them.
the inclusiveness of democracies in respect to immigrants we tried to discover the currently
dominant line of reasoning or theory, although this represents very often a rather conservative
stance to which we do not adhere personally. At the end of the paper, we point to alternative
theories, contexts and arguments which would lead (in most cases) to higher standards or to
different weightings of the components of the index and to higher democratic deficits for the
European nation-states under scrutiny. The reason for this strategy is simple: We can show
that even with a rather conservative normative standard, the quality of most European democ-
racies in respect to the inclusion of immigrants is mediocre, only a few come close to fulfilling
these standards and many are far away from it. From a more progressive point of view, the
democratic deficits of European nation-states are even higher.

The IMIX stands at the crossroads of democracy measurement tools and indices measur-
ing integration and citizenship policies. Whereas for the former there exists a long tradition
(for an overview over the state of the art at the end of the 20th century, see Lauth 2004), for the
latter kind of index building we have witnessed a mushrooming in recent years (see Helbling
2013 for an overview), whereby the databases made available by EUDO³ stand out for their
breadths and depths. Quantitative tools for measuring democracy were originally geared to-
wards assessing the transformation from autocracies to democracies (especially the important
POLITY index⁴), but recently the goals have shifted to a more fine-grained evaluation of the
quality of democracy and towards an assessment of different kinds of democracies. The most
important examples are the Democracy Barometer⁵, a joint project of the Berlin Social Science
Centre (WZB) and the University of Zurich, and the Varieties of Democracy project⁶, a broad
transatlantic endeavor lead by M. Coppedge, S. Lindberg, G. Gerring and J. Teorell.

Index builders in both fields are torn between two goals: they want to create a measur-
ment tool that enables the evaluation of political systems/democracies and, at the same time,
they want to use it for “purely” descriptive purposes with the main goal being the explanation
of the variance between the political systems/democracies. Nevertheless, there are tensions
and trade-offs between the evaluative goal and the explanatory one. For example, for re-

³ http://eudo-citizenship.eu/ (July 23, 2014)
⁵ http://www.democracybarometer.org/about_en.html (July 23, 2014)
searchers who are interested in explaining differences among countries or progress over time, dimensions, components or indicators that show no variation among the cases are “uninteresting”. This is one reason why the fundamental dimension of “inclusion” was excluded from many indices of democratization after exclusions based on class, race and gender were overcome in most democracies, and it thus seemed as if “universal suffrage” had been established in all Western liberal democracies at the end of the 20th Century (see e.g. Coppedge and Reinecke 1991: 51 for a typical defense of ignoring “inclusion” when measuring the extent/quality of democracies and Beckman 2008 for a critique). Within an explanatory model, it does not make a difference whether all countries have a value of 10 or a value of 99 on a 100-point scale - there is no variety among the countries and therefore, this measure is not helpful in explaining processes of inclusion/democratization or different grades/forms of inclusiveness across countries. Within an index that aims to assess the gap between a norm and reality, the message is dramatically different if all countries reach a 99 value in comparison to the situation in which they all score only 10 points. This takes us to the next important difference. Ideally, the endpoints of the scales that we use for explanatory purposes should be defined by empirical minima and empirical maxima; within an evaluative approach, by contrast, they should be defined by a normative standard as the maximum and zero as the minimum.

We proceed in the following way: In the next chapter, we will deduce from liberal and republican theories of democracy why and when democracies ought to electorally include long-term residents with a migrant background. Then we define electoral inclusiveness by distinguishing the concept from related concepts and by marking the boundaries of the concept. Then we move on to deduce its constitutive dimensions and these dimensions’ components from the starting point of the normative theories indicated above. We then operationalize these components by relating them to clusters of observable indicators. Based on these deductive specifications, we can then move up the ladder of abstraction again (Sartori 2009: 118) by defining the aggregation rules based on the conceptual architecture specified in our concept tree. Equipped with the explication of the architecture of our evaluative concept, we can then operationalize it and show the subsequent evaluation results. We conclude by reflecting on the democratic quality of European nation-states in respect to their electoral inclusion of long-term residents with a migrant background and, lastly, indicate how our evaluative concept could potentially be expanded or modified.
2 Why and when to include immigrants?

During its “second coming” (Dunn 2005) within the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states, democracy has come to be understood as the rule of one national demos over a polity demarcated by territorial borders (Bohman 2007: vii). The present realities of strong transnational migration thus present a challenge, for who is the demos, if the population of a democratic polity is no longer largely equivalent with the traditional citizenry, but increasingly composed of both long-term sedentary inhabitants and immigrants? In other words, because, on the one hand the idea that national demoi are naturally given – having the right to naturalize those immigrants fulfilling their criteria – persists, and on the other hand migration across national borders rises, an increasing number of individuals risks falling out of the practice of popular self-rule. In consequence, the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl 1989: 119-131) is showing up with a new urgency for democracies, democratic theory and for those who want to measure and evaluate democracies. Often, it is assumed that excluding immigrants from the right to vote does not hinge on the quality of a national democracy (Song 2009: 607). But, considering that what makes democracy more persuasive and supportable than any other form of political rule (Dahl 2000) is the congruence between the authors and the subjects of rules, this is not only questionable but illogical: Excluding immigrants systematically from political participation undermines the democratic standard that no one ought to be “a mere subject, [and] no one [...] a mere ruler, but all are subjects and rulers at the same time” (Beckman 2009: 84, cf. Dahl 1989: 122). This democratic standard follows from both major strands of democratic theory: liberalism – arguably the currently dominant approach (Dryzek, Dunleavy 2009: 18) – and republicanism.

At the heart of a liberal understanding of democracy lies the principle of personal autonomy (Held 1995: 115), according to which every person “should be assumed to be the best judge of his or her own good or interests” (Dahl 1989: 100). From this assumption of autonomy follows another one: That all human beings are, at least in this sense, equal. Building on

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7 Of course, also the period before the First World War had seen strong flows of migration (Beckman 2012: 36). Yet, it is only today that strong transnational migration represents a challenge to democracy, because the earlier “flows of migration took place before the first wave of democratisation had even begun [and thus...] migration could simply not have been a democratic problem in those times” (Beckman 2012: 38).
the principles of autonomy and equality, liberalism makes a bold statement for our case: “Every adult subject to a government and its laws must be presumed to be qualified as, and has an unqualified right to be, a member of the *demos*” (Dahl 1989: 127). Thus, “[t]he citizen body in a democratically governed state must include all persons subject to the laws of that state except transients and persons proved to be incapable of caring for themselves” (Dahl 2000: 78).

Indeed, if all individuals can judge their own good or interests best and these interests are of equal weight, then it is unacceptable if some individuals cannot take part in the decision-making which affects them. Since no one can judge better what is in the interest of an individual than this individual herself, no one else than herself can guarantee to adequately voice this interest. And even if we would put this principled concern away and assume for a moment that the interests of an individual without the right to voice those could, in most situations, be adequately expressed by another individual, we are still not off the hook: Because even if her interests could eventually be voiced by someone else, the individual that *has* these interests would not (have to) be taken equally serious by those with democratic decision-making power as individuals who can voice their *own* interests – for the simple reason that individuals without the right to voice their interests are not potential voters. Their interests do therefore not matter for those wishing to stay in or get into power (Dahl 2000: 77). Therefore, from a liberal perspective, an individual who is subjected to political rule must be included politically because only then can she secure her autonomy.

From a republican perspective on democratic theory two complementary arguments call for the political inclusion of immigrants: On the one hand, only those included can be part of the *political self-determination via participation*; and on the other hand, only those included are recognized as equals and thus not dominated. Let us shortly elaborate both arguments. Drawing on Aristotle’s concept of the nature of human beings as *zoon politikon*, (neo-)classic republicanism emphasizes the value of political participation for individual self-realization and for collective self-determination. From this perspective, political participation is not merely an instrument to reach freedom. Rather, since a human being is by nature a political animal, it is in need of the possibility to act politically; thus, political participation is intrinsically valuable. In this vain, Benjamin Barber argues that democracy is not merely a form of political rule, but rather a “way of living” (Barber 2003: 118). Immigrant residents thus need to be included politically, for without the possibility to participate, they do not only – as liberal or neo-republican accounts would have it – forego a means to protect their freedom, but are deprived of the
possibility of human beings to live a humane life per se. And this, in turn, would undermine the capacity of a community of human beings to determine itself; that is, if immigrants are excluded from the political community, this community’s self-determination as a democracy, built on active citizenship, is critically weakened.

A neo-republican point of view, drawing on republican Rome rather than on ancient Athens, is more concerned with the statuses or structures which ensure individuals’ and collectivities’ non-domination (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 12, 16) than with the intrinsic value of political participation. From this perspective, for a democratic order to be legitimate, it must not only guarantee the freedom to pursue individual interests in the absence of coercion, as the liberal reasoning goes. For even if an individual does not directly face coercive interference with her actions at a certain point in time, she might still not be free, but rather dominated by another party who possesses the capacity to arbitrarily interfere with her choices, but benevolently chooses not do so at the moment. Freedom as non-domination requires the assurance of “some sphere or range of choices within which we need not fear others exercising arbitrary power or control over us [...] This assurance, in turn, will be sufficiently resilient only when that protected sphere does not depend on the mere will or pleasure of others – that is, when it is protected by stable institutions that no political actor or small set of actors can upset unilaterally” (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 17). Therefore, the only way those living in a democracy can counter the danger of domination looming in their midst is for them to mutually recognize each other as equals. This is expressed by an equal status including all its bearers into “the joint exercise of these powers and capacities” (Bohman 2008: 199). Thus, also immigrants must carry such an equal status because elsewise they cannot be free, but will always live under the domination of those with this status who thereby exercise what is “the most common form of tyranny in the history of humankind”, namely “the political rule of citizens over non-citizens” (Walzer 1983: 62). Because the institution of citizenship secures and expresses the recognition of an equal status, “genuine freedom from domination requires the extension of equal citizenship rights to everyone” (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 17).

We can thus deduce a democratic imperative for democracies to politically include immigrants who are subjected to their political rule from the two main strands of normative democratic theory. Yet, almost nobody favors an unconditional inclusion of all people who live on the territory of a democratic state at a certain point of time, because such a position would face the “obvious objection [...] that it implies extending the vote to tourists and transients,
which many regard as absurd” (Beckman and Erman 2012: xiv). When, then, should immigrants be included?8

As we have seen above, liberal democratic theory holds that every individual must be regarded as the best judge of her own good or interest and therefore “every adult subject to the laws of the state should be considered to be sufficiently well qualified to participate in the democratic process of governing that state” (Dahl 2000: 76). Thus, since the liberal stance focuses exclusively on the individual, the only acceptable qualifications to the imperative of inclusion are that this individual is autonomous (that is, not mentally deprived) and that she bears the consequences of her decisions (Dahl 1989: 129). To operationalize the latter qualification, liberals (in contrast to libertarians) would not only draw on subjective intentions but also take some objective indication for judging the probability that an immigrant will face the long-term consequences of her decisions into account. The most practical means to do so is to take the time somebody has already resided in a country as a proxy for the probability that she will stay there in the future. Thus, liberals could accept that only those immigrants get the full set of political rights who have been living in a country for at least one or two years, but they would not accept a much longer residency requirement, since from a liberal perspective the problem of over-inclusion weights less than the problem of under-inclusion: Whereas the bearing of future consequences is a matter of probability and partiality, the current subjection to the law of the state is certain and comprehensive.

Communitarian thinkers would object that liberalism underestimates the importance of a stable and culturally grounded political community. Focusing on the practice of political participation rather than on political rights, they argue that a functioning democracy needs members who identify with the polity and are loyal to it. Furthermore, they assume that the identification with and the loyalty to the polity are based on a feeling of belonging to a socio-cultural community. Therefore, they argue that the political inclusion should take place after immi-

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8 In principle, the question must be stated in more general terms: Under which conditions should immigrants be included? There are two ways by which democracies can try to ensure that newly included citizens fulfil the qualifications which seem necessary from the various theories of democracy: naturalization tests and a required time of residency. In the following, we focus on the latter. In the final chapter, we indicate that including tests would certainly enhance the quality of the IMIX but would be very demanding, since liberal, republican and communitarian theories of democracy would accept divergent kinds of tests (if at all) and the analysis of existing citizenship tests is a demanding task in itself (see Michalowski 2011).
grants are culturally and socially assimilated. These processes of assimilation take time, which legitimizes democracies to prescribe a rather long time of residency on their territory pre inclusion.

Both republican strands that we introduced lead to a position in-between liberalism and communitarianism. (Neo)classic republicans who focus on political participation both as an intrinsic good allowing human beings to live a humane life as active citizens and as a precondition for the capacity of the democratic community to determine itself, face some trade-offs. Both, individual self-realization and the capacity for collective self-determination could be strengthened through an early inclusion of immigrants, in principle. But when we acknowledge that political participation demands some effort by the individuals and that we can expect “good” or productive participation only from those who are familiar with the political system and who follow the political debate, it becomes apparent that immigrants need some time to fulfill these demands. Liberal republicans would focus on the ability of the immigrants, which leads to the conclusion that they should have been in a country for about the time of one legislature in order to get familiar with the political process. Republicans with a communitarian leaning would put more emphasis on the necessary identification with a polity as a precondition for turning the right to participate into actual deeds. Although we cannot identify a clear-cut deduction to a specific time of residence here, it seems clear that neither an immediate inclusion nor a very long waiting time can be justified.

