

# European Political Science Review

<http://journals.cambridge.org/EPR>

Additional services for *European Political Science Review*:

Email alerts: [Click here](#)

Subscriptions: [Click here](#)

Commercial reprints: [Click here](#)

Terms of use : [Click here](#)



---

## Divided loyalty? Identification and political participation of dual citizens in Switzerland

Andrea Schlenker

European Political Science Review / *FirstView* Article / June 2015, pp 1 - 30  
DOI: 10.1017/S1755773915000168, Published online: 25 June 2015

**Link to this article:** [http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract\\_S1755773915000168](http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1755773915000168)

### How to cite this article:

Andrea Schlenker Divided loyalty? Identification and political participation of dual citizens in Switzerland. *European Political Science Review*, Available on CJO 2015 doi:10.1017/S1755773915000168

**Request Permissions :** [Click here](#)

# Divided loyalty? Identification and political participation of dual citizens in Switzerland

ANDREA SCHLENKER\*

*Institute of Political Science, University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland*

In spite of the recent increase in dual citizenship, there are widespread fears that this double status undermines loyalty towards the state, understood as identification with and political participation in the country of residence. We analyze whether there are systematic differences between dual citizens, mono citizens, and foreign residents in this respect, based on data from a 2013 survey of dual citizens in Switzerland with very different migration backgrounds. The results reveal that controlling for migration-related and socio-demographic factors, dual citizens are more loyal in many respects than foreign residents, but there are no significant differences between dual citizens and mono citizens in their level of identification with Switzerland and political participation there. They are even more likely than mono citizens to participate in serving its interests. In addition, there is no trade-off between these forms of loyalty to the country of residence and identification and political participation in the country of descent. On the contrary, they are positively related. Transnational loyalties seem to co-exist or even to be mutually reinforcing. Thus, dual citizenship does not seem to diminish loyalty to the country of residence and countries therefore do not stand to lose anything by allowing it.

**Keywords:** dual citizenship; transnationalism; loyalty; identification; political participation

## Introduction

During the 20th century vigorous attempts were made, through international norms and state regulations, to ensure that every individual had one, but just one citizenship. Migrants were expected and asked to renounce their former nationality in order to become naturalized in the receiving country and thus to prove their undivided loyalty to the new home country. At the turn of the 21st century, this changed dramatically. An increasing number of states worldwide now permit dual or multiple citizenship and many people use the opportunity to formalize their multiple affiliations. Even many states that do not permit it officially now tolerate it (Brondsted-Sejersen, 2008; Vink and de Groot, 2010).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> While dual citizenship has always existed due to a lack of uniformity in countries' nationality laws (*ius soli* or/and *ius sanguinis*), its proliferation today is facilitated by various factors. In particular, the increase in international mobility, marriage and commerce has driven up the number of dual citizens (often children born to bi-national couples) and the demand for acceptance of dual citizenship. We also witness shifting interests of migrant-sending countries when the constituency abroad is expected to offer benefits in terms of political influence and financial remittances (Guarnizo *et al.*, 2003; Kivisto and Faist 2007: 108–110).

\* E-mail: andrea.schlenker@unilu.ch

This increasing acceptance of dual citizenship, however, should not gloss over the fact that important normative and empirical concerns persist. In many states, dual citizenship is (still) forbidden and is highly contested. Opponents argue that ‘one cannot serve two masters’ and are concerned that loyalty towards the state, national cohesion, and democracy are undermined by dual citizenship (see Faist and Gerdes, 2008: 13). In contrast, proponents underline that allowing dual citizenship is a sign of welcoming newcomers while acknowledging their additional ties; they say it increases the willingness to naturalize and encourages political integration (Bauböck, 2003: 31). Thus, both the normative desirability and the empirical consequences of dual citizenship are disputed.

However, fears and hopes about dual citizens are often built on speculation. The rare empirical studies on this specific group are inconclusive and often struggle with insufficient data (Cain and Doherty, 2006; Staton *et al.*, 2007a; Wong, 2008; Mügge, 2012). Based on comparative data on dual citizens in Switzerland, we want to make an empirical contribution to the question whether dual citizenship endangers the political integration of dual citizens and their loyalty to the residence country. A second passport might offer an easy exit option, but dual citizens can also express their ‘voice as a function of loyalty’ (Hirschman, 1970: 77). We understand loyalty as a two-dimensional phenomenon: first, it signifies a ‘tie that binds’ (Campbell, 2003: 43) or affective political attachment (Shklar, 1993: 188), closely related to feelings of belonging or identity. Second, as Royce (1967: 235) suggests, loyalty is an ‘attitude [which] makes a man give himself to the active service of a cause’. Loyalty to a democratic community can also be expressed by various forms of political participation. Thus, the guiding research question is *whether dual citizens systematically differ from mono citizens in respect to their level of identification and political participation in the country of residence*. This analysis will help to elucidate the broader question of whether immigration states gain from allowing dual citizenship or whether, by contrast, they pay a price by creating citizens who, because of their dual affiliation, feel less attached, are less involved and overall less loyal.

The paper is structured in four parts. First, we provide a definition of the central concept of citizenship and a brief overview of the debate on dual citizenship, allowing us to derive a set of hypotheses about its consequences for identification and political participation. In the second part, we specify our operationalization and describe the methods applied and the data, which is based on a survey among dual citizens and control groups in Switzerland conducted in 2013. The empirical third part includes descriptive analyses illustrating the extent of their identification and political participation in Switzerland in comparison with mono citizens. Furthermore, multivariate analyses will investigate the robustness of the relationships once relevant controls are introduced. A discussion of our findings and their implications in the fourth part, together with the conclusion and some suggestions for future research, rounds off the paper.

## Dual citizenship and its consequences

### *Definition of citizenship*

In general, citizenship, defined as membership of a political community, can be understood in a narrower or a broader sense. It concerns first of all a formal legal status that has an important symbolic value and comes with a bundle of rights and duties (for the Swiss case, see Hainmüller and Hangartner, 2013: 5). In this sense, citizenship or nationality<sup>2</sup> marks the difference between being a tolerated resident and being a full member with equal rights (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 31; Bellamy, 2008: 12).<sup>3</sup> Beyond a legal status and related rights, citizenship, in a broader sense, encompasses other dimensions as well, namely a set of responsibilities and practices that support democratic self-government and a shared collective identity (Faist, 2007; Bauböck, 2008: 3; Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008: 154–156; Jakobson and Kalev, 2013; Schlenker and Blatter, 2014).

Within the context of the Westphalian system of nation-states, it was commonly assumed that all dimensions are necessarily connected and congruent for an adequate understanding of citizenship (Cohen, 1999: 249). Although this has always been a theoretical assumption in need of empirical investigation, it is particularly challenged by the recently booming literature on transnationalism, which underlines the continuing social ties and linkages of immigrants across national borders (Glick Schiller *et al.*, 1992; Basch *et al.*, 1994: 7). Constituting a legal tie that connects an individual to two countries, dual citizenship contradicts the classic understanding of citizenship as single and exclusive affiliation to one state. The implications of this transnational status<sup>4</sup> for the other dimensions of citizenship, citizenship practices and identities and political loyalty in the country of residence are a matter of heated debate. After the following brief overview of this debate, our empirical analysis will trace the different dimensions of citizenship separately and analyze the relationships between them – (dual) formal status and related rights on the one hand, and identification, political participation and overall loyalty on the other hand.

### *A brief overview of the debate on dual citizenship*

For a long time, (multiple) membership of political communities was not an issue of concern as belonging was determined by estates rather than by nation-states.

<sup>2</sup> While nationality defines whether a person is considered a citizen of a particular state, citizenship characterises the nature of a national's rights and responsibilities. Since this legal distinction is little known, we use the terms interchangeably when we refer to citizenship as status.

<sup>3</sup> Besides active and passive voting rights at the national level and full security of residence, citizenship confers additional social rights, and benefits in many countries. Jobs in the public sector are usually reserved for nationals, for example Howard (2009: 7).

<sup>4</sup> In fact, dual citizenship is first of all a plurinational status. However, since the broader usage of the term 'transnational' is more common, we also use it here for dual citizenship which, for Fox (2005), is the transnational form of citizenship par excellence.