Also the neo-republican approach is faced with trade-offs when determining a non-arbitrary time of residence before immigrants should be included. In a first take, it seems obvious that providing immigrants immediately with citizenship status or with the right to vote is the best way to avoid their domination by the sedentary population. Nevertheless, as soon as we take into account that current day migration is versatile, the conclusion is not so evident anymore: Of course, an important group of migrants migrates to escape hopeless or even dreadful conditions in the home country and is in a vulnerable position in the country of residence because they cannot easily go back; but there is also a growing class of wealthy and mobile people who use the growing rights to free movement in order to pick their country (or countries) of residence in order to maximize their personal well-being. Within the context of the “competition state” (Cerny 2009) mobile wealthy or “talented” people are in a very favorable position vis-à-vis sedentary people and national communities. To avoid unjustified domination of national communities and sedentary people by such a class of wealthy mobile peo-
ple, a more restrictive approach to the political inclusion of immigrants seems to be in order and in terms of non-domination across borders it is especially problematic if states “sell” their citizenship status to wealthy people since this undermines the ability of other states to legitimately govern their members (e.g. by collecting taxes). Nevertheless, all kinds of people – also the wealthy – need to have a status which secures them against domination and can thus not be politically excluded if they have settled in a country for some time, paid taxes and respected the laws of this country.

With regard to the question when immigrants should be politically included we can thus deduce a general consensus that some temporal requirements or permanence in respect to residency should be accepted as necessary condition for inclusion, but detect a variety of stances in respect to the exact time one has to live in a country in order to qualify as long-term resident. We consider a required residency period of five years (i.e. a long legislative cycle) not only as a decent compromise among strongly divergent normative positions (balancing the radical liberal demand for immediate inclusion and the radical communitarian demand for full-fledged assimilation), but also as a time span that takes more moderate liberal and republican concerns into account: after this time there is a high probability that the migrant will stay in the country and we can expect familiarity with the political system. This condition should satisfy all those who fear the inclusion of ‘incompetent’ or ‘irresponsible’ members into the demos, whilst it is the absolute maximum for those who are concerned with the autonomy and non-domination of immigrants.

Overall, we propose as a normative standard, indeed as a democratic imperative, that immigrants have to be included into the national demos after five years of residency on the national territory. This standard balances not only the rights and interests of immigrants with the rights and interests of the sedentary members of a territorially demarcated political community, but represents a decent and well justified compromise among the major normative theories of democracy.
3 Defining the basic-level concept of the IMIX as *electoral inclusiveness with respect to long-term immigrants*

As a first step in the process of forming the concept that represents the theoretical backbone of the IMIX as a quantitative tool for evaluating democracies we define the linguistic elements of our concept at the basic level with reference to the relevant semantic field, the goals and the normative standards that we developed upfront (Sartori 1970: 1041 and Sartori 2009: 124; see also Blatter and Blume 2008: 343). In addition, we point to the framing effects that emerge with the use of specific terminology in describing the results of an evaluation.

The most central notion is that of *inclusiveness*. This term indicates that we are concerned with immigrants’ access to the political community, that is, the inclusion into the *demos*. We develop our concept in the context of democratic theory and with an eye on existing tools for measuring and evaluating the democratic qualities of political systems. In this context, ‘inclusiveness’ is the established term to refer to access to the political community (most importantly: Dahl 1989: ch. 9). In contrast, the terms *integration*, *incorporation*, or *assimilation* are widely used within the citizenship literature (cf. Morales 2011: 20-3); they go beyond what we evaluate in that they refer not only to access to the *political* community but also to socio-economic and cultural aspects.

It is important to realize that we deliberately focus on the inclusion of immigrants into the *political* community. One might argue that the actual inclusion into the political community is dependent on the socio-economic integration or the cultural incorporation of immigrants and we are aware of the debate on a potential trade-off between immigration and naturalization policies (many assume that an open immigration policy is coupled empirically with a more exclusive naturalization policy and vice versa; e.g. Miller 2008: 377, Bader 2012), but, in line with all normative theorists of democracy that we are aware of, we think that the inclusion of resident immigrants into the *demos* should be unconditional: it should neither depend on socio-economic integration nor on a specific form of cultural incorporation (assimilation); and democracies have a moral obligation to include immigrants into the *demos* (by naturalization or by providing alien voting rights) after they have accepted them as legal immigrants. From a normative point of view, it is clear that democracies might have a rather high level of discretion in respect to their immigration policy, but they have a much lower level of discretion in respect to how they should treat those they accepted as legal residents and members of their
One could even argue that in times of migration one of the core differences between autocracies and democracies is that in principle democracies do not accept “immigration without inclusion” (for an example how much that formula characterizes the Gulf states see Fargues 2011).⁹

As a starting point for developing a measurement tool for evaluating the inclusion of immigrants we focus on voting as the classic mechanism that secures that the preferences of the members of the demos are taken into account in the process of political decision-making. Of course, other mechanisms such as participating in demonstrations or contributing to the public discourse are also seen as important, especially in participatory or deliberative theories of democracy. Nevertheless, in line with the Varieties of Democracy project¹⁰, we perceive the electoral form of participation and inclusion as central for the functioning of a democracy within contemporary nation-states.¹¹ Thus, to the notion of inclusion we add the adjective electoral. Logically, if one has voting rights¹², one is electorally included – if not, one is electorally excluded. Nonetheless, electoral inclusion has to be conceptualized as a matter of degree: one can be more or less electorally included. For instance, one may be granted voting rights only on a sub-national level. In consequence, we are dealing with a continuous conceptual continuum (Goertz 2006: 30-35).

Next, we need to define the target group on which we focus when evaluating inclusiveness. As noted above, there is much evidence that for established democracies migration is

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⁹ There is a second justification for not taking into account the rules and realities that characterize further boundary crossings: admission/access to the territory of a country (immigration policies), access to the social community and to the economic system (integration policies) and cultural acceptance (incorporation policies either geared towards assimilation or towards mutual recognition). Not including these aspects makes it possible to measure them independently and to test the empirical relationships between immigration, integration, incorporation and inclusion policies and practices. Whereas this kind of argumentation takes center stage within an explanatory approach to democracy measurement, in our evaluative approach, it is only secondary.

¹⁰ The centrality of “electoral democracy” within the VoD project show up most clearly in the visualization of the Kellogg foundation (see http://kellogg.nd.edu/projects/vdem/; April 19, 2014)

¹¹ Since electoral inclusion is seen as a necessary but not sufficient for political inclusion in almost all theories of democracy, in chapter 11 we will point to necessary extensions of the IMIX in order to make it a full-fledged tool for measuring the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of democracies.

¹² We focus only on voting rights (i.e. active suffrage) and leave out the aspect of candidacy rights (i.e. passive suffrage), since the latter is more important for representation rather than inclusion in a very basic sense.
currently the most important challenge for solving the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl 1989) in a normatively satisfying way. Therefore, we focus on migrants and limit our attention to the electoral inclusion of immigrants in the country of residence because the demand for including this group – in contrast to the demand for including emigrants or affected externals – is in principle undisputed in normative democratic theory. On a more specific level we end up with the rather technical definition of the group of people that we are concerned with: \textit{long-term residents with a migrant background}. This is because more common terms do not fully capture what is necessary in order to be in accordance with the theoretical demand. The term \textit{immigrant} covers only people who have moved across the borders of nation-states themselves, but we also have to take into account those who are descendants of migrants. Many states deny the latter group of people full political rights although they are born in the country and have lived there their entire life. In labeling our measurement tool, we stick to the more common term, but on a more technical level, we use the more precise expression. Another more common term – \textit{resident aliens} – does also not cover the entire population that that has to be taken into account when we want to evaluate the inclusiveness of democracies in times of migration. We are not only concerned with non-citizens but also with those people who migrated themselves or are descendants of migrants, but have gained or will gain access to citizenship via birthright or naturalization.

These reflections lead to the decision that we use the shorthand term \textit{resident immigrants} to denote the group we are concerned with. Furthermore, we take up the result of our discussion on when immigrants have to be electorally included, and define \textit{long-term residence} as a minimum of uninterrupted residency of five years. We complete the definition of our target group by two further decisions that reflect our rather conservative approach in this first attempt to measure the inclusiveness/exclusiveness of democracies. First, we bracket the question of whether democracies should also include children, stick to the traditional assumption that only adults should be included (Dahl 1989: 127), and we apply a minimum age of 18\textsuperscript{13} when we calculate the number of residents who should be included. Second, neither in the evaluation of the regulation nor in the calculations of the excluded we take illegal residents into account, for the pragmatic reason that there are no valid statistics for this group.

\textsuperscript{13} We apply this threshold across all countries for reasons of simplicity, even if some deviate from it.
At the very end of this definitional step in concept formation, we take head on one important aspect that becomes much more apparent in an evaluative approach to concept formation, although it is certainly not irrelevant in explanatory approaches. For a comprehensive understanding of a concept we do not only need precise definitions of each linguistic element of the concept, but also a reflection on the *framing* effects that come with the terminology that we use in describing the results gained by applying the measurement/evaluation tool. Within an evaluative approach to concepts/indices we are interested in the relation between the empirical values and the normative standards (and not in the variation of the empirical values between the cases as in an explanatory approach) and this relation can be described in distinct terminology. Logically, we can describe a meager result either as a high level of exclusiveness or as a low level of inclusiveness. What might be even more important than the effect of such an “equivalency framing”\(^\text{14}\) is the more or less deliberate use of “issue framing” when presenting results.\(^\text{15}\) We can equate a low level of inclusiveness with a low quality of democracy or with a strong democratic deficit. These terms point to different discourses and have different connotations: whereas the former term (quality) has come to be used within debates on the democratization of nation-states, the latter term (deficit) is usually employed vis-à-vis supranational forms or institutions of decision-making (especially the European Union). The findings of the IMIX are useful for both discourses. Within the first discourse, the IMIX point to the fact that many established democracies are still quite exclusive. For the second discourse, where it is common to claims that the EU and other international or supranational organizations suffer from a democratic deficit, we want to highlight that national polities have quite substantial democratic deficits, as well.\(^\text{16}\) In consequence, we will present the findings in two versions. Within the text, figure 2-8 illustrate the results within an “inclusiveness” frame, whereas in the Appendix II we present the same results in a “democratic deficit” frame.

\(^{14}\) Stronger forms of “equivalency framing” include distinct designs of tables. In our example, we could present the levels of exclusiveness instead of the levels of inclusiveness and – maybe even more effectual – present the level of exclusiveness as bars that point into the negative direction.

\(^{15}\) For a definition of “equivalency framing” and “issue framing” and its effect in the context of immigration, see Merolla, Ramakrishnan and Haynes (2013).

\(^{16}\) Furthermore, it is often claimed that the EU does not only have a democratic deficit in respect to its supranational level, but that it has also a negative influence on the functioning of national democracies. The IMIX brings to the fore that membership in the European Union actually reduces the exclusiveness of national democracies in respect to immigrants, since it demands from its member states to provide voting rights on the local and the supranational level for all EU citizens.
4 The two meanings/dimensions of electoral inclusiveness: 
De jure and de facto

Having defined the basic level of our concept as the electoral inclusiveness of long-term immigrant residents, we can now specify the secondary level of this concept, that is, its constitutive dimensions (Goertz 2006: 6). Within an evaluative approach this involves answering the question of what it means if we diagnose that a polity has a high quality in respect to the electoral inclusion of immigrant residents. There are two distinct meanings:

a. The de jure meaning: A democracy has a high quality in respect to the electoral inclusion of immigrant residents if the legal norms that the democracy has given itself in order to regulate the inclusion into the demos are in line with the imperative that we deduced from normative theories of democracy.

b. The de facto meaning: A democracy has a high quality in respect to the electoral inclusion of immigrant residents if the democratic system actually functions as it should according to the imperative we deduced from normative theories of democracy.

Using these two meanings of electoral inclusiveness for the evaluation of democracies has complementary advantages and disadvantages:

a. Looking at the rules which regulate the inclusion of immigrant residents has the advantage that it involves measuring only what is entirely determined by explicit democratic decision-making of the democracy under scrutiny: The de jure meaning of electoral inclusiveness expresses the will of a political community to be inclusive. Yet, measuring a specific set of rules and regulations has the disadvantage that it might miss the actual functioning of the democracy; e.g. when it captures only the rules in law and not the rules in use. For example, a country might have very lenient naturalization regulations, but the naturalization rate is still very low because there are costs and hurdles beyond the citizenship law (compulsory military service is an example for a cost that is external to the naturalization regulations but still very formal and explicit, but hurdles can also be much more informal, e.g. the attitude by which autochthonous residents meet immigrants; cf. Howard 2009: 24).

b. Looking at the realities, that is, how much inclusion actually takes place has the advantage that it captures the actual functioning of the democracy under scrutiny in respect to its inclusiveness towards immigrant residents. However, the reality of inclusiveness might be strongly influenced by factors that cannot be attributed to the will of the political community under scrutiny. For example, a country might have a low citizenship rate and a low naturalization rate (for definitions of these two terms, see below), and therefore the functioning of its democracy is seriously undermined in that many residents who are subject to the law of the country are not included in the process of making these laws. Neverthe-
less, this unsatisfactory situation might be much more due to external factors (e.g. geographic proximity to countries with a security or an economic crisis or the non-acceptance of dual citizenship by sending countries) than to the rules that regulate the inclusion of immigrants.

Due to fact that the measurement of the two meanings of electoral inclusiveness has complementary strengths and weaknesses, both should be undertaken in order to arrive at a normatively adequate judgment of the democratic quality of a polity. We therewith echo the practice of the two most recent democracy measurement tools: the Democracy Barometer and the Varieties of Democracy project. The leaders of the Democracy Barometer have explicitly stressed their attempts to complement *de jure* indicators by *de facto* indicators (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 131) and have been applauded for doing so (Jäckle et al. 2013: 112). Many of the indicators that we find in the VoC project attempt to capture the realities in contrast to, and potentially complementing, the indicators that depict the formal rules that exist in the countries under investigation (Coppedge et al. 2014: 6).

Nevertheless, in contrast to these democracy measurement tools, we take up the distinction between *de jure* and *de facto* not on the indicator level, but on the level of the constitutive dimensions of our concept. We thereby emphasize that for an evaluative approach to democracy measurement, the *de jure* and *de facto* dimensions represent two fundamentally distinct answers to the question of what it means when we talk about a high level of inclusiveness or democratic quality. In consequence, if we want to assess democracies comprehensively, we should treat the two meanings/dimensions as necessary conditions. If we treat the normative and the functionalist understandings as necessary conditions, we take into account both, the intention of the political community and the actual practice in the country, when we answer the question how good the democracy is in including immigrants. The functionalist *de facto* dimension alone misses the aspect of responsibility, which is not acceptable from a normative point of view; the normative *de jure* dimension, on the other hand, is in danger of overlooking whether the regulations have (the intended) consequences. Therefore, we treat the two kinds of meanings as distinct dimensions that are both necessary for a comprehensive assessment of the quality of democracies in respect to the electoral inclusion of immigrant residents.

Calling both the *de jure* and *de facto* dimension necessary conditions for judging the inclusiveness of a democracy does not yet determine the rule of aggregation, since there are rules which lay in-between full non-substitutability and full substitutability (Goertz 2006: 53-
Within an evaluative approach to concept formation, questions of substitutability or compensation have to take into account aspects of causality and aspects of responsibility. This will show up when we reflect on the relationship between the two dimensions in the following, the goal of which is a theoretically justified rule of aggregation.

First, we address the question whether a high de jure inclusiveness should be allowed to compensate for a low de facto inclusiveness. In order to reach an answer, we start by assuming that there are three potential causes for a low de facto inclusiveness:

a. It is the result of a low de jure inclusiveness which represents the explicit will of the political community to be exclusive; logically, low de jure inclusiveness cannot compensate for the low de facto inclusiveness. Therefore, such a situation is not relevant for the question.

b. It is the result of other formal and informal rules within the polity through which the high(er) de jure inclusiveness is counteracted and undermined; in this case, the high de jure inclusiveness should not be allowed to compensate for the low de facto inclusiveness, since it masks an underlying unwillingness to include.

c. It is the result of conditions lying outside the influence of the political community; in this case, a high de jure inclusiveness should be allowed to compensate for the low de facto inclusiveness since it expresses the strong but nevertheless unsuccessful attempt to include immigrants.

In an ideal world of evaluation, one would have to analyze the situation of each country in order to come up with a fair and evidence-based answer to our question. If this is not possible, what is the next best solution? We start with the assumption that some part of the reason for a low de facto inclusiveness always lies beyond the influence of the polity under scrutiny; therefore, some compensation is justified in principle. But if the de facto inclusiveness is very low, it is very likely that this has not only been caused by external factors (case c) but also by internal ones (case b). In consequence, the compensation allowed by a high de jure inclusiveness should be lower the lower the de facto inclusiveness is.

We now turn to the question whether a high de facto inclusiveness should be allowed to compensate for a low de jure inclusiveness? Once again, we start by assuming that there are three potential causes for a low de jure inclusiveness:

a. It is the result of the fact that the political community has decided to stay exclusive despite of a high problem pressure/social demand which shows up in a low de facto inclusiveness; but low de facto inclusiveness cannot compensate for low de jure inclusiveness, so once again this case is not relevant for the question.
b. It is the result of the fact that the political community has decided to stay exclusive despite of a medium problem pressure/social demand which shows up in a medium \textit{de facto} inclusiveness; in this case, the medium \textit{de facto} inclusiveness should not be allowed to compensate for the low \textit{de jure} inclusiveness since the political community deliberately decided to ignore the social demand or the democratic imperative.

c. It is the result of the fact that a low problem pressure/social demand which shows up in a high \textit{de facto} inclusiveness has not triggered a reform of the rules that characterized the \textit{de jure} inclusiveness; in this case, a high \textit{de facto} inclusiveness should be allowed to compensate for the low \textit{de jure} inclusiveness since the latter cannot be interpreted as a deliberate decision against the electoral inclusion of immigrants.

Again, we start with a rather generous assumption, which is in this case that a certain part of the explanation for a low \textit{de jure} inclusiveness lays in the time lag between an increasing problem pressure and the rules that are developed in order to deal with the problem; therefore compensations are justified in principle. But if the \textit{de jure} inclusiveness is very low, it is very likely that this is not only the result of a missing problem pressure/social demand (case c) but also an expression of the will to stay exclusive (case b). In consequence, the compensation allowed by a high \textit{de facto} inclusiveness should be lower the lower the \textit{de jure} inclusiveness is.

Overall, both dimensions should be allowed to compensate each other's weaknesses, but the lower the quality of the \textit{de jure} or the \textit{de facto} inclusiveness is, the less should it be allowed to be compensated by a stronger quality of the other dimension. In other words, the closer one dimension of inclusiveness approaches zero, the less the other dimension should be able to compensate it, which means that the more the overall value of inclusiveness should get to zero. The mathematical operator that translates these considerations into the corresponding aggregation rule is the geometric mean (Munck 2009: 50).

5 The two means to regulate/pathways to reach electoral inclusion: Access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement

The third level of our concept consists of the two means by which democracies regulate the electoral inclusion of immigrants (the \textit{de jure} dimension of inclusiveness), which represent at the same time the pathways by which immigrants (or their descendants) actually reach such an inclusion (the \textit{de facto} dimension of inclusiveness): access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement.
By citizenship we refer to the formal status that is granted by a state to an individual either through birthright or naturalization. Since all countries grant all their adult citizens (with minor exceptions, e.g., criminal disenfranchisement; see Paxton et al. 2003) voting rights, access to citizenship is the first pathway to electoral inclusion. The other means by which states can provide electoral inclusion for immigrants is by introducing voting rights for legally resident non-citizens. In order to judge the *de jure* inclusiveness of the two pathways, we have to assess the citizenship and naturalization rules as well as the rules that regulate the enfranchisement of aliens, i.e., the distribution of rights as specified in law. The assessment of the *de facto* inclusion can focus on the corresponding distribution of rights in the actual populations, such as the *citizenship rate* (which indicates how many long-term residents of a country are electorally included as citizens), and the *naturalization rate* (which indicates which percentage of the immigrant population is naturalized per year). In order to get a comprehensive picture of the *de facto* inclusiveness, these indicators have to be complemented by indicators that measure how many residents, which are not yet included through access to citizenship, are included via alien enfranchisement.

We will provide further specifications of these indicators in the chapter on measurement, but first we have to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the two pathways from the point of view of normative theories in order to justify how we aggregate and weigh the two means/pathways both in the *de jure* and in the *de facto* dimension. In contrast to the two dimensions on the second level of our concept, each of the two means/pathways is not a necessary, but an individually sufficient condition for reaching *de jure* or *de facto* inclusiveness, respectively. In other words, a high *de jure* inclusiveness can either be reached via rules that provide fast and easy access to citizenship or by rules which grant alien voting rights on the different levels of the polity. Also, a democracy can reach a high level of *de facto* inclusiveness either by having, or moving towards, a high level of congruence between its non-transient residents and its citizens or by ensuring a high congruence between the resident population and its *demos* by granting alien voting rights extensively. However, whereas the goal to reach a high *de jure* or *de facto* inclusiveness can in principle be reached through each means/pathway, the two means/pathways themselves are valued differently by divergent normative theories of democracy. In consequence, we have to complement an *additive* aggregation rule with a weighting scheme that depends on the theory of democracy that we apply. In this section we draw on currently dominant and rather conservative strands within liberal and
Joachim Blatter, Samuel D. Schmid, and Andrea C. Blättler: 
The Immigrant Inclusion Index (IMIX)

republican theories of democracy for justifying our weighting scheme. In consequence, access to citizenship will be given a higher weight. Later on (in section eleven), we will show that more recent and progressive strands provide arguments for a higher valuation (and thus weighting) of alien enfranchisement.

Currently dominant strands of democratic theory provide a set of arguments for the claim that inclusion via access to citizenship is better for the functioning of a democracy than employing the pathway of alien enfranchisement: First, a liberal approach focuses on the set of rights that immigrant residents gain through the two means of inclusion. Whilst both pathways lead to electoral rights, citizenship not only renders the electoral right an immigrant gets non-reversible: once a citizen, one does not lightly lose the right to vote in the respective country. Much more, the citizenship pathway carries the enormous advantage that it implies the right to stay in and to come back to the country that has granted citizenship. In other words, being a citizen means that one cannot be expelled (Bosniak 2008: 127-128). In consequence, citizenship provides a broader set of rights than alien enfranchisement and therewith more strongly enhances the security of both the voting rights as well as the individual security of immigrants more strongly than alien enfranchisement. And with more individual security comes a higher degree of individual autonomy in general, but also in the electoral process: An individual with a secure legal status is likely to be freer from fear and thus freer in its conduct of voting.

Second, from a classical republican point of view, rights must be matched by duties. Furthermore, individual and collective self-determination have to be combined. Whereas both access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement are able to reduce the existing gap between the duties that immigrants face (especially obeying the law and paying taxes) and the limited political rights to influence these laws and taxes, providing legally resident aliens with a special right to vote bears a higher risk that this right is not matched by corresponding duties (e.g. serving in the military or as an assistant in elections) than granting the full citizenship status to the immigrant residents. Arguably, inclusion through naturalization represents an expression of loyalty from the side of the immigrant and it demands an effort from both the immigrant and the host society. As such, it secures much better than alien enfranchisement that the new members of the polity actually participate. That is, from a motivational point of view, citizenship stimulates those holding it to act as members of the polity because they have been socialized into the political community within the socializing process of naturalization. Such so-
cialized citizens can be expected to strive for serving the common good together with their compatriots, rather than to stay passive residents with a special right to vote. A classical republican point of view thus expects citizenship to lead to higher levels of participation from the immigrants and to more commitment to the polity than alien enfranchisement could.

Third, neo-republicans stress that citizenship is not only a set of rights but also a status that provides the necessary structural underpinning to avoid domination: If immigrants are granted citizenship they do not only have the same set of rights as autochthonous residents do, but they are formally recognized not only as equal but also as same members of the political community. Alien enfranchisement, in contrast, amounts to a benevolent citizenry granting a right to the immigrants who thereby gain the possibility to protect themselves against interference, but are still far from being free from domination: The (formerly benevolent) citizens could change their mind and take these special rights away again, leaving the immigrants with no chance to remain electorally included (Lovett and Pettit 2009). Being recognized as same and equal, by contrast, can be expected to lead to a sense of empowerment and identification on the side of the immigrant, which, in turn, provides the motivational basis for them to participate as full members of the political community both in terms of the quantity and the quality of their participation: Whilst an alien voting right motivates its bearers to act in a way so as to secure themselves from interference, being a citizen means that political participation is the key process in which one can enact oneself as a human being free that is from domination.

Lastly, a neo-classical republican point of view is primarily concerned with strong political participation as the crucial fundament of a well-functioning democracy. As we have seen, the arguments in favor of political inclusion of immigrant residents via citizenship all carried a motivational aspect providing a stronger stimulus for political participation than an alien voting right could: The practice of voting can be enhanced by a sense of security, by a sense of duty, by socialization through the naturalization process, and by a sense of being recognized as a full – that is, same and equal – member of the national community. Overall, these arguments bolster the conclusion that access to citizenship is the more important and better means/pathway to electoral inclusiveness than alien enfranchisement. Therefore, in our (conservative) conceptual scheme, we will give it a higher weight when aggregating the components both in the de jure and in the de facto dimension.
6 Operationalization

In this section, we explain the operationalization of our components. It should be noted that, in the context of our evaluative approach, this ‘challenge of measurement’ (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 15-22) consists of the delineation of indicators that are sufficient to numerically depict the components in a way that is consistent with our normative framework. In order to fulfill the established criteria of validity, reliability, and transparency (Munck and Verkuilen 2002: 8), in the following we lay out the data sources we used and decisions we took in detail.

For measuring the component "de jure access to citizenship" we are in the lucky situation to be able to draw on the EUDO Citizenship Law Indicators (CITLAW) introduced by Vink and Bauböck (2013). This database provides the most comprehensive and most fine-grained information on the de jure situation of European countries in respect to citizenship laws. From this database we select three specific sub-components which include the legal provisions explicitly aiming at the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants and their descendants: (1) the territorial inclusion via citizenship acquisition by birth, which is measured by the composite indicator for jus soli; (2) the acquisition by naturalization, which is measured by specifically weighing and averaging indicators for ordinary naturalization and special naturalization; and (3) the possibility for immigrants to obtain multiple citizenship. The resulting component of de jure access to citizenship is calculated as the simple arithmetic mean of these three sub-components, since we find no normative reason to assign more weight to any of them. Since the basic coding scheme uses a 5-point scale resembling a fuzzy-set, the measurement level of

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17 The indicators for ordinary naturalization receive a double weight, since this mechanism is of primary importance for the inclusiveness with respect to immigrants. In addition, here we incorporate a measurement of practical obstacles in implementation (Huddleston 2013) to capture more nuanced dynamics of exclusion in ordinary naturalization procedures. For coding details, see Jeffers et al. (2012). For all details on the used indicators as well as our transformations and aggregation procedures on the lowest levels (also for the following constructions), see Appendix I.