However, this has changed since the second half of the 19th century, when nationality became more exclusive. After that, dual citizenship was a situation to be avoided. One reason was a concern that issues of diplomatic protection of dual nationals could result in conflicts between states. A second and related concern involved the matter of military service (Koslowski, 2003). Concerns over diplomatic protection are less relevant in an era of international sensitivity to human rights, and the matter of military service is increasingly regulated by treaties between countries. Still, where borders are contested and former empires like Hungary and Russia grant dual citizenship to ethnic kin people in neighbouring states, which in turn fear for their integrity, this can become a major source of tension (Bauböck, 2010; Riedel, 2012). But also in Western European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, dual citizenship is still a highly controversial and politically salient issue (Schrüter *et al.*, 2005; Faist, 2007; Naujoks, 2009).<sup>5</sup> In contrast and, in light of the rather exclusive citizenship regime, surprisingly, the acceptance of dual citizenship in Switzerland in 1992 did not trigger a broad debate, although the right-wing Swiss People's Party (SVP) attacked this right repeatedly.<sup>6</sup>

The question whether dual citizenship should be accepted is debated first and foremost from two angles: as a matter of justice, on the one hand, and as a matter of consequences, on the other. Proponents of dual citizenship argue that the rules of inclusion in the political community should be accessible and welcoming in order to diminish the existing incongruence between residents subject to law and citizens who are entitled to participate in law-making. As only full citizenship provides immigrants with the right to vote in national elections – only a few countries worldwide grant this right to resident non-citizens<sup>7</sup> – its accessibility and thus equal opportunities for migrants are interpreted as a matter of justice. In contemporary nation-states, even those with a federal system, the national level is (still) the most decisive arena for political decision making, which highlights the importance of citizenship. Furthermore, granting citizenship is seen as an act of recognition by which the receiving community welcomes the immigrant (Bauböck, 2003: 31). Critics of dual citizenship, however, reply that the right to vote in two countries is unjust: first, because one cannot live in two countries simultaneously. Dual citizens who are entitled to participate in law-making in the country of origin do not have to face the consequences of their decisions. Second, their easy exit option would create differently committed political choices in the country of residence (e.g. Naujoks, 2009). And lastly, such unjustified double voting rights would undermine the basic

<sup>5</sup> Germany has accepted dual citizenship for EU and Swiss citizens since 2007. All other foreign nationals have to decide whether to keep their existing nationality or naturalise in Germany. The latest amendment of German citizenship law in 2014 allows dual citizenship for those born in Germany and with at least 8 years of schooling in Germany.

<sup>6</sup> As early as 2004, SVP representative Jasmin Hutter introduced a motion entitled 'exclusion from dual citizenship right', which was rejected (see Achermann *et al.*, 2010: 28–29).

<sup>7</sup> Only New Zealand, Chile, Malawi, and Uruguay confer political rights at the national level (Pedroza 2014: 3).

principle of equality of citizens, expressed by ‘one person, one vote’ (Goodin and Tanasoca, 2014).<sup>8</sup>

When dual citizenship is debated as a matter of consequences, the discussion focuses especially on its potential effects on the integration of immigrants. This concerns, on the one hand, possible consequences for their socio-economic integration such as employment or income. There is an empirically well-founded consensus that naturalization has strong potential to improve immigrants’ economic situation (e.g. Bevelander and Pendakur, 2012; Steinhardt, 2012). Whether this positive relationship is affected by the retention or renunciation of the citizenship of origin is, however, not clear (Mazzolari, 2009; Vink and Schmeets, 2013).

On the other hand, an even more debated question is whether dual citizenship has an impact on the political and socio-psychological integration of immigrants. There is considerable evidence that the acceptance of dual citizenship lowers obstacles to naturalization and thus increases naturalization rates (Schröter *et al.*, 2005; Vink *et al.*, 2013). However, findings on the impact of naturalization on identification and political participation in the country of residence when the former nationality is retained are ambiguous. Several studies conclude that dual nationals are less attached to the country of residence and less politically involved than naturalized immigrants who have not kept their former nationality. In the US context, Cain and Doherty (2006) found that dual citizens are significantly less likely to vote in comparison with mono US citizens. This finding is strengthened by Staton *et al.* (2007a), who also report that dual citizens are less likely to participate in non-electoral political activities, to express high levels of civic duty, to identify as Americans and to consider the United States their homeland. Both studies use data on first-generation Latinos. Interestingly, the disconnecting effect of dual citizenship did not hold beyond the first generation (Staton *et al.*, 2007b).

In contrast, Ramakrishnan (2005: 93–94) found that dual nationality increases the likelihood of voting among immigrants (except for Cubans) in the United States. Evidence from Canada also revealed that dual citizenship does not diminish civic participation and the sense of belonging to Canada (Wong, 2008: 87). While dual citizens seem to engage less in political participation, the author points to significant differences between ethnic groups in this respect. Analysing Turkish and Surinamese immigrants in the Netherlands, Mügge even concludes that ‘migrants with dual nationality are more likely to participate in the host country’s political life than those who only have Dutch nationality’ (Mügge, 2012: 15).

Thus, the empirical evidence on the impact of dual citizenship on identification and political participation in the country of residence is inconclusive. While most studies concentrate on the US context, quantitative and representative data on dual citizens in Europe – at least to our knowledge – does not yet exist.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, the

<sup>8</sup> For these reasons, dual citizens in the European Union are not allowed to vote twice in European elections.

<sup>9</sup> Mügge (2012), for example, relies on interviews with 100 respondents based on a snowball sampling procedure.

existing studies analyze first-generation immigrants and are based on small sample sizes. Cain and Doherty's (2006) results, for example, are based on 157 dual citizens from very different countries of origin. This makes it impossible to control for the impact of the second or former nationality. The present study, based on data from a recent survey designed especially for the purpose, helps to close this research gap. In the following section, based on the arguments in the lively political and normative debate, we present two hypotheses on the relationship between dual citizenship and loyalty expressed by identification and political participation.

### *Hypotheses on dual citizens' identification and political participation*

One of the major objections to dual citizenship is a suspected conflict of loyalty. Formal ties to more than one country run counter to the widespread expectation that immigrants should not only '*share* the national identity of the receiving society', but '*accept it as overriding all other affiliations*' (Bauböck, 2002: 11). Especially in the event of conflict or war, a state depends on the undivided loyalty of its nationals, who are called to arms in its service. But even without such an extreme event, many fear that dual citizenship is similar to 'bigamy' and promotes a betrayal of one's commitment to the country of residence (e.g. Renshon, 2005).<sup>10</sup> Thus, a first set of arguments is based on the communitarian understanding of citizenship (Blatter, 2011): dual nationals endanger collective identity, loyalty, and solidarity among members of the political community because they have an easy exit option, dissipating patriotism (Renshon, 2005: 54–78, 167–191; also Huntington, 2004). This may even lead to the dilution of state-based identities (Spiro, 2008) or at least to the devaluation of citizenship when multiple passports are simply managed and used at one's convenience (Ong, 1999).

A second set of arguments focuses on rather liberal and deliberative concerns. Individuals' limited (time) capacities make it very likely that those who are members of two polities at the same time have less time and fewer resources to become thoroughly informed about the issues in each polity in comparison with those who belong to just one. In consequence, they are also less inclined to participate (Renshon, 2005: 150; Cain and Doherty, 2006: 93). Huntington (2004: 212), for example, suggests that dual citizens either focus their effort on politics in one state, ignoring their duties in the other, or neglect their responsibilities in both. Thus, if dual nationality has an influence on political involvement, it is a negative one, diverting attention, motivation, and loyalty. This sceptical stance towards dual citizenship can be called the traditional or assimilationist view based on (exclusive) affiliation and assimilation in the country of residence (see also Staton *et al.*, 2007a).

<sup>10</sup> In Switzerland, there is currently a debate about whether dual citizens should be allowed to occupy representative diplomatic positions (*Schweiz am Sonntag*, 2014). In Finland, a group of ministers recently agreed to investigate whether or not civil servants with dual citizenship could pose a risk to national security (Uutiset, 2014).

It basically assumes a zero-sum or antagonistic relationship between different affiliations in the sense that those who (still) have another nationality are necessarily less loyal to their country of residence (Tsuda, 2012: 635; Erdal and Oeppen, 2013: 878). According to this view, we can expect that:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Dual citizens identify less with the country of residence and participate less in its politics than mono citizens.