18 This construction strongly resembles an existing index measuring policies regulating the access to citizenship for immigrants (Howard 2009: 19-26; cf. Janoski 2010: 36-40). However, the measurement of CITLAW is still more detailed and comprehensive both with regard to content and coverage, which is why we choose it.
the resulting component is ordinal (cf. Vink and Bauböck 2013: 634) and ranges from 0 (theoretical minimum) to 100 (theoretical maximum).\textsuperscript{19}

To assess the component \textit{“de jure alien enfranchisement,”} we again turn to indicators from EUDO (see Arrighi et al. 2013: ch. 4 for an overview), since also in that realm they offer the most comprehensive and systematically comparable data of the recent past. The online database\textsuperscript{20} contains qualitative information\textsuperscript{21} about which non-citizen residents are enfranchised under which conditions, encompassing all political levels (national, regional, local) and all types of election (legislative, executive, referendum). For each of the resulting nine cells in each country, our measurement covers two basic categories of non-citizen residents – non-national EU citizens\textsuperscript{22} and Third Country Nationals (TCNs)\textsuperscript{23} –, and two kinds of indicators – eligibility and access to voting rights. The former is a scale of the basic extent of voting rights (i.e. whether all, only selected or no persons of each category are eligible). The latter implies a reduction of the eligibility score if the respective non-citizens are required to reside in the respective country longer than five years to gain access to voting rights, thus exceeding our normative criterion for when the inclusion of immigrants is adequate. In addition, the eligibility score is reduced further in case the registration procedure for non-citizen residents is discriminatory compared to citizen residents, that is if the registration for non-citizen residents is both non-automatic and non-identical with the one applying to citizen residents (i.e. while citizen

\textsuperscript{19} Even though the selection of indicators for CITLAW is based on an inductive survey of relevant provisions in the countries covered (cf. Jeffers et al. 2012: 6), the scaling itself can be considered to reasonably reflect \textit{theoretical} minima and maxima (ibid. 12-3).

\textsuperscript{20} http://eudo-citizenship.eu/electoral-rights/comparing-electoral-rights (July 24, 2014)

\textsuperscript{21} EUDO has not yet released a coding scheme for this data. However, our considerations on how to code and aggregate them are partly inspired by the currently ongoing efforts of determining a respective scheme by EUDO itself.

\textsuperscript{22} Since the EU requires its member states to include non-national EU citizens on the local level, this could be regarded as a problematic conflation of national and supranational responsibilities. However, we think that such a ‘reward for EU membership’ is adequate, because the states in question either knew that this would be part of their membership when they decided to join the EU, or then they participated in the decision-making that led to this regulation if they already were members before its implementation.

\textsuperscript{23} However, this distinction is not empirically relevant in any case on the national level, which is why on that level we treat all non-citizen residents as one category.
residents are automatically registered, non-citizen residents have to register), or when further requirements such as an oath or language tests apply.  

Having calculated the scores for each cell, our aggregation applies the following procedure. First, we aggregate the three types of elections on each level with a simple arithmetic mean to obtain a score for each level. Next, we calculate an overall score for both sub-national levels, again using a simple arithmetic mean. Finally, the score of the sub-national levels (as the first sub-component) is averaged with the score for the national level (as the second sub-component), resulting in the final score for the component of de jure alien enfranchisement. Like de jure access to citizenship, the measurement level is ordinal and again ranges from 0 (theoretical minimum) to 100 (theoretical maximum).

As the normative justification for the electoral inclusion of non-citizen residents on various political levels has been an ongoing matter of dispute, the last steps of aggregation of this component may be the most controversial. With reference to certain arguments in this debate, one might conclude that the local level is of primary importance for alien enfranchisement (e.g. Bauböck 2003a, 2003b), and that electoral inclusion on the national level may be better attained through the access to citizenship (Pedroza 2013a). However, going back to our normative stances rooted in both the classical liberal criterion of the electoral inclusion of ‘all subjected to law’ as well as the neo-republican notion of freedom as non-domination or the neo-classic republican emphasis on active and strong political participation, we argue that giving the national level (at least) as much weight as the sub-national levels for alien enfranchisement is warranted. After all, the national level usually is the political level that is the most relevant and has the most capacity and regulatory clout to directly influence and affect the lives, circumstances, and chances of all the (long-term) inhabitants of a national territory. Besides, in recent decades, particularly the influence of national executives has often increased due to the rising relevance of international cooperation; and participating in the election of these executives, be they direct or indirect, has thus become key for adequately strong participation as well as representation, also on the inter- and supranational levels. Nonetheless, the focus of

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24 Since our focus is on the congruence of electoral inclusion of non-citizen residents compared to citizen residents, we only measure registration equality instead of various modes of registration themselves.

25 We could find no dominant normative reason to put more weight on either legislative or executive elections, or referenda. Note that for the aggregation on the local and regional levels, we allot a double weight to TCNs as opposed to EU citizens.
this normative argument on the actual power of the different political levels suggests that for a measurement sensitive to varying national contexts, one should consider the degree of political decentralization to assess and assign the respective weights for each level case by case. If we would be able to do that, we would weigh the existence of alien voting rights on a sub-national level in Switzerland higher than their existence in France, for example.

The operationalization of the component “de facto access to citizenship” is based on two sub-components. First, we simply measure what we label as the citizenship rate: the number of all adult resident citizens as a proportion of all legally resident adults that should be included, i.e. all resident adult citizens plus all adult, legal, and long-term\textsuperscript{26} non-citizen residents. As a (modified) statistical mirror of the foreigner rate, this percentage captures the level of congruence between those people who live in the territory of a state and are included via citizenship and those people who should be included into the demos according to our normative standard. As such, this indicator measures most closely our functionalist understanding of democratic inclusiveness. To this indicator, we add a second indicator, the naturalization rate, an indicator that signals how well a country functions in reducing the gap between the subjected population and the demos by transforming non-citizen residents into citizens. Usually calculated as the number of citizenship acquisitions during one year as a proportion of the resident non-citizen population at the beginning of that year, this indicator can be seen as the general likelihood of being naturalized (Reichel 2012: 5). But to measure this likelihood more precisely, it would be necessary to “base the rate on the foreign population actually eligible for naturalization, or as statisticians call it, the population at risk of experiencing an event” (Reichel 2011: 8). However, our normative argument does not imply as a target group the population that is actually at risk, but the population that should be at risk, that is, the population that ought to be naturalized. When specifying the denominator of this percentage, we thus again use all adult, legal, and long-term non-citizen residents as our reference group. However, since the number of citizenship acquisitions is subject to relatively high fluctuations (Reichel 2012: 6), our numerator includes the average number of the last 5 years. As a consequence, our indica-

\textsuperscript{26} The identification of the short-term non-citizen residents contained in the total number of adult and legally non-citizen residents is based on an estimation with data from the European Social Survey (ESS 2010). Details on our estimation procedure are documented in the Appendix Id.
tor for the naturalization rate is defined as the average number of citizenship acquisitions during the last 5 years as a proportion of all adult, legal, and long-term non-citizen residents.

We argue that the combination of these two indicators is well-suited to measure the de facto access to citizenship in light of our specific purposes. The citizenship rate indicates the extent of incongruence between those who should be included in the demos and those who actually are included via citizenship – and the naturalization rate depicts to what extent this gap is being closed via the access to citizenship pathway (the other option to close the gap is measured via the alien enfranchisement rate, see below). Given this well-ordered ‘conceptual division of labor’ with a thoroughly consistent target group, we consciously refrain from using other indicators of de facto access to citizenship, namely rejection rates. It has been suggested that rejection rates are superior to naturalization rates, since by using the number of actual applications for citizenship as the reference group they capture more directly the restrictiveness of the naturalization regime (Helbling 2011). While that may be true for certain research questions, it is exactly this construction of the reference group that makes this measure incompatible with the goals of our evaluation. We are not interested in how many of the actual applicants succeed, but in how many of those who should apply are in fact naturalized. Of course, although quite clear causal connections between naturalization policies and naturalization rates are indeed possible (Reichel 2012: 18-21), this measurement and the subsequent evaluation consequently entails individual factors and behavior, which are to some extent out of reach of national political systems or naturalization regimes (see e.g. Dronkers and Vink 2012). As we explicitly conceptualize these two aspects of de jure and de facto as the constitutive parts of our concept that can compensate each other to a certain extent, however, this is not problematic. By contrast, we suggest that this is exactly what a comprehensive evaluation should encompass.

27 This number does not include automatic acquisitions by birth (cf. Janoski 2010, 2011), not only because they are very demanding to measure, but also because these acquisitions in fact do not substantially change the rate itself due to a complex interaction with the jus soli regime in respective countries (for the detailed argument see Vink 2011). Furthermore, if someone is not granted citizenship at birth, this person eventually ends up in our target group, and the usual naturalization rate then captures his or her inclusion. If someone is granted citizenship at birth, this is still incorporated in our citizenship rate.

28 Still, it is widely acknowledged that very restrictive regimes can have tangible deterrence effects (e.g. exceptionally high application fees), which may directly impact certain individuals not to apply for naturalization at all (Helbling 2011).
To gauge "de facto alien enfranchisement," we measure what we call the enfranchisement rate: the number of enfranchised aliens as a proportion of all adult, legal, and long-term non-citizen residents. However, the number in the numerator needs to be specified in a way that is consistent with the composition and the relative weights we assign to the different elements in de jure alien enfranchisement. Unfortunately, data availability is quite limited for such indicators, which is why (so far) we cover only the (registered) numbers of aliens that have active suffrage in legislative elections on either the local or on all political levels. Therefore, we weigh all aliens that are enfranchised only on the local level with a factor of 0.5, while the ones that are enfranchised on all the levels are fully counted—a weighing scheme that corresponds to the simple average of the national level and the sub-national levels in the calculation of de jure alien enfranchisement, in which the sub-national levels make up for half of the final value. Consequently, the enfranchisement rate is defined as the number of enfranchised aliens on all levels plus 0.5 times the number of enfranchised aliens on the local level as a proportion of all adult, legal, and long-term non-citizen residents. The resulting value is a percentage that captures the degree of congruence between those non-citizen residents who are supposed to be included via alien voting rights and those non-citizen residents who actually are.

7 Normalization, concept tree and aggregation rules

Before we can aggregate the components, they have to be normalized both in terms of measurement range as well as measurement level. For this purpose, we propose an ordinal classification scheme (table 1) that makes the different components directly comparable. Both the de jure components as well as the enfranchisement rate are plausibly scaled from 0 to 100, albeit with different measurement levels. To harmonize them, we propose a 6-point ordinal scale which is based on a corresponding linear and equal division of this value range, and labelled with categories that can be used for a suitable evaluation of our concept and its meaning. The

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29 In case a registration requirement exists, we use the number of all actually registered aliens rather than the number of all eligible aliens. Besides limitations in data availability, we are convinced that this is an adequate measurement for de facto inclusiveness that corresponds with the procedural aspect incorporated in the de jure aspect, even though it again involves an element of individual behavior. One could even argue that this measurement is not sufficient to measure de facto inclusion since it does not capture de facto participation via participation rates. This again points to a possible expansion of our assessment tool.
same general principle applies to the *citizenship* and the *naturalization rate*, but since their values do not plausibly translate into a scale from 0 to 100 that can be directly related to our normative framework, we define other values as the end of the scales.

First, the scale for the *citizenship rate* starts at the value of 90%, because this has been previously used as a threshold for the identification of full-fledged democracies in traditional approaches to democracy measurement (Dahl 1971: 232-2, 246-8; see also Munck 2009: 43, 149-50). This is an important decision that has strong implications when we assess and judge the exclusiveness of democracies. Therefore, we want to go beyond this reference to the founding father of democracy measurement in justifying this decision. At a time when democracy indices look at the exclusion of much smaller parts of the population (e.g. the exclusion of felons, as the Democracy Barometer does, for example) and imply that these kinds of exclusion are reducing the quality of democracy, we think that is fully adequate to demand from established democracies that they should at least include 90% of the adult resident population in order to call themselves full-fledged democracies. Within a normative approach to democracy measurement, and in contrast to Munck (2014), we indeed think that it can be useful to differentiate the criteria and standards for measuring democratization and the criteria and standards for measuring the quality of (established) democracies. For those who are convinced that “inclusion” is a fundamental dimension of democracy (Dahl 1971), it makes sense to argue that as long as a polity has not yet included at least 90% of the long-term resident adult population, it cannot be regarded as completely democratized. If a polity includes 90% of those it is supposed to include (all adults residing in the country for longer than five years), it is still a very exclusive democracy, but we would not question any longer its status as a fully democratized country. Of course, the 90% threshold is to a certain extent arbitrary, but it certainly is more reasonable in comparison to much higher or much lower thresholds. We cannot think of any good justification for a lower threshold. One has to bear in mind that there are no good normative reasons for excluding long-term residents from the *demos*. This is different, for example, for thresholds that are established in many representative democracies when it comes to transforming electoral votes into parliamentary seats. In the latter case, thresholds that result in the exclusion of votes can be justified by the goal to have a stable government. But in our case, a threshold is not the result of balancing various democratic ends. Instead, it is purely pragmatic and takes into account that the normative demand for including immigrants has been raised only recently.
For the naturalization rate, we identify the value of 10% as an ideal for a democracy to qualify as very inclusive, and assign our ordinal categories to this interval accordingly. In this case, we can clearly explicate why the particular value of 10% is the adequate threshold according to our normative reasoning. First, if we take seriously our deductive criterion that after 5 years it is appropriate for immigrants to become included, we can think of an ideal-typical situation in which always 20% of our total immigrant target group is naturalized within each of these 5 years. However, temporary and circular migration (i.e. that not all immigrants remain permanently in the country) undermine this ideal-typical construction to some extent, making an adequate adjustment of this ideal value necessary.