On the other hand, proponents of liberal naturalization regulations and dual citizenship deny any negative effect of transnational ties on national integration (e.g. Hammar, 1985). They see the acceptance of dual citizenship as an instrument that not only facilitates the socio-economic and cultural integration of immigrants but also stimulates their political involvement. 'By encouraging naturalization of immigrants and expanding the 'training ground' in which people learn transferable political skills' (Bloemraad *et al.*, 2008: 168), it can have an activating effect on political participation and also on identification (e.g. Bloemraad, 2004; Bevelander and Pendakur, 2010: 75; De Rooij, 2012: 460). Instead of exit, voice is then an important means to express political preferences, which are also more likely to be taken into consideration by politicians (Faist and Gerdes, 2008: 9). The right to vote, beyond being a matter of justice as discussed above, is also assumed to induce political interest and other forms of political participation, irrespective of whether this right is held in multiple countries. From this perspective, the status of (dual) citizenship is seen as a regulatory institution that has the effect of socializing new members in political practices (Gerdes and Faist, 2007: 63–64). In addition, political socialization and skills learned in one context can be transferred to another. As participation in any political community enhances the (sense of) individual autonomy, it can be a trigger for political participation in other contexts too (Portes, 1999: 471).

Beyond the positive effect of the acceptance of dual citizenship on naturalization rates (Vink *et al.*, 2013) and of naturalization on political integration, the former can also be perceived as an act of recognition by which the receiving community welcomes and accepts the immigrant, encompassing his/her past and continuing ties to the country of origin (Bauböck, 2003: 31). This in turn encourages a sense of belonging to the country of residence and boosts political involvement. Creating equal opportunities for migrants to be fully fledged citizens in multiple countries is likely to increase the other dimensions of citizenship as well (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2002). With full membership and an increased sense of empowerment and self-worth, immigrants may feel more attached, more efficacious and interested in dealing with the affairs of the host country while simultaneously maintaining transnational ties (e.g. Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Smith, 2007).<sup>11</sup> Thus, from this transnationalist perspective, dual citizenship is

<sup>11</sup> Even more, continued links to the country of origin through dual citizenship might strengthen the social capital of migrants, in the sense of increased social networks (Portes, 1999: 472) that can further positively impact their political integration.

not negatively related to political integration, but may, instead, actually foster identification and participation in the country of residence. This account assumes that loyalty towards two political communities can co-exist or even that transnational engagement in two countries is positively reinforcing (Tsuda, 2012: 635), synergistic (Erdal and Oeppen, 2013: 878) or simply complementary (Dekker and Siegel, 2013: 4). Thus, even the more cautious assumption suggests a negation of the traditional hypothesis elaborated above:

HYPOTHESIS 2: Dual citizens do not identify less with the country of residence and do not participate less in its politics than mono citizens.

## **Operationalization, data and methods**

### *Operationalization*

In general, dual citizenship is acquired by three avenues: first, migrants who successfully apply for citizenship are allowed to keep their former nationality. Second, children of multinational couples are eligible for the nationalities of their parents. Third, children born to foreign parents in a country with birthright citizenship receive the nationality of their country of residence and can apply for the nationality of their parents. Our analysis includes the first two categories (naturalized dual citizens and those who acquire dual citizenship by birth). Switzerland does not accept the birthright principle for citizenship; children born to foreign parents on Swiss territory do not automatically receive Swiss citizenship.

We operationalize our dependent variables along the following lines: the kind of collective identity we are interested in here refers to an individual's identification with a political community (e.g. Brewer, 2001). According to social psychology (e.g. Tajfel, 1981), this involves two operations: first, the individual cognitively ascribes him/herself to this community (self-description); second, this belonging is emotionally relevant (attachment). Third, such identification should also be relevant to the relations towards other members of the community, creating special ties in the sense of obligation. This relational aspect of collective identity will be assessed by feelings of solidarity. We thus assess identification in three ways: by self-description, attachment, and solidarity.

Political participation is conceived broadly and is measured by various indicators. They include two indicators, which can also be considered preconditions of political participation. First, we assess the extent of interest paid to politics at the national and lower levels (see, e.g. Huddy and Khatib, 2007). Second, political knowledge is measured by a multiple-choice question asking whether respondents know the name of the current Swiss minister of finance. Furthermore, we assess various common forms of political participation covering, first of all, stated and intended participation in elections as well as non-electoral forms of participation such as contacts to politicians or media (Verba and Nie, 1972). As introduced by Barnes *et al.* (1979), unconventional forms of political participation are also relevant,

Table 1. Operationalization of the dependent variables

	Indicators
Identification	Self-description as Swiss Attachment to Switzerland Solidarity with all Swiss
Political participation	Interest in Swiss politics Knowledge of Swiss politicians Voting/vote intention in national elections Non-electoral participation
Loyalty	Participation in the (perceived) interests of Switzerland

namely legal protest activities such as participating in demonstrations and signing petitions (see also Jennings *et al.*, 1990). The different forms of non-electoral participation will be combined by constructing a scale.

Finally, we also include a measure, which can be regarded as an indicator of loyalty itself, combining identification and participation. Identification should ultimately guide behaviour in the group's interests and, vice versa, political participation can best be regarded as a function of loyalty to a political community when it is actively serving its cause (Royce, 1967: 235). We will assess this by asking in the interest of which country individuals act when they participate in politics. Table 1 gives a (simplified) overview of our operationalization (for question wordings, see Appendix).

### Data

Our analysis is based on quantitative, cross-sectional data from a survey among dual citizens, mono citizens, and foreign residents in Switzerland financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation and conducted by a professional survey institute (LINK). Many international and national surveys include indicators of identification and political participation but not dual nationality. The questions customarily used in these surveys served as a basis for the questionnaire for our own survey, to ensure that the results were comparable with existing findings while assessing all relevant dimensions of citizenship.

We chose Switzerland as country of residence as it has been a frontrunner in Europe in accepting dual citizenship, doing so back in 1992. Dual citizens now make up a significant percentage of the Swiss population. The 2000 census revealed that more than 10% of the seven million Swiss citizens have a second passport (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2011).<sup>12</sup> The large population of foreign nationals (21% in 2009) and the fact that 36% of marriages in 2009 were bi-national ensure

<sup>12</sup> This number does not include Swiss citizens living abroad: in 2010, 695,101 were registered as 'Swiss living abroad', 70% of whom are dual nationals (EDA, 2011).

that this already significant number of dual citizens in Switzerland will continue to grow steadily.

In order to have sufficient numbers from one national background to control for it, we selected three countries of origin<sup>13</sup> with very different migratory ties to Switzerland: Germany as, currently, the major source of new and mostly highly qualified migrants, Italy as the most important country of origin of former, less qualified ‘Gastarbeiter’, and Kosovo as one of the main sources of refugees and newer, less qualified labour migrants. By selecting these different nationalities (in addition to the Swiss), which make up the largest share of immigrants into Switzerland and which are often the focus of considerable media interest, we hoped to capture the range of possibilities while simultaneously facilitating comparative analyses.

Unfortunately, as in many other countries, dual citizenship is not documented in any official register in Switzerland. Our sampling procedure, however, was designed to reach enough dual citizens and relevant control groups, namely mono citizens and foreign residents with a permanent residence permit (Permit C). For quantitative analyses, we aimed at around 100 respondents per category for each group. In order to draw a randomly selected sample, we received generous support from two Swiss authorities: for contacts to naturalized and foreign immigrants from the selected three nationalities, addresses from the official register of the Federal Office for Migration were randomly selected. Gender (equally distributed) and age (minimum 18) were also taken into account. Autochthonous Swiss citizens were randomly selected from the sampling register of the Federal Office for Statistics. Both samples included mono and dual citizens, who were afterwards assigned to the respective categories. In a first round, we contacted 3855 individuals. In order to reach our quota of dual citizens, we contacted an additional 600 naturalized citizens in a second round. Due to the small percentage of dual citizens by birth among the general Swiss population, they were the most difficult target group. Fortunately, we were able to contact another 492 dual citizens by birth via the online panel of LINK.