But how many immigrants leave a country after having resided there for at least 5 years? Unfortunately, we have not come across empirical studies that would answer this exact question. Still, we know from statistics on temporary and circular migration as well as from figures on emigration that the proportion of those non-citizen residents who leave before having resided in a country for 5 years is usually below 50% in European immigration countries. For example, about 25% of all persons who immigrated to Austria between 2003-2008 fell under the category of short-time migration of up to one year, while in the UK, 49% of migrants entering the country in 2009 reported that they intend to stay for only one to two years, while only 25% wanted to stay for more than four years (EMN 2011: 55). Nonetheless, since these numbers are based on temporary employment permits, they still underestimate the number of migrants who end up staying longer by using the option to renew these permits (Quinn 2011: 19). Even more, considering that in the EU the standard requirement for attaining a long-term or permanent residency permit is a continuous duration of residence of 5 years, it seems safe to assume that after 5 years of residence, emigration becomes relatively unlikely – and that at least about half of all immigrants that have resided in a country for such a period of time will stay there for a significant amount of time. Therefore, we think it is adequate to cut back our maximum value for the naturalization rate from our ideal-typical situation by half, that is from 20% to 10%. In fact, this benchmark may still be rather generous, because we only take into account actual long-term residents as a reference group also in the calculation of this figure.

After having normalized the components, the scores of this basic scale can be aggregated. As indicated in the theoretical part, to calculate the de jure and the de facto dimension respectively, we combine the corresponding components with an additive rule of aggregation, since their theoretical relationship is one of high substitutability and ‘family resemblance’ (Goertz
Applying our normative framework leads to the following weighting scheme:

a. For the *de facto* components, we first add the (ordinal scores of the) citizenship rate and the naturalization rate, but allot a double weight to the citizenship rate, since it is arguably more pivotal for actually capturing how inclusive the democracy is in its everyday functioning. This score of *de facto* access to citizenship is then added with the score of *de facto* alien enfranchisement (which is directly derived from the enfranchisement rate) to receive the overall score on the *de facto* dimension. Thus, we assign a triple weight for the pathway of access to citizenship as opposed to the complementary pathway of alien enfranchisement (see Figure 1) – a scheme that is in line with our characterization of access to citizenship as the most central and normatively desirable pathway to electoral inclusion, at least as long as we consider the currently dominant and rather conservative strands within liberalism and republicanism.

b. In the *de jure* dimension, based on the same arguments, we proceed accordingly. Having calculated and classified the scores on the two components, we apply addition as aggregation rule, but weight the means of access to citizenship with a factor of three. Finally, we re-scale the resulting scores so that they are distributed in the interval from 0 to 10, which can be divided into and interpreted with the same ordinal classification scheme we used above (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Ordinal classification scheme</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very inclusive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98.33 – 100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inclusive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56.67 – 98.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95.00 – 96.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fairly inclusive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91.67 – 93.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Very exclusive</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;90.00 – 91.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In our discussion above we proposed that the geometric mean is the most appropriate aggregation procedure that translates our considerations of the relationship between the *de jure* and the *de facto* dimensions into a mathematical formula. Hence, to obtain the score of the IMIX, we multiply the *de jure* and the *de facto* dimension, and then derive the square root. To repeat the overall conclusion of our theoretical arguments in technical terms, this means that there can only be compensation if both dimensions score higher than 0 – and that compensation remains limited if the values are very low, but the more the value of one dimension increases, the higher the leverage for compensation becomes. We thus conclude our conceptu-
The normative demand to electorally include immigrants without any qualifications can only be raised against established democracies with stable boundaries. The data collection for the so-called ‘blueprint sample’ of the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 123) followed a similar premise. Taking the Polity IV and Freedom House scores from 1995-2005 as a basis for selection, Marc Bühlmann and his colleagues compiled a sample of 30 countries that can be considered to be the ‘most established democracies in the world’. As indicated above, our effort relies on indicators from EUDO for measuring the de jure components, while the de
facto components are constructed with data from Eurostat\textsuperscript{32}, the European Social Survey (ESS 2010) as well as autonomous data collection based on official country statistics and individual queries. Combined with the criterion of membership in the group of the ‘most established democracies’, the overlap of all the sources allows us to cover a cross-section of 22 European democracies, with data stemming either from or clustering around our basic reference year of 2010. In fact, we thus include all European democracies that are also part of the ‘blueprint sample’ of the Democracy Barometer, except for Iceland.

9 Results

In this section we present and discuss the results in light of our evaluation scheme for the 22 selected European democracies. In order to provide maximum transparency, we start with presenting the results on a disaggregated level and then move up step by step to the most aggregated one.

9.1 The results for the (sub-)components

The results for the (sub-)components will be presented in the following order: First, we have a look at the citizenship rate, followed by the naturalization rate, both representing the de facto aspect of the access to citizenship pathway. Next, we present a figure that includes both, the de jure and the de facto component of the alien enfranchisement pathway. We end up with a figure that portrays the results for the de jure component of the access to citizenship pathway.

Figure 2 reveals that the gap between the population that should be included according to democratic standards (all autochthonous adults plus all adults with a migrant background who reside legally in the country for at least five years) and the population that is de facto included in the democratic decision-making process as citizens varies strongly among European democracies. Although there are just a few countries that are almost fully inclusive (Poland) or inclusive (Hungary and Finland) in respect to their resident population, most countries are fairly inclusive or come close to this status. But there is a group of countries that score substantially weaker: Ireland, Belgium, Austria and Germany are categorized as exclusive, and

\textsuperscript{32} See tiny.cc/eurostat_migrantstats (July 22, 2014)
they come close to be judged as very exclusive since they exclude almost 8% of the population that should be included. Spain is even more exclusive by excluding almost 10% of this population. And Cyprus, Switzerland and Luxemburg are even below the threshold that Dahl and we consider adequate for calling a country a full-fledged democracy.

Figure 2: Share of citizens among the population (de facto citizenship / citizenship rate)

We have deliberately included the mean value that indicates a rather high degree of exclusiveness overall, since we want to recall that an average exclusion of more than 7% of the (long-term) resident adult population is enormous when compared to figures such as criminal disenfranchisement, which are usually way below 1%. On the other hand, the table also shows the big differences that exist in respect to the congruence between the people that should be included and the part of the resident population that is included. Furthermore, it becomes clear that countries that have high immigration rates fare much worse than countries that have low immigration rates.

So, is it fair to give countries which high immigration rates a low score in respect to their democratic inclusiveness? This question comes up especially since the finding could be used to recommend that democracies should apply exclusive immigrant policies in order to fare better in democracy ratings. There are two answers to this question: First, yes, the judgment is fair, since it shows that some countries are rather open when it comes to let foreigners work and live on their territory, but they are not open when it comes to give those people a
vote/voice in making the rules they have to obey. From a democratic point of view, this is not acceptable. We think that the citizenship rate is an important indicator that highlights one of the most important deficits in current day democracies.

This said, we come to the second, more cautious answer. Although we want to measure the democratic quality of a country (and not the degree on which they provide other values like welfare or freedom to their residents), restricting the notion of "political inclusion" to electoral inclusion might be a little bit too narrow in order to be fair to those countries that have a rather lenient immigration policy in comparison to those who strongly limit the entry into the country. After all, the non-citizen residents that have been admitted a legal resident status in the territory enjoy almost all other political (as well as civic and social/economic) rights in most countries. This means that if we cast our net wider both in respect to the people who might have to be included and in respect to the means of inclusion, countries with a liberal immigration and a restrictive citizenship policy would fare better. Nevertheless, from a normative point of view, having an open immigration policy should not give them any excuse for excluding immigrant residents from the *demos* if these countries want to be seen as democratic.

A first sign for whether nation-states are able to fulfill their democratic duty by turning long-term immigrants into citizens is to look at the naturalization rates. Figure 3 shows that in most countries naturalization only partially functions as it is supposed to in order to reduce the gap between those who should be included and those who are actually included via access to citizenship. Only Sweden comes close to the 10% naturalization rate that we would see as adequate for reducing the gap and this is due to specific circumstances.\[33\] In a large group of countries, naturalization takes place at least in an acceptable pace. 10 countries qualify to be

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33 This high figure is due to Sweden’s exceptionally inclusive rules for socialization-based naturalization. At the same time, its *de jure* access to citizenship score is mediocre, since *jus soli* is practically inexistent (cf. Figure 5). One may argue that this assessment ignores the fact that the absence of *jus soli* is actually substituted by socialization-based naturalization. Since we conceptualize the *de jure* and *de facto* aspects as mutually constitutive and partly compensatory for electoral inclusiveness, however, we think that, overall, our assessment is still adequate also for this special case. Nonetheless, this example also shows that our assessment can be reformulated and fine-tuned when taking into account contextual factors and national idiosyncrasies. The same is true for the case of Hungary, whose naturalization rate is boosted above average partly due to the preferential naturalization of ethnic Hungarians, to some extent producing a statistical artifact. Still, the figure here is only affected by the latest wave of accelerated naturalizations of non-resident ethnic Hungarians to a limited extent, since this most recent change of the law was implemented only in 2010 (Kovács and Tóth 2013), and we take into account the acquisitions from 2006-2010. To compare, Hungary’s naturalization rate in 2012 surged to over 12% (Source: Eurostat, Tables *(migr_acq)* and *(migr_pop1ctz)*; cf. tiny.cc/eurostat_migrantstats) (July 22, 2014)
fairly inclusive or come close to it (from the UK to Finland). In two countries with a high level of immigration (Cyprus and Switzerland), a mediocre naturalization rate reduces the growing gap between inhabitants and citizens at least a little bit. But in eight countries, naturalization rates are so low that access to citizenship is not working in order to close the gap between resident population and national *demos*. And in the Czech Republic naturalization seems to be almost completely dysfunctional in terms of closing the gap between citizens and non-citizens with regard to electoral inclusion. The latter result is even more striking when one considers that the Czech Republic excludes more than 4% of the long-term resident adult population. Finally, the low mean value indicates that European democracies are not very successful in closing the gap between those who should be politically included and those who are actually included by smoothing the pathway to citizenship (and the value would be even worse if we exclude the “outlier” Sweden).

Figure 3: Naturalization rates / *de facto* naturalization

At least in principle, democracies have an alternative means for closing this gap. So, let’s turn to the results in respect to *alien voting rights*. Figure 4 combines the *de facto* and the *de jure* results of our judgment on how well the European countries include immigrants via alien enfranchisement. The figure shows that a substantial number of countries neither provides the adequate rules for this means to electoral inclusion, nor does the pathway works as it could, since they rarely reach an inclusive category in our classification system. Nevertheless, with
respect to the *de facto* situation, eight countries provide a fair amount of inclusion to their non-citizen residents; four of them can even be classified as fairly inclusive (Denmark, Belgium, Sweden and the Netherlands). The other countries are either exclusive (Malta, Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic) or very exclusive (nine countries). With respect to the *de jure* regulations, only the Scandinavian countries Denmark, Sweden, and Norway cluster around the edge of being inclusive, whilst all other countries are fairly exclusive or exclusive (eight countries) or very exclusive (eleven countries). Thus, we can conclude that most European countries have not yet accepted alien enfranchisement as a means for including immigrants as “others”, which is supported by the fact that also the mean values of both the *de facto* and the *de jure* alien enfranchisement component score as exclusive.

**Figure 4: Alien enfranchisement (sub-)components**

A further insight of this graph is that, while the correlation of the two components is positive and significant overall (see Appendix IVa/b), in some countries the *de jure* and the *de facto* indicators do not go together. In Belgium and the Netherlands, we find a rather high level of *de facto* inclusion, although the regulations would not imply a high level of inclusiveness via alien enfranchisement. And in Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Portugal it is the other way round. Based on further insights provided by Pedroza (2013b) on the case of Portugal, we take this as an argument for our stance that by looking at the *de jure* situation alone one cannot not capture the actual inclusiveness of democracies. But that does not mean that the *de jure* situation...
is meaningless, since it expresses the explicit will of democracies to be inclusive much more directly than the *de facto* situation. Therefore, we now turn to the results that we gained when we aggregated the EUDO data according to our own normative standards.

Figure 5 depicts the scores for the inclusiveness of the *citizenship laws* for each country. None of the countries developed rules and regulations in line with the normative standard that we deduced from democratic theory in a fully satisfactory way, but Belgium, France, Portugal, Ireland, the UK can be judged as inclusive and another six as fairly inclusive. Eleven countries fall below the medium threshold, but the good news is that most of them have to be judged only as fairly exclusive, just two countries – Austria and Denmark – have to be classified as exclusive.

**Figure 5: *De jure* citizenship / citizenship law**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR</td>
<td>77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IE</td>
<td>83.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LU</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI</td>
<td>85.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SE</td>
<td>82.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SI</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL mean</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MT</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HU</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CY</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PL</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZ</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We now turn to the results that we gain when we apply of our first aggregation rule, which combine the values of our components within each of our two dimensions. We begin with the *de facto* dimension.

9.2 The *de facto* inclusiveness of European democracies

Figure 6 presents the scores that provide an integrated view on how well the immigrants are included in reality. The overall scores that the countries receive are important since we want to
assess their overall quality of democratic inclusiveness, but it is even more revealing to see how the various components play together in producing the overall results.

According to our classification scheme it seems that only Sweden can be judged to be actually inclusive with respect to immigrants. Four further countries function in a fairly inclusive way (Hungary, Finland, the Netherlands, and Poland). Whereas Hungary, Finland and Poland end up on the more inclusive upper side of our classification schema because of their comparatively high citizenship rate (which in turn is primarily a consequence of their comparatively low immigration rate), Sweden and the Netherlands show it is possible to reduce the gap between the long-term residents and the members of the demos substantially by facilitating naturalization and by providing alien voting rights to non-citizens in much more demanding contexts (of high immigration).

Figure 6: De facto inclusiveness

We have to classify over three quarters of our sample as fairly exclusive (nine countries), exclusive (four countries) or as very exclusive (four countries) in their actual functioning. The figure shows that most countries that display a substantial gap between citizenry and the total adult long-term population are neither able to close this gap by naturalizing nor by enfranchising aliens. The main exception is Belgium, a country that reduces the large discrepancy between inhabitants and citizens not only by a rather high naturalization rate but also by providing a substantial amount of non-citizen residents voting rights. The four countries that show a dramatic gap between long-term adult population and citizenry (Switzerland, Cyprus, Spain, and
Luxembourg) do neither naturalize a substantial number of their immigrants nor grant them voting rights as aliens to a recognizable amount. De facto, these democracies function in a very exclusive manner.

But how far do they do this intentionally? In order to get a part of an answer to this question (as we indicated in the theoretical section, some aspects of the will of the political community might not be expressed in explicit legal norms), we turn now to the aggregated de jure inclusiveness of European democracies.

9.3 The de jure inclusiveness of European democracies

If we look at the legal norms, only Ireland, the UK, and Portugal classify as inclusive democracies as far as immigrants are concerned, and six others (from Belgium to Luxembourg) come close to this status (see Figure 7). Four countries (from Norway to Hungary) have scores just below the medium, and another eight countries are qualified as exclusive and one country (Austria) ends up in our most exclusive category. Overall, this means that European nation-states have a lot of room for improvement in their citizenship and enfranchisement laws if they want to fulfill the normative demand to include immigrant residents in their democratic decision-making processes.

In line with other studies (see e.g. Huddleston and Vink 2013), the IMIX shows that usually countries introduce alien voting rights not as a substitute for a restrictive policy regulating the access to citizenship. On the contrary, the relationship tends to be positive (see the scatter plot in Appendix IVd). Those countries that are rather open in making aliens to citizens seem to be more willing to grant immigrant residents voting rights as “aliens”; and those that try to keep them out of their citizenry are also not generous in granting voting rights to non-citizens. However, there are some exceptions that make the overall correlation statistically insignificant (see Appendix IVa/d): Denmark – and Norway in a less radical fashion – is very restrictive in its citizenship regulations but relatively lenient in respect to alien voting rights. But also in these cases, it would be inappropriate to interpret this as a deliberate move to include immigrants as aliens in order to avoid their inclusion through access to citizenship. The relatively generous provision of voting rights for alien is a shared Scandinavian trait, but these countries are quite different when it comes to their citizenship regulations. In consequence, the lenient distribution of alien voting rights elevates Finland and Sweden – countries with a less exclusive citizen-
ship law – into the realm of being (fairly) inclusive overall. For Norway – and even more for Denmark – generous alien enfranchisement rules helps them to get out at least of the (very) exclusive categories in the realm of access to citizenship.

Figure 7: De jure inclusiveness

There is only one country (France) that reaches the inclusive category without including immigrants by significantly enfranchising aliens. And there are only two countries below the mean score that provide alien enfranchisement (Hungary and Denmark). Therefore, we conclude that the introduction of alien enfranchisement seems to indicate a rather general will to be inclusive with respect to immigrants. Political communities that are not willing to include immigrants through alien enfranchisement are generally not very open to granting them access to citizenship either. Until today, this exclusive attitude is clearly most common in the German speaking countries.

9.4 The overall electoral inclusiveness of European democracies with respect to immigrants

A look at the findings that result when we aggregate the results of a de facto understanding and of a de jure understanding of electoral inclusion of immigrants (Figure 8) offers the following insights: None of the countries in our sample of established European democracies can be judged as inclusive with respect to immigrants and only seven countries (Sweden, Finland,
Portugal, the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Hungary) reach the level of being fairly inclusive. Most countries either fall under the category of being fairly exclusive (seven countries) or exclusive/very exclusive (eight countries); and the overall mean score only slightly exceeds the threshold above the exclusive category.

Figure 8: The inclusiveness of democracies with respect to immigrants

Switzerland, Cyprus and Austria only very narrowly exceed the threshold of being very exclusive, while Luxemburg and Spain narrowly miss it. These five countries thus suffer from a serious democratic deficit, and whereas Luxemburg and Spain at least try to reduce this deficit through much more inclusive laws, Switzerland, Cyprus, and especially Austria have such exclusive regulations that it seems clear that these countries do not want to be more inclusive when it comes to immigrants. From a normative point of view in the age of migration, they fail to live up to their claim to be well-functioning and full-fledged democracies.

10 Summary and conclusion

In this paper, we developed an evaluative tool for assessing the electoral inclusiveness of democracies with respect to immigrants. This is especially relevant since in times of migration the “problem of inclusion” (Dahl 1989) resurfaces as a pressing and urgent issue for the legitimacy of political rule, especially in developed democracies. Throughout the development of the
IMIX, we emphasized that we are developing a concept and a measurement tool specifically for evaluative purposes. Therefore, we started by deducing standards for the inclusion of immigrants from normative theories of democracy. In the next steps, we developed the measurement tool according to recognized principles of concept formation. Finally, we applied this tool to 22 established European democracies. We extracted data from existing sources (EUDO), but collected further data especially in order to complement an evaluation that is focused on the laws regulating the electoral inclusion of immigrants with an evaluation that reveals how well the inclusion of immigrants is actually functioning in the respective countries.

The results of our first application of the IMIX are quite sobering. Although we always chose rather conservative positions when we developed our normative standards and despite the fact that we selected 22 European democracies that fare very well in traditional democracy indices, our results show that both the laws and the practice are rather exclusive when it comes to immigrants.

In our final section, we want to address the current limitations of the IMIX and point towards potential expansions and modifications. It will become clear that the extensions and changes that we consider reasonable will in most cases not lead to a better evaluation of the inclusiveness of current day national democracies.

11 Potential expansions and modifications

In the introduction and at various steps in our endeavor to develop and apply a tool for evaluating the electoral inclusiveness of democracies with respect to immigrants we highlighted some limitations of the IMIX: It is developed in order to serve evaluative and not explanatory purposes and we drew on dominant and rather conservative lines of arguments within normative theories of democracy when we deducted our standards with respect to when and how to include immigrants. Moreover, primarily for pragmatic reasons, we started with the narrow understanding of political inclusion as electoral inclusion and drew the boundary of those who should be included rather narrowly among those who reside legally in a country for at least five years. Furthermore, we used a limited set of indicators and measures, especially in the de facto dimension, since we could there not draw on elaborated databases in a way that was possible for the de jure dimension. Finally, we deliberately started the empirical application with a specific set of established democracies since it might be argued that the normative de-
mand to include immigrants in democratic decision-making processes is only justified under particular conditions.

In the following, we indicate how the current IMIX could be adjusted or expanded. This includes the following aspects:

a. **Broadening the empirical scope beyond established democracies with stable boundaries**

b. **Broadening the operationalization and measures**

c. **Broadening the means of political inclusion beyond electoral inclusion**

d. **Overcoming identification as a precondition for political inclusion, which leads to a re-evaluation of the two pathways or means for inclusion**

e. **Broadening the group of people who should be included beyond residents**

### a. **Broadening the empirical scope beyond established democracies with stable boundaries**

In our first application of the IMIX we limited the range of countries that we evaluated to those European countries that ranked high in other democracy indices. Since we discovered major shortcomings even among these democracies, it seems highly likely that other democracies are even less inclusive with respect to immigrants. Nevertheless, due to the theoretical stance from which we deduced the normative standards on which the IMIX is based, we think that we cannot apply our tool universally in the same manner. From liberal and from republican theories of democracy we can derive arguments why the criteria of uncontested boundaries of the nation-state should be seen as a scope condition for the IMIX: The autonomy of individuals depends on a functioning state who guarantees individual rights and liberties; if the integrity of a state could be endangered through the inclusion of certain groups like minorities with a neighboring kin state with imperial ambitions, the unconditional demand for inclusion that we have formulated in section 2 cannot be upheld anymore (Bauböck 2010). Also from a neo-republican point of view, the goal to secure the non-domination of immigrants by established residents has to be balanced with the goal to secure the non-domination of national political communities. In consequence, for democracies that are faced either with minorities which have a powerful kin state or which are faced with large streams of refugees from neighboring countries, the IMIX should not be applied as it is.

But this does not mean that the evaluative reach of the IMIX must stay limited to established democracies. In principle, we could expand the empirical scope of the IMIX, if we would
adjust the normative standards and the corresponding measures to the specific contextual conditions. For example, for the Baltic countries that are faced with large Russian minorities, we might adjust the *de jure* standards by excluding the expectation of allowing dual citizenship in case of naturalization. Hence, these countries would not suffer in their scoring on *de jure* inclusiveness if they do not accept dual citizenship for Russians. Nevertheless, the normative demand to include the Russian speaking minorities (by other means than dual citizenship) should be upheld. We already collected data for Latvia and Lithuania and will try to show in a next step how such a ‘contextualized’ evaluation could take place.

b. **Broadening the operationalization and measures**

To measure the *de jure* dimension in terms of the two means of access to citizenship and alien voting rights we were in the lucky situation that we could draw on the new and very differentiated EUDO datasets. As laid out before, we exploited these datasets in accordance with our normative standards. We were not as lucky when we tried to measure the two pathways in the *de facto* dimension, especially with regard to alien enfranchisement. We are convinced that with the citizenship rate, the naturalization rate and the alien enfranchisement rate we have introduced some very important and valid indicators. But certainly, the measurement could be expanded, especially in order to capture the real functioning of electoral inclusion via actual participation rates, both with respect to naturalized citizens with an immigrant background as well as with respect to enfranchised non-citizen residents. As it now stands, the IMIX is still quite legalistic in its focus.

c. **Broadening means of political inclusion beyond voting**

Limiting the understanding of political inclusion to voting does obviously not represent the current state of affairs in democratic theory. Especially participatory and deliberative theories of democracy have stressed the fact that elections and the aggregation of votes are and should not be the only ways through which the members of the *demos* influence political decision-making (see for example Barber 1984, Gutmann and Thompson 2004, della Porta 2013). In consequence, a full-fledged tool for evaluating political inclusion would have to include indicators for means/pathways such as consultative bodies, councils, conferences, public debates or petitions through which the arguments, interests and values of immigrants can be introduced into the political decision-making process. At this point, we cannot provide a full set of relevant non-electoral means and pathways of inclusion and the corresponding indica-
tors. Instead, we want to highlight the fact that the relationship between electoral inclusion and other forms of inclusion can be conceptualized in different ways, leading to divergent consequences for the standard we apply when evaluating democracies.

Arguably, most normative theorists would describe the relationship between electoral inclusion and other forms of inclusion (through participation or deliberation) as one in which the former represents the necessary core condition and the latter a range of potential further conditions which are also necessary for a well-functioning democracy. Depending on the theory, the combination of free and fair elections with further forms of participation like referenda or the combination of elections with a high level of public deliberation would be seen as sufficient for a well-functioning democracy. Based on such a presumption, the introduction of additional means and measures of political inclusion would result in a higher normative standard according to which we evaluate democracies. A high level of electoral inclusiveness would not anymore be sufficient to score high on the IMIX. From this perspective, our current evaluation is still very lenient.

But some proponents of deliberative democracy like John Dryzek can be interpreted as denying voting/elections the status of a necessary condition for a well-functioning democracy (Dryzek 2006, 2007 and Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008). From a deliberative point of view one could argue that the inclusion of the interests and values of the immigrants in the public discourse of democracies is at least as important as the electoral inclusion. Which means that the establishment of specific councils representing the immigrants or an inclusive public debate is a sufficient substitution for electoral inclusion. If we perceive electoral inclusion as fully substitutable by non-electoral forms of inclusion, the aggregation of these different means/pathways to inclusion would have to allow for such substitution. Some countries might end up with a better rating in comparison to current state of affairs.

d. Overcoming identification as a precondition for political inclusion, which leads to a re-evaluation of the two pathways/means for inclusion
In section 5 we discussed whether access to citizenship or alien enfranchisement is the better means to regulate/pathway to reach inclusion. Due to our limited focus on an established understanding of democracy, we ended up with a strong endorsement of the former – which is why we weighted access to citizenship three times as much as alien enfranchisement both in the de jure and the de facto dimension. For this stance, we drew on arguments from liberal and divergent strands of republican theories of democracy. Nevertheless, we already indicated
that these argumentative lines are by far not the only ones that one could bring forward to bear on this issue. In the following, we draw on more recent theories of democracy and on other argumentative lines within the established strands, making the case that inclusion via alien enfranchisement has its own important advantages – and should therefore be weighted equally.