We were able to reach or exceed our target for most categories, except for naturalized mono Swiss of German and Italian origin, most of whom have kept their former nationality, and for dual citizens by birth of Kosovar descent.<sup>14</sup> Field work was undertaken between April and July 2013 and was carried out in German,

<sup>13</sup> Country of origin always means the country of the former or second nationality in which the respondent currently does not live, irrespective of a personal migration background. Selecting specific groups is common to surveys among immigrants (Font and Mendez, 2013: 275).

<sup>14</sup> This can be explained by the fact that our sample mainly includes persons who became naturalised between 2008 and 2012. By this time, Italy (since 1998) and Germany (since 2002) had already accepted dual citizenship with Switzerland. Although this is also the case for immigrants of Kosovar origin, apparently when naturalising in Switzerland members of this group have more incentive to give up their former nationality, which does not offer European citizenship. Since Kosovo has only existed as an independent state since 2008, many respondents might have preferred to give up their former Yugoslavian or Serbian passport without making the effort to apply for the Kosovar passport (yet). Their low number of dual citizens by birth might be due to the fact that compared with the other two groups, this is one of the most recent immigrant groups in Switzerland.

Table 2. Sample by category

Categories	Second/former/foreign citizenship			N
	German	Italian	Kosovar	
Dual citizens by birth	49	151	1	201
Dual citizens by naturalization	333	198	197	728
Mono citizens by naturalization	14	16	108	138
Mono citizens by birth				285
Permanent foreign residents	183	118	111	412
Total N by random quota				1764

French, Italian, and Albanian.<sup>15</sup> The overall response rate was ~35.5%, which is not an unusually low rate among individuals with migration backgrounds (see Lipps *et al.*, 2013). The sample for this analysis includes, overall, 1764 respondents: 929 dual citizens, 423 mono Swiss citizens, and 412 foreign residents (Table 2).<sup>16</sup>

## Methods

Our research design is factor-centric (Sieberer, 2011). In order to single out the main independent variable (dual citizenship), we differentiate between dual citizens and those with only Swiss citizenship and those without Swiss citizenship. As also the dependent variables (identification and political participation) take the individual as the level of analysis, we have to control for other potentially relevant factors on the individual level. Two factors are closely related to status, thus constituting possibly confounding variables. First, we control for the difference between those who are Swiss citizens by birth and those who are naturalized. Second, we control for the second or former nationality. Furthermore, due to the (personal or inherited) migration background of our target group, we will take generation and linguistic competence into account as important influences on integration in general, and on identification (Staton *et al.* 2007a) and political participation (Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999) in particular. A dummy variable is constructed that distinguishes first-generation immigrants from those who live in the country in the second generation or longer.<sup>17</sup> Linguistic integration is assessed with sensitivity to the different language regions in Switzerland. In addition, feelings of discrimination may exert

<sup>15</sup> A total of 66% were conducted in German, 11.5% in French, 12.4% in Italian, and 10.1% in Albanian.

<sup>16</sup> In order to check the questionnaire and the length of interview, a pre-test with 48 interviews was conducted. During the final survey, 1307 interviews were conducted as online interviews and 457 as written interviews at the participants' request. The interviews were on average 32 min long; the median was 28 min.

<sup>17</sup> This also includes native Swiss. As children born to immigrants are not automatically Swiss, this is not synonymous to the difference between foreign-born and native born citizens. For the sake of parsimony and as it was not significant in any model, we omitted residence duration from the final models.

influence on political participation and even more on identification (e.g. Schildkraut, 2005), especially where a salient minority is concerned, such as Muslims in Switzerland; 78% of our Kosovar respondents reported to be Muslim.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the usual socio-demographic variables are included, such as gender and age, as well as variables from the ‘standard socio-economic status model’ (Verba and Nie, 1972; Barnes *et al.*, 1979). Individuals with high levels of education and socio-economic resources are more likely to adopt psychological orientations that motivate their political participation (for a review, see Leighley, 1995). Income is a sensitive question in Switzerland, which many of our respondents did not answer. As income and education level usually correlate, we opt for education as a control variable.<sup>19</sup>

In order to check the reliability of the results, we will in a second step analyze a reduced sample of only foreign-born Swiss. This sample, thus, will not represent the general population the majority of which are native born citizens. This reduced sample allows us to evaluate whether the results are robust when analysing more comparable groups of respondents who all have an immigration background. This sample also allows the inclusion of the transnational dimension in the sense of an identification with and political participation in the country of descent.<sup>20</sup> This final set of control variables will thus assess whether our results on the transnational status of dual citizens change once we also include transnational identities and practices.

The following empirical part will include descriptive results (comparisons of percentages and means with *t*-tests) and multivariate analyses based on logistic and linear regressions. We are aware of the fact that analysing the effect of (dual) citizenship is difficult because of the selective nature of the naturalization process.<sup>21</sup> Possible effects of citizenship may be caused by characteristics inherent in the individual who becomes naturalized, rather than by the status of citizenship (Vink and Schmeets, 2013: 9–10). They may also be caused by the specific selection criteria applied by the country of residence and inherent in the established rules for naturalization, such as civics tests or direct democratic decisions.<sup>22</sup> As Switzerland

<sup>18</sup> Including nationality and religion in our models would thus cause strong multicollinearity.

<sup>19</sup> Income and education also significantly correlated in our sample ( $r = 0.317$ ). Including income in our models did not reveal a significant impact on any dependent variable but reduced the sample size by 288 respondents.

<sup>20</sup> These questions were not asked to native Swiss and can therefore not be included in the analyses of the whole sample.

<sup>21</sup> Some scholars try to apply specific methodological strategies such as using instrumental variables for cross-sectional datasets (Bevelander and Pendakur 2012), longitudinal analysis with panel data (Steinhardt 2012) or experimental designs for large-scale surveys (Hainmüller and Hangartner 2013).

<sup>22</sup> Until 2003, 44 Swiss municipalities used referenda with closed ballots to decide on naturalisation requests. Hainmüller and Hangartner (2013) have shown how selective – and discriminatory – these direct democratic decisions on naturalisations were. As respondents from our sample became naturalised after 2008, they were not subject to this strong selection bias. Nevertheless, patterns of discrimination in naturalisation processes may still exist, along with forms of potential discrimination that may deter immigrants from applying for citizenship in the first place.

has one of the most exclusive citizenship regimes based on a primarily ethnic definition (Giugni and Passy, 2004), citizenship is seen as a reward for a successful integration process.<sup>23</sup> We can thus assume that there is strong (self-)selection of naturalized (dual) citizens who are more integrated than foreign residents. Overall, we do not claim to establish causal relationships, but aim to discover systematic differences between dual and mono citizens.

## Results

### *Identification*

At first sight, dual citizenship seems to matter for (cognitive) self-description and attachment. While mono Swiss clearly describe themselves as Swiss (on average indicating 8.8 out of 10 points) and feel strongly attached to Switzerland (2.7 out of 3 points), dual citizens are slightly more hesitant, especially in respect to describing themselves as Swiss ( $m = 7.8$  in self-description and 2.6 on attachment)<sup>24</sup>. However, the significant differences between dual and mono citizens disappear once control variables are introduced (Table 3).<sup>25</sup> Multivariate regression analyses reveal that dual citizens do not significantly differ from mono Swiss neither concerning self-description, nor in attachment or solidarity. Also, analysing the reduced sample of only foreign-born residents, dual citizenship does not seem to matter (Table A3a). Not surprisingly, foreign residents are clearly less likely to describe themselves as Swiss; they are, however, equally likely to report attachment to Switzerland and solidarity with all Swiss.<sup>26</sup> What seems to matter beyond the formal status, is not whether one has one or two passports, but whether one is Swiss by birth or by naturalization. Being naturalized considerably reduces the propensity to describe oneself as Swiss, while it increases attachment and solidarity. Furthermore, a former or second Italian passport goes along with less identification with Switzerland and less solidarity, while a German background only matters for solidarity.<sup>27</sup> Two additional factors related to migration background also seem relevant in this respect: linguistic integration increases identification with Switzerland, while feelings of discrimination reduce it. This finding can be set in relation with others'

<sup>23</sup> In Switzerland, the regular naturalisation process is decided on three levels of administration, the local, the cantonal, and the national level, each with its own criteria. Among other criteria, one of the world's longest duration of residence is demanded: while applicants have to live in Switzerland for at least 12 years, some municipalities even demand 12 years of residence within their community. Besides, the fees can be considerable (Helbling 2010).

<sup>24</sup> There are no significant group differences in the average level of solidarity, with 1.8 out of 3 points for each category. For an overview of the comparisons of means with significance tests, see Table A1.

<sup>25</sup> All analyses were also calculated stepwise with the result that the effect of dual citizenship disappears in most analyses once we control for the second or former citizenship.

<sup>26</sup> Analysing foreign-born residents only, non-citizens are also less likely to feel attached and solidary.

<sup>27</sup> The analysis of the reduced sample shows that in comparison with Germans, those of Kosovar descent are more likely to feel attached and solidary.

Table 3. Multivariate analysis of identification

	Self-description		Attachment		Solidarity	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.277	(0.275)	-0.009	(0.070)	-0.075	(0.086)
Not Swiss	-3.278***	(0.255)	0.074	(0.065)	0.026	(0.079)
Naturalization	-0.573*	(0.223)	0.244***	(0.057)	0.171*	(0.070)
Second/former citizenship (ref. Swiss)						
German	-0.497	(0.396)	-0.179	(0.101)	-0.388**	(0.123)
Italian	-0.792*	(0.366)	-0.245**	(0.093)	-0.307**	(0.114)
Kosovar	-0.680	(0.388)	0.001	(0.099)	-0.029	(0.121)
First generation	0.014	(0.198)	0.028	(0.050)	0.110	(0.062)
Linguistic integration	0.553***	(0.074)	0.094***	(0.019)	0.021	(0.023)
Feelings of discrimination	-0.827***	(0.195)	-0.236***	(0.050)	-0.108	(0.061)
Male	-0.023	(0.128)	-0.012	(0.033)	-0.032	(0.040)
Age	0.003	(0.005)	0.001	(0.001)	0.004*	(0.002)
Education	-0.021	(0.019)	-0.009	(0.005)	-0.012*	(0.006)
Intercept	7.106***	(0.628)	2.274***	(0.160)	1.882***	(0.196)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.345		0.083		0.048	
N	1432		1446		1408	

Method: Linear regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.

perceptions in this respect: the more individuals are perceived as ‘foreigners’, the less they identify with the country of residence.<sup>28</sup>

Including identification with the country of descent in the analysis of the reduced sample of foreign-born residents only (Table A3b) the same overall pattern comes up: dual citizens do not differ from mono citizens, while they clearly identify more with Switzerland than foreign residents. This analysis further reveals that there is no systematic and significant relationship between self-description as Swiss and self-description as German, Italian, or Kosovar; the same applies to attachment to both countries. Apparently there is no trade-off between these measures of transnational identification. In contrast, we discover such a trade-off in respect to solidarity: those who feel solidarity towards co-nationals of their country of descent are less likely to feel obliged towards all Swiss. Thus, while simultaneous identification with two countries seems unproblematic, potentially more resource-related feelings of obligation seem to be less easily combined.

<sup>28</sup> There are significant negative correlations between being perceived as a German, Italian, or Kosovar and cognitive or emotional identification with Switzerland (Pearson’s  $R = -0.365^{**}$  and  $-0.157^{***}$ , respectively). Among the other control variables, only age slightly increases solidarity and education slightly reduces it.

Table 4. Multivariate analysis of political participation I

	Voting		Vote intention		Political knowledge	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.112	(0.289)	-0.368	(0.398)	0.113	(0.302)
Not Swiss	-		-		-0.223	(0.295)
Naturalization	-0.059	(0.229)	0.523	(0.366)	0.334	(0.263)
Second/former citizenship (ref. Swiss)						
German	0.446	(0.419)	0.613	(0.620)	0.268	(0.459)
Italian	-0.022	(0.375)	-0.008	(0.524)	-0.232	(0.417)
Kosovar	-1.129**	(0.406)	-0.224	(0.569)	-0.439	(0.443)
First generation	-0.089	(0.250)	0.391	(0.408)	-0.345	(0.232)
Linguistic integration	0.093	(0.095)	0.117	(0.162)	0.117	(0.088)
Feelings of discrimination	0.259	(0.237)	-0.243	(0.336)	-0.484*	(0.206)
Male	0.376*	(0.149)	-0.124	(0.228)	0.169	(0.151)
Age	0.038***	(0.006)	0.039***	(0.009)	0.031***	(0.006)
Education	0.089***	(0.023)	0.123***	(0.035)	0.043	(0.022)
Intercept	-2.593***	(0.744)	-1.746	(0.838)	-0.908	(0.744)
2 log-likelihood	1166.826		562.951		1206.388	
Cox & Snell	0.181		0.074		0.060	
Nagelkerke	0.250		0.157		0.095	
N	1068		992		1284	

Method: Binary logistic regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.

### *Political participation*

About 66% of dual citizens report having participated in the last national elections in Switzerland, which is about 5% more than the percentage of mono citizens. In their intention to vote in the next national election (91% have this intention), they also surpass mono citizens by 7 percentage points. The general problem of social desirability in surveys urges us to interpret self-reported electoral participation carefully as it may be perceived as a civic duty.<sup>29</sup> Again, there is no significant difference between dual and mono citizens when control variables are introduced in binary logistic regressions (Table 4).<sup>30</sup> Among the control variables, having a Kosovar second or former citizenship significantly reduces the propensity to vote, while being male, older and better educated increases it. Also concerning political knowledge, there is no systematic difference: dual citizens are no less likely to be

<sup>29</sup> A total of 58% is the official figure for participation by all Swiss citizens in the last election in 2011 (BFS 2014). The higher percentages for those who intend to vote also demonstrates the difference between intention and eventual action.

<sup>30</sup> This non-influence is confirmed also in the reduced sample analysis (Table A4a).

Table 5. Multivariate analysis of political participation II

	Interest		Non-electoral Participation		Loyalty	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.531	(0.271)	-0.151	(0.326)	-1.232***	(0.329)
Not Swiss	-0.770**	(0.247)	-0.774***	(0.147)	-2.185***	(0.305)
Naturalization	0.560*	(0.217)	-0.180	(0.204)	0.195	(0.262)
Second/former citizenship (ref. Swiss)						
German	0.031	(0.387)	0.204	(0.131)	-0.790	(0.468)
Italian	-0.629	(0.359)	-0.064	(0.207)	-1.276**	(0.432)
Kosovar	-0.802*	(0.380)	-0.285	(0.191)	-1.059*	(0.457)
First generation	-0.145	(0.192)	-0.060	(0.115)	0.063	(0.235)
Linguistic integration	0.187**	(0.071)	0.095*	(0.102)	0.185*	(0.088)
Feelings of discrimination	-0.108	(0.189)	0.392***	(0.038)	0.086	(0.234)
Male	0.377**	(0.125)	0.079	(0.100)	0.323*	(0.152)
Age	0.035***	(0.005)	0.008**	(0.066)	0.010	(0.006)
Education	0.112***	(0.018)	0.053***	(0.003)	0.071**	(0.022)
Intercept	2.833***	(0.613)	0.552***	(0.009)	6.255***	(0.748)
Adjusted $R^2$	0.147		0.113		0.116	
N	1444		1363		1372	

Method: Linear regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.

informed than mono citizens.<sup>31</sup> Controlling for voting and knowledge in the country of descent, we even find a positive relationship between their occurrence in both countries.<sup>32</sup>

Concerning interest in Swiss politics, dual citizens express in absolute numbers, with a mean of 6.7 on a 10 point scale, slightly more interest than mono Swiss with a mean of 6.1. The results of multivariate analyses, however, again reveal that dual citizens do not differ from mono citizens in respect to political interest; here, key factors are again whether respondents are citizens at all – foreign residents being significantly less interested – and whether they are naturalized or Swiss by birth (Table 5). Being naturalized significantly increases the propensity to express political interest. Being of Kosovar descent or having an additional Kosovar passport reduces this likelihood, while linguistic integration increases it. Among the other control variables, the usual suspects – older and better educated men – are more likely to express interest in politics.

Also in respect to non-electoral political participation, which is at a relatively low level for all respondents, dual citizens seem at first sight to be more involved than

<sup>31</sup> Feelings of discrimination have a negative effect in this respect and age has a positive one.