From what can be called a *multi-cultural or difference-based theory of democracy* (Young 1996, 2000, Benhabib 1996, 2007), immigrant inclusion via alien enfranchisement can be seen as the better pathway to inclusion in comparison to access to citizenship because when political communities offer electoral inclusion by introducing alien voting rights this amounts to recognizing the immigrant residents as equally valuable ‘others’. To the newcomers this signals that they are not expected to incorporate themselves into a homogeneous *demos*, that is, that they do not have to transform themselves into ‘one of us’, but are perceived as of equal value despite – or even due to – their specific, differing backgrounds and cultures. By contrast, the procedure of ‘naturalization’, which characterizes inclusion via access to citizenship, sends out exactly the former kind of signal. From the perspective of the political community, the differences that are recognized through alien enfranchisement can be understood as “resources to draw on for reaching understanding in democratic discussion rather than as divisions that must be overcome” (Young 1996: 120). This way, a political community could learn that “we should come together *because* of, not *in spite of*, our differences” (Thompson 2006: 133, drawing on Taylor 1998).

The argument that political inclusion should be granted without demanding that the immigrants have to change their identity can be infused into existing strands of democratic theory, which leads to further arguments for alien enfranchisement. In *liberal* parlance, it can be argued that disconnecting voting rights from the citizenship status enhances the autonomy of the individual since she then can protect her interests in the political processes of the polity to which she is subjected without being forced to demand for a change of her formal status. Such an unbundling of citizenship status and voting rights does not only make it easier to overcome formal hurdles, e.g. when the country of decent does not allow dual citizenship and thus delivers a smoother and quicker pathway to electoral inclusion, but also frees the granting of voting rights from identity questions. If a legal long-term resident is given the right to vote precisely because she resides permanently on a respective political territory this voting right does not carry any other function than to provide the individual with the possibility to protect her-
self from interference. The resulting procedure of voting, thus, is motivated by the will to realize her individual freedom and thus bears a high level of individual autonomy.

As we have seen above, classical republicans invoke a strong concern with loyalty and with the correspondence between rights and duties. Traditionally, political rights and duties have indeed been reserved to citizens as argued above. Today however, less and less countries know a compulsory military service based on citizenship and as far as the remaining duties that correspond to political rights are concerned, one could, for instance, well imagine alien voting rights to be connected to the duty to serve as an electoral assistant. Thus, alien enfranchisement actually provides for a higher, not a lower degree of de facto correspondence between rights and duties. When it comes to the concern with loyalty, the argument provided for the supremacy of citizenship over alien enfranchisement above can be turned around when taking into account that migration is becoming a more and more extensive phenomenon in today’s world: The need to ask for naturalization in order to get the chance of becoming part of the voting demos can also backfire in that immigrants might retreat into growing parallel communities due the disaffirmation shown by the host society, thereby potentially forming cells of disloyalty. Alien voting rights, on the contrary, pave the way for a first experience in political participation. Practicing political participation is another form of socialization, that enhances the willingness to further participate because it generates competences and confidence (potentially also to overcome the obstacle of the naturalization procedure). Thus, political inclusion via alien voting rights can lead to higher levels of participation by immigrants in comparison to only offering the option to naturalize.

In a world of strong transnational flows and interdependencies, immigrants who are allowed to stay “others” can better serve as sensors for external changes and demands, and they can quicker and smoother function as networkers and mediators between the national community and the outside world. When it is recognized that all this contributes to the common good of the national political community, another core concern of classic republicanism is turned into an argument for alien voting rights.

As highlighted before, neo-republicans are primarily concerned with institutional features that guarantee non-domination on a structural level. From this point of view, access to citizenship has the advantage that it provides an individual status that helps to fight domination. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that the introduction of alien voting rights is a symbol for the fact that multicultural values or a strong sense of tolerance are structurally engrained in
a polity. The introduction of alien voting rights represents and at the same time reproduces this structural or cultural underpinning of the polity. And the fact that the norm to recognize others as different but equal is structurally embedded in a polity, in turn, provides the immigrants with a sense of being welcomed and invited to participate. This, in turn, provides the basis for these immigrants to be motivated to participate not only more frequently but also with more intention in striving for the common good of a then both externally and internally non-dominating political community, than if they would first have had to peel off their differences.

As we did above we end by turning to the neo-classic republican emphasis on actual participation. The new starting point and the revised arguments provided here present a different perspective on the motivational and mobilization effects that come with the two pathways to inclusion. Providing immigrants with voting rights through a general enfranchisement of all long-term resident aliens instead of forcing them to naturalize has, as we have seen, the following motivational advantages: the willingness to actually vote is likely to increase as immigrants feel recognized as different but equals, because, first, their identity is not under scrutiny; second, due of the competence/confidence that comes with experiencing the voting practice; and third, because immigrants perceive the polity as inviting and worthy to contribute.

Overall, we have seen that as soon as we overcome the assumption that a well-functioning democracy needs a common identity of its demos, there are as many arguments in favor of inclusion via alien enfranchisement as there are for the access to citizenship means/pathway. The symmetry of the structural and motivational arguments existing for both pathways/means can be summarized as follows:
Table 2: *Structural* arguments for the two pathways to political inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Theory</th>
<th>Access to Citizenship</th>
<th>Alien Enfranchisement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Non-reversibility of voting rights</td>
<td>Stronger personal autonomy if voting rights are decoupled from citizen status, that is <em>de facto</em> disconnected from identity questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Higher level of security (e.g. expulsion)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Republicanism</td>
<td>Higher formal correspondence between rights and duties</td>
<td>Higher <em>de facto</em> correspondence between rights and duties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stronger loyalty through socialization in the naturalization procedure</td>
<td>Less disloyalty through reduced retreat of excluded persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Republicanism</td>
<td>Membership status guarantees non-domination of the individual</td>
<td>Alien voting rights symbolizes that the valuation of diversity is structurally ingrained in the society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recognition as same and (therefore as) of equal worth</td>
<td>Recognition as different (as others) but of equal worth</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: *Motivational* functions of the two pathways to political inclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic Theory</th>
<th>Access to Citizenship</th>
<th>Alien Enfranchisement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Security → Freedom of fear in the conduct of voting</td>
<td>Personal autonomy → Free from social expectations in the conduct of voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classical Republicanism</td>
<td>Naturalization as socialization process → Loyalty → Participation out of a sense of duty</td>
<td>Voting practice as socialization process → Experience → Participation out of a sense of confidence/competence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Republicanism</td>
<td>Recognition as “one of us” → Identification with the political community → Participation out of a sense of identity</td>
<td>Recognition as different but equal → Identifying the polity as worthy → Participation out of a sense of being invited and of realizing its importance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more progressive evaluation of political inclusion of immigrant residents will thus weigh both pathways equally. The result is that most European countries show an even higher democratic deficit in respect to the electoral inclusion of immigrants than they do in our current results (we present the results of alternative weighting schemes in Appendix III).
e. Broadening the group of people who should be included beyond residents

The most significant theoretical limitation of the IMIX as it stands now is certainly due to the fact that we stuck to the still dominant assumption in normative democratic theory that only those who live on the territory of a democratic nation-state should be included into the * demos. We have witnessed (and participated in) an intensive debate among theorists of democracy on the right criteria for determining the legitimate boundaries of the * demas* (e.g. Benhabib 2005, Bohman 2007, Bauböck 2007, Goodin 2007, Miller 2009, Beckman 2009, Song 2009, Koenig-Archibugi 2012, Näström 2011, Blatter 2011). The growing transnational flows and interdependencies provide the background for arguments that we should exchange the principle of “all subjected to law” by the principle of “all affected by law” in defining who should be included in democratic decision-making. Although we clearly side with those who are convinced that granting political rights only to those who reside within the territory of a nation-state is not a defensible position anymore in a world of massive transboundary flows and (inter)dependencies (Schlenker and Blatter 2013, Blatter and Schlenker 2014), the normative standards that we applied so far for the IMIX remain rooted in such a stance. We have made it clear right from the beginning why we did so: We wanted to highlight the fact that even from a conservative point of view, established European democracies suffer from considerable deficits with respect to their electoral inclusiveness. A more progressive normative stance would make the gap between existing legal norms and realities and the normative imperatives even more striking.

But maybe this has to be qualified, since more and more nation-states include people living outside their territorial boundaries electorally. They are not only very lenient for allowing their emigrants and their decedents to keep their citizenship, but invest more and more to make voting from abroad easy for this group (Bauböck 2005). Nevertheless, it is far from clear whether this group that is included should be included from the point of view of normative theories of democracy. In order to overcome this most serious theoretical limitation of the IMIX, it is necessary to consult the normative literature in order to arrive at standards in two respects: (a) Should emigrants be included and for how long?; and (b) Should affected externals (non-citizen non-residents) be included and how? Based on the answers, we would have to develop corresponding measures to analyze the citizenship and the electoral laws and practices. We expect that with respect to emigrants many countries might already be over-inclusive (Caramani and Strijbis 2013); and we know that currently no democracy has included affected
externals in their electoral process. The latter fact is not a legitimate reason for excluding such an evaluative standard, if we come up with a convincing reason for such a standard based on normative theories of democracy.
References


Appendix

I. Documentation of indicator selection, coding, and aggregation

Ia. De jure access to citizenship (DJcit)

Sources:
- CITLAW indicators (see Jeffer et al. 2012)
- CITIMPL indicators (see Huddleston 2013)

Calculation and aggregation (all indicator values transformed from 0-1 to 0-100):

General rule for the selection of indicators:
- Target group must directly involve immigrants or their descendants
- Indicator must reflect a measure that can be justified by both liberal and republican theories; if at least one theory clearly does not ‘support’ the indicator, it is not included

Justification of the aggregation rules and weighting schemes:
- Equal weights on the second level: No strong theoretical reason to weigh differently; different aspects are more relevant from different perspectives;
- Birthright indicator (ASOL): only jus soli is included, since this is the most appropriate mechanism for territorial inclusiveness;
- Naturalization indicators (ANAT):
  - Ordinary naturalization is of primary importance in the context of inclusion; also, it is the better mechanism for inclusion than special naturalization; thus, restrictions here are more relevant and should be assessed accordingly (double weight on ordinary naturalization); the scores are
also differentiated according to whether naturalization is an entitlement (as coded by EUDO) – if it is an entitlement, the score is increased.

-7*a  restrictions on residence are most important

[.0*c]  language requirements are not defensible from a liberal point of view, since it involves an implicit punishment of socio-economically weak groups

.1d/e/f all further requirements of assimilation, clean criminal records, and economic resources cannot be justified by our theories and must lead to lower values (as coded by EUDO)

- CITIMPL only concerns ordinary naturalization; thus we aggregate it with this indicator, but weigh it less, because the law is more important than its implementation, but still should be accounted for to capture more nuanced mechanisms of exclusion.

- Special naturalization is of secondary importance in the context of inclusion; also, it should be a surrogate of the ordinary mechanism; thus, restrictions here are less relevant and should be weighted accordingly.

-5*ANAT07 socialization is an very important and sensible reason for naturalization

.5*ANATFAM family transfers are important for immigrants and their communities

all other indicators for special naturalization are excluded, because they are quite extraordinary and thus not sufficiently relevant

- Dual citizenship indicators:

- The possibility of multiple citizenship touches the core of liberal and republican notions of inclusion, especially of their reformulations in an age of transnational relations – and the imperatives for toleration of multiple citizenship are strong, since a political system should not take away inclusion on the grounds of an inclusion into another political system.

ANATOR06b renunciation requirement of foreign citizenship in case of naturalization as the most important and direct provision for immigrants and their possibility to obtain multiple citizenship (similar loss indicators are not included, since we are concerned only with conditions for acquisition)

Ib.  *De jure* alien enfranchisement (DJae)


Coding scheme to measure the *eligibility* of non-national EU citizens (local and regional levels):

100  generally enfranchised

0  generally disenfranchised

Coding scheme to measure the *eligibility* of Third Country Nationals (local and regional levels) and all non-citizen residents (national level):

100  generally enfranchised

50  selected categories enfranchised

0  generally disenfranchised
Deductions for requirements and procedures that impact the actual *access* to these rights:

- **Residence requirement (if eligibility is above zero):**
  
  - 0 residence requirement for the respective category of non-citizen residents (or all sub-categories) to become eligible implies a continuous *residency duration under or equal to five years*, but is either not attached to a status at all, or requires a status that can be obtained in less than five years.
  
  - 20 residence requirement for the respective category of non-citizen residents (or at least one sub-category) to become eligible implies a continuous *residency duration exceeding five years* or, in addition to five years of residence a *residence status is required, the acquisition of which is also non-automatic*.

- **Registration equality (if eligibility is above zero):**
  
  - 0 registration procedure for the respective category of non-citizen residents (or all sub-categories) is *identical* with the one applying to citizen residents (regardless of whether it is automatic or non-automatic).
  
  - 10 registration procedure for the respective category of non-citizen residents (or at least one sub-category) is *non-automatic and non-identical* with the one applying to citizen residents.

  These scores are deducted from the respective eligibility scores to obtain the score for each category of voters.