<sup>32</sup> Including voting in the country of descent reduces the sample to dual citizens only (Table A4b).

mono citizens, with a mean of 1.9- on an 8-point scale in comparison with 1.7 for mono Swiss and 1.2 for foreign residents. However, in the multivariate analysis, dual citizens again do not differ from mono citizens. Only foreign residents are significantly less likely to be politically involved in this way. Among our control variables, linguistic integration and feelings of discrimination, as well as age and education, are tied to more non-electoral participation.

The diverse forms of political participation are certainly more resource- and time-consuming than feelings of belonging. Even if one accepts that it is easier for dual citizens to combine or duplicate such feelings in the sense of a transnational approach and that a dual status therefore does not decrease identification with the country of residence, the traditional approach would assume that a dual status has at least a negative impact on political participation in the country of residence. Our results, however, indicate that dual citizenship does not reduce such political participation; in this respect too, they thus run counter to the traditionalist hypothesis and strengthen the transnationalist one. This interpretation is further strengthened by our reliability analyses of the reduced sample of foreign-born residents (Tables A5a and A5b), which reveal the same pattern. In addition, they show that political interest and non-electoral participation in Switzerland is not reduced by equal involvement in the country of descent; on the contrary, they are positively related.

Finally, the high scores of dual citizens on political involvement in the country of residence increase the importance of the question of whose cause is actively served. Our data reveals that dual citizens participate in politics even more in the (perceived) interest of Switzerland than mono Swiss or foreign residents ( $m = 7.6, 7.1,$  and  $5.3,$  respectively). This positive association of dual citizenship to more 'loyalty', measured in this way, is robust even when we introduce the same control variables as above (Table 5).<sup>33</sup> Given that some critics fear that dual nationals could vote according to the will of the government of their other nationality (Naujoks, 2009: 3), these results clearly undermine any assumption of 'directed voting'. A second passport seems to go along with increased loyalty towards the country of residence and not with less or divided loyalty.

## Discussion

This analysis concentrated on associations of dual citizenship with identification and political participation and is thus more correlational than causal and uni-directional. As we do not find any significant negative association of dual nationality with any measure of citizenship identities and practices, however, we can conclude that a dual status does not trigger negative consequences for political

<sup>33</sup> Having a second or former Italian or Kosovar passport has a negative impact in this respect. Linguistic integration, being male and better educated has a positive impact. Analysis of the reduced sample of foreign-born residents only, again, reveals a very similar pattern.

loyalty to and integration in the country of residence. Our results clearly run counter to the traditional or assimilationist perspective that expected a trade-off or zero-sum relationship and gives empirical backing to the transnationalist perspective on dual citizenship. It even seems to go along with increased loyalty, in the sense that dual citizens are more likely to report taking Swiss interests into consideration in their political participation. Our results are thus in line with Mügge's (2012) findings on the Netherlands and deliver counter-evidence to what Cain and Doherty (2006) and Staton *et al.* (2007a) found in the US context.

Furthermore, in line with the findings of other studies (Bevelander and Pendakur, 2010; De Rooij, 2012), our results underline the relevance of naturalization, which does not seem to be reduced by the retention of a second nationality. Those naturalized expressed more attachment, solidarity, and political interest than foreign residents and those who are Swiss by birth. This result is certainly, to a large extent, due to the (self-) selection of those who successfully naturalize in Switzerland (see also Hainmüller and Hangartner, 2013). Indeed, many of our respondents indicated that feelings of belonging and interest in political participation were important reasons to naturalize.<sup>34</sup> These orientations prior to naturalization feed into the generally high level of political participation of naturalized (dual) citizens in Switzerland. While there are considerable differences between the nationalities in this respect,<sup>35</sup> second or former nationality seems not to be important for many of our variables once controls are introduced. In light of the immense diversity of the selected groups in our study, this is an additional important finding.<sup>36</sup>

The differences found between native and naturalized citizens may also be caused by social desirability. We are aware of the problem, which plagues all surveys, especially those conducted among individuals with a migration background, as these are particularly sensitive populations in a survey context (Lipps *et al.*, 2013). This general sensitivity is assumed to be heightened by direct questions concerning identity, solidarity, and loyalty. In Switzerland, it is not just the right-wing SVP that repeatedly bases its political agenda on nationalist or racist topics. Due to the politization and polarization of immigration, our results may therefore overestimate the loyalty of non-native Swiss respondents.<sup>37</sup> It is all the more important

<sup>34</sup> A total of 46% of the 866 naturalised citizens in our sample wanted to express their feelings of belonging to Switzerland by naturalising. For a full 61%, the wish to politically participate in Switzerland was one of the reasons to naturalise.

<sup>35</sup> A total of 81% of naturalised (dual) citizens of German descent, 62% of Italian descent and 38% of Kosovar descent mention their wish to participate in Swiss politics as a reason to naturalise. The original nationality seems clearly related to this motivation – those with a German background were especially interested in political participation. In respect to identification, there are still some, albeit fewer, differences between second/former nationalities; 37.5% of German descent, 59% of Italian descent, and 47.5% of Kosovar descent wanted to express their feelings of belonging to Switzerland by naturalising.

<sup>36</sup> This finding, however, has to be cautiously interpreted because of the low numbers of naturalised mono citizens of German and Italian descent and of Swiss Kosovar dual citizens by birth.

<sup>37</sup> For example, one respondent called and reacted quite angrily to our survey as she assumed that we would take away her Swiss passport if she did not give the 'right' answers.

that also the analyses of a reduced sample of only foreign-born residents, in which this bias should be equally distributed, revealed similar patterns of no difference between dual and mono citizens in all respects, except for the question in whose interest they participate, where we even found a positive relationship.

That there are no significant differences in identification and political participation between dual and mono citizens when migration-related and socio-demographic control variables are included contradicts any fears of divided loyalty caused by dual citizenship. Among the myriad factors that influence loyalty, a dual status does not seem to play a major role.<sup>38</sup> Concerning alternative influences, our analysis did not reveal any difference between first-generation immigrants and others, in contrast to that of Staton *et al.* (2007a, b). What seems relevant in our case is linguistic integration, which increases identification with Switzerland. By contrast, feelings of discrimination understandably reduce it. This finding underlines the role the receiving society and majority population play in the political integration of immigrants in general. While socio-demographic and socio-economic factors are not relevant for feelings of belonging, they proved important for almost all indicators of political participation, which is in line with previous research on political participation (Leighley, 1995).

The transnationalist account is strengthened by further results. Additional analyses showed that the occurrence of non-formal dimensions of transnational citizenship also do not decrease loyalty towards the country of residence. Except for solidarity, there seems to be no trade-off or antagonistic relationship between identification with and political participation in two countries. On the contrary, loyalty to both countries seems to co-exist simultaneously or is even mutually reinforcing (Tsuda, 2012) or complementary (see also Dekker and Siegel, 2013). They may co-exist for different and unrelated reasons. Those who feel that they belong to two countries usually do so for different reasons (Tsuda, 2012: 643). Also political engagement is often encouraged by the country of residence and the country of descent for their own reasons. Alternatively there might be a positively reinforcing relationship: as Tsuda (2012: 638) underlines, ‘a certain amount of resources and stature in the host country is necessary to become actively engaged in home country politics’.<sup>39</sup>

Other studies also show that the acquisition of citizenship by immigrants does not weaken transborder political engagement back home and may in fact increase it

<sup>38</sup> Our models could least explain attachment and solidarity – apparently more complex phenomena for which factors other than those included in these analyses matter.

<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Erdal and Oeppen (2013: 878) conceive of a synergistic relationship between integration and transnationalism when ‘connections to one place give confidence to further develop connections in the other’ or when ‘resources gained in one place are invested to develop further resources in the other’. Such a relationship is plausible for our sample given that our respondents were primarily motivated to retain their former nationality by emotional, personal, and practical reasons, clearly less by the desire to retain political rights in the country of descent. A total of 67% still felt (also) German/Italian/Kosovar and 55% mentioned personal relationships and 74% of Germans and 42% of Italians did not want to lose the privileges of EU citizenship. The right to political participation in the country of origin was mentioned by only 21%.

(Itzigsohn and Saucedo, 2002: 25; Guarnizo *et al.* 2003). Conversely, transnational ties do not necessarily weaken political integration in the country of residence; Gershon and Pantoja (2014), for example, even found that they positively impact Latino immigrants' political integration in the United States.<sup>40</sup> We therefore maintain, with Tsuda (2012: 643), that 'strong immigrant identifications with their homelands certainly do not preclude dual national (i.e. transnational) loyalties, unless the home and host countries are in a highly antagonistic international relationship'.

## Conclusion

Based on comparative data on dual citizens, mono citizens and foreign residents in Switzerland, we can conclude that dual citizens in Switzerland are not less attached and politically involved than mono citizens. Controlling for relevant alternative factors, dual citizenship does not trigger any consequences in respect to most dimensions of loyalty. When directly asked in whose interest they politically participate, dual citizens are even more likely to act in the (perceived) interest of Switzerland. We thus find no evidence of dissipated patriotism among dual citizens (Renshon, 2005), dilution of state-based identities (Spiro, 2008) or a hollowing out of citizenship as such (Ong, 1999). Membership of multiple national communities apparently does not hinder identification with and political participation in the country of residence. Thus, fears about divided loyalty are not backed by our data. Consequently, the already considerable number of dual citizens in Switzerland and the further growth of this number will not cause major problems for national integration or loyalty in Switzerland. On the contrary, because the acceptance of dual nationality promotes naturalization and our results also confirm previous findings that naturalization goes along with stronger feelings of belonging and political involvement, citizenship of the country of residence is important for these central elements of democracy, irrespective of a second passport.<sup>41</sup>

The similar extent of identification and political participation in the country of residence of dual citizens compared with mono citizens does not come at the expense of weak feelings of belonging and low political involvement in the country of their second nationality. In contrast to Jakobson and Kalev (2013), our results do not suggest a zero-sum relationship. Dual citizens in Switzerland are transnationally involved, as scholars of transnationalism suggest (e.g. Vertovec, 2009). While transnational identification seems to co-exist without a trade-off, transnational political participation even seems mutually reinforcing: political participation in one country may help citizens to become more resourceful and efficacious in the other.

<sup>40</sup> There is, however, also some evidence of a trade-off. On the basis of qualitative data from a comparison of four very diverse transnational spaces connecting European to non-European countries, Jakobson and Kalev (2013) found that no dimensions of citizenship were duplicated, that is, existed in two countries simultaneously.

<sup>41</sup> The loyalty of Swiss men with a migration background is repeatedly called into question in the context of military service. Empirical evidence, however, revealed that they are even more motivated and willing to serve than autochthonous Swiss (*Tagesanzeiger*, 2014).

Before generalizing these results, however, we have to take the Swiss context into account. Compared with other countries, Switzerland has a relatively open institutional context, offering citizens diverse avenues and frequent opportunities to participate. The combination of open political institutions and inclusive political strategies characterizes, according to Kriesi *et al.* (1995), the Swiss form of political integration in general. This might facilitate the political integration of dual citizens that we found. However, the specific political opportunity structures for migrants in Switzerland are rather closed due to its exclusive citizenship regime, with the acceptance of dual citizenship being an exception to the otherwise exclusive rule (Giugni and Passy, 2004). The exclusivity of the Swiss national community may counteract the inclusive effect of open political institutions for people with a migration background even after naturalization; or, alternatively, it may further increase identification and participation once they are full citizens. Cross-national analyses with comparable data would be needed in order to situate our results on Switzerland in a broader context.

As we do not find any negative consequences of dual citizenship for political loyalty, our results do not give any empirical backing to the demand that nationality should be singular in principle. As long as there is no conflict between legal norms, rights, and obligations tied to the two nationalities and as long as state borders are not called into question by expansive neighbours, dual citizenship should be accepted as the default position (Bauböck, 2002: 13). Under such circumstances, not tolerance but open acceptance of a dual status may also set into motion processes of self-transformation of national identities toward more pluralistic forms. Immigration countries can thus benefit from recognizing their citizens' multicultural origins (Koskelo, 2012). Instead of demanding exclusive loyalty, which is inappropriate in an age of migration, loyalty can be overlapping and overarching, reflecting the manifold transnational interdependencies of today's world.

Furthermore, overcoming one single national frame for identification and political involvement may promote even broader, supranational forms. In a next step, we will therefore analyze dual citizens' supranational identification and political involvement in order to find out whether dual citizenship not only does not hinder national integration and is compatible with involvement in another country, but in addition may even promote involvement in supranational arenas. By taking transnational ties adequately into account, we may be able to gain a better understanding of new forms of citizenship that are substantially grounded and simultaneously outwards directed, offering significant potential for the advancement of democracy in a globalizing world.

## Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Joachim Blatter for his valuable comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript and Samuel Schmid for his dedicated research assistance. The author is also grateful to Anita Manatschal and the anonymous

reviewers of EPSR for their helpful comments and for inspiring discussions at the General Conference of the ECPR in Bordeaux in 2013 and at the General Assembly of the Swiss Political Science Association in Berne in 2014. This paper could not have been written without the generous support from the Swiss National Science Foundation, which finances our ongoing study on dual citizens, including the large-scale survey. The quality of the data also owes a lot to the support from the Swiss Federal Office for Migration and the Federal Statistical Office.

## References

- Achermann, C., G. D'Amato, M. Kamm and B. Von Rütte (2010), *Country Report: Switzerland*, Fiesole: EUDO Citizenship Observatory.
- Aleinikoff, T.A. and D. Klusmeyer (2002), *Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration*, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Barnes, S.H., et al. (1979), *Political Action – Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, Beverly Hills/London: Sage.
- Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller and C. Szanton Blanc (1994), *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments and Deterritorialized Nation-States*, Langhorne: Gordon and Breach.
- Bauböck, R. (2002), 'Farewell to multiculturalism? Sharing values and identities in societies of immigration', *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 3(1): 1–16.
- (2003), 'Wessen Stimme zählt? Thesen über demokratische Beteiligung in der Einwanderungsgesellschaft. In: *Wiener Hefte zu Migration und Integration in Theorie und Praxis*', *Defizitäre Demokratie – MigrantInnen in der Politik* 1: 26–44.
- (2008), *Stakeholder Citizenship: An Idea Whose Time has Come?* Washington, DC: TransAtlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute.
- (ed.) (2010), *Dual Citizenship for Transborder Minorities? How to respond to the Hungarian-Slovak Tit-for-Tat*. EUI Working Papers. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, San Domenico di Fiesole.
- Bellamy, R. (2008), *Citizenship: A Very Short Introduction*, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bevelander, P. and R. Pendakur (2010), 'Voting and social inclusion in Sweden', *International Migration* 49(4): 67–92.
- Bevelander, P. and R. Pendakur (2012), 'Citizenship, co-ethnic populations and employment probabilities of immigrants in Sweden', *Journal of International Migration and Integration* 2: 203–222.
- BFS (Bundesamt für Statistik) (2011), *Eidgenössische Volkszählung 2000*, Neuchâtel: BFS.
- (2014), *Statistik der Nationalratswahlen*, Neuchâtel: BFS.
- Blatter, J. (2011), 'Dual citizenship and theories of democracy', *Citizenship Studies* 15(6–7): 769–798.
- Bloemraad, I. (2004), 'Who claims dual citizenship? The limits of postnationalism, the possibilities of transnationalism, and the persistence of traditionalism', *International Migration Review* 38(2): 389–426.
- Bloemraad, I., A. Korteweg and G. Yurdakul (2008), 'Citizenship and immigration: multiculturalism, assimilation, and challenges to the Nation-State', *Annual Review of Sociology* 34: 153–179.
- Brewer, M.B. (2001), 'The many faces of social identity: implications for political psychology', *Political Psychology* 22(1): 115–125.
- Brondsted-Sejersen, T. (2008), "'I Vow to Thee My Countries" – the expansion of dual citizenship in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century', *International Migration Review* 42(3): 523–549.
- Cain, B.E. and B.J. Doherty (2006), 'The impact of dual nationality on political participation', in L. Taeku, S.K. Ramakrishnan and R. Ricardo (eds), *Transforming Politics, Transforming America: The Political and Civic Incorporation of Immigrants in the United States*, Charlottesville/London: University of Virginia Press, pp. 89–105.
- Campbell, D. (2003), 'Deterritorialized loyalty: multiculturalism and Bosnia', in M. Waller and A. Linklater (eds), *Political Loyalty and the Nation-State*, London: Routledge, pp. 43–58.