**Rationale:**

We reduce the eligibility scores by 0.2 and 0.1 for residence requirements and registration equality respectively, because these values are particularly well-suited for a combination with both our basic coding as well as our ordinal classification scheme, allowing us to transform the eligibility scores into the adequate categories and value ranges. For example, a perfect eligibility score (100) would be transformed to correspond to the next lower category if the residence requirement is above our maximum benchmark (100 – 20 = 80), but not to the next lower category if also registration equality is not present (100 – 20 – 10 = 70). By contrast, if there is only registration inequality the scores are reduced in a way that do not lead to ‘categorical shifts’ on our basic classification scheme.

In addition, to obtain cell scores on the sub-national levels, we allot a double weight to TCNs as opposed to non-national EU citizens. This is due to the fact that the enfranchisement of non-national EU citizens is often facilitated by EU Directives, at least in our sample. This means that enfranchising TCNs can be seen as a greater deliberate choice of political communities, and therefore a greater will for inclusion, which should be adequately rewarded.

Also, for each basic indicator on the sub-national levels in federal states, we multiply the values of the cells with a code for the territorial coverage in case only not all respective territorial units on these levels include immigrants the way it is generally done, or in case only a minority of territorial units enfranchises aliens at all. In fact, however, in our sample, this only applies to Germany (where some city-states and Länder do not apply the general rules) and Switzerland (where less than half of all cantons and municipalities grant alien voting rights).

**Codes for territorial coverage:**

*0.75* more than half of the respective territorial units apply the respective enfranchisement laws

*0.5* half of the respective territorial units apply the respective enfranchisement laws

*0.25* less than half of the respective territorial units have enfranchisement laws with scores above 0
Finally, it should be noted that certain types of elections are not held or not applicable in certain countries on certain levels, leading to ‘empty cells’ that cannot be used to calculate an overall score with statistical software in only one step (i.e. by entering the aggregation formula that applies to all countries). Therefore, the final step before aggregation makes sure that each cell contains a value and comparability across countries is not distorted. We do this by substituting the cells that contain the information “not applicable” or “election not held in country” with the other codes for each territorial level in a way that the overall code of the respective level reflects either the value of the only valid code on the respective level, or an average of all the valid codes on the respective level. If a whole level on the sub-national level contains this information, the cells of this level are substituted with the average of the codes of the respective other level. If the whole national level contained this information (which is not the case in our sample, and, most probably, in any other democracy), the average of the codes of the combined sub-national levels would again substitute the codes on the national level.

Cells that contain the information that a certain type of election is only held in certain territorial units (i.e. “… where election is held”) do not change the score for the cell, since in territorial units in which the election is not held no inclusion is possible. Rather, these cells then receive the code that is appropriate for the territorial units in which the election is actually held.

Ic.  **De facto** access to citizenship (citizenship rate and naturalization rate / DFcit)

Construction described in the text (chapter 6).
Source: Eurostat
For estimation of target group (all adult, legal, and long-term non-citizen residents) see Appendix Id.

Id.  **De facto** alien enfranchisement (enfranchisement rate / DFae)

Sources:
- Qualitative data collection for all countries that go beyond the ‘usual inclusion’ of EU citizens on the local level (almost perfectly congruent with the EUDO Electoral Rights database).
- Quantitative data collection, mostly with the help of Eurostat or direct country sources and queries, sometimes with country-specific calculation methods and/or proxies, depending on data availability.

Calculation and aggregation:

\[
\text{enfranchisement rate} = \frac{[\text{NCRenfra}]}{[\text{NCRallt}]}
\]

\[
[\text{NCRenfra}] = \text{Non-Citizen Residents Enfranchised} = 1 \times [\text{NCRenfra} \text{ all}] + 0.5 \times [\text{NCRenfra} \text{ local}]
\]

\[
[\text{NCRenfra} \text{ all}] = \text{[country-specific value / calculation method for the non-citizen residents who are enfranchised on all levels]}
\]

---

34 Tables (migr_acq) and (migr_pop1ctz); cf. tiny.cc/eurostat_migrantstats (July, 22, 2014)
35 Table (migr_pop1ctz); cf. tiny.cc/eurostat_migrantstats
\[ \text{[NCRenfra}_{\text{sub}}] = \text{[country-specific value / calculation method for the non-citizen residents who are enfranchised on the local level only]} \]

\[ \text{[NCRall]}\text{\textsuperscript{36}} = \text{Non-Citizen Residents Adult Legal Long-Term} = \text{[NCRal]} \times \text{[estimate of proportion short-term residents]} \times \text{[NCRal]} \]

\[ \text{[NCRal]} = \text{Non-Citizen Residents Adult Legal (Source: Eurostat}\text{\textsuperscript{37}}) \]

[estimate of proportion short-term residents] is an estimate derived from the European Social Survey from 2010 (ESS 2010), with the following questions and estimation method:

**C26:** Are you a citizen of [country]?

**C30:** What year did you first come live in [country]?

- For each country, we then estimated the proportion of non-citizen residents who have lived in the country less than 5 years (answer to C30 < 2006)
- If the proportion estimated was 0 (due to relatively low numbers of cases in countries with low proportions of non-citizen residents), the value was readjusted to 0.05, since we assume that there is a minimum proportion of short-term immigrants in any country in our sample. If the proportion estimated exceeded 0.20, it was cut back to 0.20 (e.g. LU) to make sure that special cases with exceptionally high proportions of short-term immigrants cannot escape our basic normative imperatives. After all, we think that even if there is a large share of short-term immigrants, no country should exclude more than a total of 20% of their total population of immigrants.
- For all countries that are included in our sample but not in the ESS, we imputed the values with the predicted average values of a number of regression models which were based on the information of all other cases as well as specially selected predictor variables such as the net migration rate or the share of the foreign-born population.

---

\text{\textsuperscript{36}} This basic target group of non-citizen residents was also used in the denominators for the citizenship rate and the naturalization rate.

\text{\textsuperscript{37}} Table (\texttt{migr_pop1ctz}); cf. tiny.cc/eurostat_migrantstats
II. The results with a “democratic deficit” frame

Here, we present our findings in an alternative version (see chapter 3), using a “democratic deficit” frame. Therefore, the values are displayed as negative values, with zero marking the ideal-point where there is no deficit (which translates into the maximum on the inclusiveness scale). The weighting scheme is the same as above.

Figure 2b: Share of non-citizens among the population (de facto citizenship deficit)

Figure 3b: De facto naturalization deficit
Figure 4b: Alien enfranchisement (sub-)component deficits

Figure 5b: *De jure* citizenship deficit
Figure 6b: *De facto* deficit

Figure 7b: *De jure* deficit
III. Results with different weighting schemes for access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement

In the paper, we have opted for a quite conservative weighting scheme, assigning a triple weight to the access to citizenship as opposed to alien enfranchisement (henceforth abbreviated as IMIX 3cit_1ae). The following illustrations show how the resulting absolute values of the IMIX and its dimensions change if we apply alternative schemes (i.e. IMIX 2cit_1ae, IMIX 2cit_2ae, and IMIX 3cit_2ae). *Note that these weights only apply to the means/pathways of access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement, not to the de jure and de facto dimensions, which are always weighed equally after being calculated as combinations of the respective access to citizenship and alien enfranchisement components.* Generally, we find that applying various more progressive schemes that put more weight on alien enfranchisement lead to lower values, making our overall evaluation of the democracies under scrutiny even more negative. Nevertheless, a correlation analysis of the different resulting values reveals that the IMIX is quite robust, at least in terms of its relative variations produced by different weighting schemes ($r > 0.9$ for all combinations).
Illa. *De facto* inclusiveness with different weighting schemes
IIIb. *De jure* inclusiveness with different weighting schemes
Illc. IMIX with different weighting schemes
III. Differences in the IMIX with different weighting schemes

*Differences in absolute scores on the IMIX with different weighting schemes (against the baseline of IMIX 3cit_1ae)*
Differences in the country ranking in the IMIX with different weighting schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>IMIX 3cit_1ae</th>
<th>IMIX 2cit_1ae</th>
<th>IMIX 3cit_2ae</th>
<th>IMIX 2cit_2ae</th>
</tr>
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<td>AT</td>
<td>LU</td>
<td>LU</td>
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<td>ES</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Correlations of the IMIX with different weighting schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>IMIX 2cit_1ae</th>
<th>IMIX 3cit_2ae</th>
<th>IMIX 2cit_2ae</th>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMIX 3cit_2ae</td>
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<td>0.99***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMIX 2cit_2ae</td>
<td>0.92***</td>
<td>0.97***</td>
<td>0.98***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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</table>

38 Countries that have identical values are ordered alphabetically.
IV. Some disaggregated analyses

IVa. Correlation matrix of all (sub-)components, dimensions, and the IMIX (based on IMIX 3cit_1ae)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>citizenship rate</th>
<th>nat. rate</th>
<th>DFcit</th>
<th>DFe</th>
<th>DF</th>
<th>DJcit</th>
<th>DJae</th>
<th>DJ</th>
<th>IMIX</th>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalization rate</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DFcit</td>
<td>0.63**</td>
<td>0.81***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enfranch. rate / DFe</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>0.69***</td>
<td>0.70***</td>
<td>0.95***</td>
<td>0.52*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DJcit</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>DJae</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>DJ</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>0.60**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IMIX</td>
<td>0.60**</td>
<td>0.74***</td>
<td>0.86***</td>
<td>0.55*</td>
<td>0.89***</td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.58**</td>
<td>0.65***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some notable coefficients are in **bold italics**

To gauge the relationships of the elements in our index, here we display a correlation matrix of all (sub-)components, dimensions as well as the most aggregate level of the IMIX (using the IMIX 3cit_1ae). Whenever possible, we use the original values and scaling of our disaggregated indicators – only the dimensions of *de jure* and *de facto* inclusiveness as well as the IMIX are based on or derived from our ordinal classification scheme. Among other things, the matrix shows that the *de jure* and *de facto* aspects of the access to citizenship are not related in a consistent way. By contrast, these two aspects seem closely related for alien enfranchisement. Furthermore, both the *de jure* aspects of the two means as well as the *de facto* aspects of the two pathways are not correlated significantly – and this is true for the aggregated dimensions as well. Lastly, the final value of the IMIX is, logically, highly influenced by the two dimensions it consists of, but its variation resembles the *de facto* dimension more closely.
IVb. Dimensional analysis of all (sub-)components

When applying the common extraction criterion of a minimum eigenvalue of 1, a principal component analysis indicates that the original (sub-)components of our index (before normalization) distribute along two dimensions, singling out de jure access to citizenship and the citizenship rate as separate from all other (sub-)components, which themselves seem to be highly correlated. However, the citizenship rate has a negative loading. Furthermore, the internal consistency the items loading on the first component is not very high, but would still be sufficiently reliable for an additive scale (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.63). By contrast, the internal consistency of the items (one reversed) loading on the second component is very low (alpha = 0.13).

**Component loadings of the index (sub-)components** (eigenvalue > 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DJcit</td>
<td>0.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJae</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship rate</td>
<td>-0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naturalization rate</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enfranchisement rate</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variance explained (cumulative)**

|            | 42.8% | 65.6% |

N = 22; orthogonal varimax rotation; loadings lower than 0.40 not shown

When adjusting the extraction criterion to a minimum eigenvalue below 1, but keeping it above 0.8, we end up with three dimensions. The two components for alien enfranchisement line up together, while there is a cross-loading for the naturalization rate, clustering with both citizenship laws and the citizenship rate. These, in turn, seem to be independent in this analysis. Nonetheless, the internal consistency of these items are very low for both the combination of DJcit with the naturalization rate (alpha = 0.16) as well as combination of the citizenship rate with the naturalization rate (alpha = 0.29). By contrast, the two components for alien enfranchisement would be very reliable for an additive scale (alpha = 0.78).

**Component loadings of the index (sub-)components** (eigenvalue > 0.8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component 1</th>
<th>Component 2</th>
<th>Component 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DJcit</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJae</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>citizenship rate</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>naturalization rate</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>enfranchisement rate</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Variance explained (cumulative)**

|            | 35.1% | 60.3% | 84.8% |

N = 22; orthogonal varimax rotation; loadings lower than 0.40 not shown

Hence, the results of the disaggregated correlation analysis above are confirmed: while there seems to be a strong connection of the two aspects of alien enfranchisement, the connection of the three elements of the access to citizenship is much more diffuse, if present at all. A correlational approach to aggregation would thus rather see the two means/pathways as the main dimensions; that is, a correlational approach might change the hierarchy in our concept. However, within our normative and ontological approach to concept formation, these correlational considerations do not play a significant role.
The following figures juxtapose the different dimensions and components. They show that neither the dimension nor the components are significantly related, though the correlation coefficients all point to the positive direction. Among other things, this supports our finding that alien enfranchisement is not used as a substitute for the access to citizenship.

IVc.  *De jure* VERSUS *de facto* inclusiveness (based on IMIX 3cit_1ae)

![Graph showing the correlation between de jure and de facto inclusiveness](image)

\[ r = 0.26 \text{ (n.s.)} \]
IVd. *De jure* access to citizenship VERSUS alien enfranchisement (*raw values*)

\[ r = 0.25 \text{ (n.s.)} \]

IVe. *De facto* access to citizenship VERSUS alien enfranchisement (*categorical values*)

\[ r = 0.31 \text{ (n.s.)} \]
IVf. Varieties of electoral inclusiveness with respect to immigrants – some country spiders

The following graphics show some notable country configurations, with examples evenly distributed along the IMIX scale. This points to a further possible usage of our tool, which is to analyze different ‘varieties of electoral inclusiveness with respect to immigrants’. Moreover, such analyses may also serve as starting points for more in-depth single and/or configurative comparative case studies.