- Castles, S. and A. Davidson (2000), *Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the Politics of Belonging*, New York: Routledge.
- Cohen, J.L. (1999), 'Changing paradigms of citizenship and the exclusiveness of the demos', *International Sociology* 14(3): 245–268.
- De Rooij, A. (2012), 'Patterns of immigrant political participation: explaining differences in types of political participation between immigrants and the majority population in Western Europe', *European Sociological Review* 28(4): 455–481.
- Dekker, B. and M. Siegel (2013), 'Transnationalism and Integration: Complements or Substitutes?' UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 071. United Nations University – Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. Retrieved 4 February 2015 from <http://ideas.repec.org/p/unm/unumer/2013071.html>
- EDA (Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten) (2011), Anzahl Schweizerinnen und Schweizer im Ausland auf über 695 000 gestiegen, *Medienmitteilung*. Retrieved 26 February 2011 from <http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/de/home/recent/media/single.html?id=37699>
- Erdal, M. and C. Oeppen (2013), 'Migrant balancing acts: understanding the interactions between integration and transnationalism', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 39(6): 867–884.
- Faist, T. (ed.) (2007), *Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Societal Integration*, Avebury, UK: Ashgate.
- Faist, T. and J. Gerdes (2008), *Dual Citizenship in an Age of Mobility*, Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Font, J. and M. Mendez (eds) (2013), *Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Fox, J. (2005), 'Unpacking transnational citizenship', *Annual Review of Political Science* 8: 171–201.
- Gerdes, J. and T. Faist (2007), 'Varying views on democracy, rights and duties, and membership: the politics of dual citizenship in European immigration states', in T. Faist and P. Kivisto (eds), *Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects*, Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 137–160.
- Gershon, S.A. and A.D. Pantoja (2014), 'Pessimists, optimists, and skeptics: the consequences of transnational ties for Latino immigrant naturalization', *Social Science Quarterly* 95(2): 328–342.
- Giugni, M. and F. Passy (2004), 'Migrant mobilization between political institutions and citizenship regimes: a comparison of France and Switzerland', *European Journal of Political Research* 43: 51–82.
- Glick-Schiller, N., L. Basch and C. Blanc-Szanton (1992), *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration*, New York: Gordon and Breach.
- Goodin, R.E. and A. Tanasoca (2014), 'Double voting', *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 92(4): 743–758.
- Guarnizo, L.E., A. Portes and W. Haller (2003), 'Assimilation and transnationalism: determinants of transnational political action among contemporary migrants', *American Journal of Sociology* 108(6): 1211–1248.
- Hainmüller, J. and D. Hangartner (2013), 'Who gets a Swiss passport? A natural experiment in immigrant discrimination', *American Political Science Review* 107(1): 159–187.
- Hammar, T. (1985), 'Dual citizenship and political integration', *International Migration Review* 9(3): 438–450.
- Helbling, M. (2010), 'Switzerland: Contentious citizenship attribution in a federal state', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5): 793–802.
- Hirschman, A.O. (1970), *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Howard, M. (2009), *The Politics of Citizenship in Europe*, Cambridge/New York: Harvard University Press.
- Huddy, L. and N. Khatib (2007), 'American patriotism, national identity, and political involvement', *American Journal of Political Science* 51(1): 63–77.
- Huntington, S.P. (2004), *Who Are We? The Challenge to America's National Identity*, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster.
- Itzigsohn, J. and S.G. Saucedo (2002), 'Immigrant incorporation and sociocultural transnationalism', *International Migration Review* 36(3): 766–798.
- Jakobson, M.-L. and L. Kalev (2013), 'Transnational citizenship as status, identity and participation: comparative assessment', in K.N. Demetriou (ed.), *Democracy in Transition. Political Participation in the European Union*, Frankfurt: Springer, pp. 201–224.

- Jennings, M.K., J.W. van Deth, S.H. Barnes, D. Fuchs, F. Heunks, R.F. Inglehart, M. Kaase, H.-D. Klingemann, J. Thomassen, H. Kriesi, R. Koopmans, J.W. Duyvendak and M.G. Giugni (1990), *Continuities in Political Action. A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in Three Western Democracies*, Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Kivisto, P. and T. Faist (2007), *Citizenship: Discourse, Theory, and Transnational Prospects*, Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Koopmans, R., P. Statham, M. Giugni and F. Passy (2005), *Contested Citizenship. Immigration and Cultural Diversity in Europe*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Koskelo, Krister (2012), Dual citizenship worldwide. *Harvard Political Review* 39(2), Retrieved 9 May 2015 from <http://harvardpolitics.com/covers/dual-citizenship-worldwide>
- Koslowski, R. (2003), 'Challenges of international cooperation in a world of increasing Dual nationality', in K. Hailbronner and D. Martin (eds), *Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals: Evolution and Prospects*, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, pp. 157–182.
- Kriesi, H., et al. (1995), *New Social Movements in Western Europe*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Leighley, J.E. (1995), 'Opportunities and incentives: a field essay on political participation', *Political Research Quarterly* 48(1): 181–209.
- Leighley, J. and A. Vedlitz (1999), 'Race, ethnicity, and political participation: competing models and contrasting explanations', *The Journal of Politics* 61(4): 1092–1114.
- Lipps, O., F. Laganà, A. Pollien and L. Gianettoni (2013), 'Under-representation of foreign minorities in cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys in Switzerland', in J. Font and M. Mendez (eds), *Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies*, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp. 241–270.
- Mazzolari, F. (2009), 'Dual citizenship rights: do they make more and richer citizens?' *Demography* 46(1): 169–191.
- Mügge, L. (2012), 'Dual nationality and transnational politics', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(1): 1–19.
- Naujoks, D. (2009), 'Dual citizenship. The discourse on ethnic and political boundary-making in Germany', Policy Brief No. 14, Focus Migration, Hamburg.
- Ong, A. (1999), *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*, Durham/London: Duke University Press.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, E. (2003), 'The politics of migrants' transnational political practices', *International Migration Review* 37(3): 760–786.
- Pedroza, L. (2014), 'The democratic potential of enfranchising resident migrants', *International Migration*, early view, doi: 10.1111/imig.12162.
- Portes, A. (1999), 'Conclusion: towards a new world – the origins and effects of transnational activities', *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 463–477.
- Ramakrishnan, S.K. (2005), *Democracy in Immigrant America: Changing Demographics and Political Participation*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Renshon, S.A. (2005), *The 50% American. Immigration and National Identity in an Age of Terror*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
- Riedel, S. (2012), *Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft als Konfliktpotential. Nationale Divergenzen unter europäischer Flagge*, Berlin: Studie der Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik.
- Royce, J. (1967[1908]), *Race Questions, Provincialism, and Other American Problems*, Freeport: NY Books for Libraries Press.
- Schildkraut, D. (2005), 'The rise and fall of political engagement among Latinos: the role of identity and perceptions of discrimination', *Political Behavior* 27(3): 285–312.
- Schlenker, A. and J. Blatter (2014), 'Conceptualizing and evaluating (new) forms of citizenship between nationalism and cosmopolitanism', *Democratization* 21(6): 1091–1116.
- Schröter, Y.M., C. Mengelkamp and R.S. Jäger (2005), *Doppelte Staatsbürgerschaft – ein gesellschaftlicher Diskurs über Mehrstaatigkeit*, Landau: Verlag Empirische Pädagogik.
- Schweiz am Sonntag* (2014), 'Doppelbürger sollen Schweiz vertreten', *Schweiz am Sonntag*, 23 August. Retrieved 19 May 2015 from [http://www.schweizamsonntag.ch/ressort/nachrichten/doppelbuenger\\_sollen\\_schweiz\\_vertreten/](http://www.schweizamsonntag.ch/ressort/nachrichten/doppelbuenger_sollen_schweiz_vertreten/)

- Shklar, J.N. (1993), 'Obligation, loyalty, exile', *Political Theory* 21(2): 181–197.
- Sieberer, U. (2011), 'Selecting independent variables: competing recommendations for factor-centric and out-come-centric research designs', in T. Gschwend and F. Schimmelfennig (eds), *Research Design in Political Science. How to Practice What They Preach*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 163–182.
- Smith, M.P. (2007), 'The two faces of transnational citizenship', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 30(6): 1096–1116.
- Spiro, P.J. (2008), *Beyond Citizenship. American Identity After Globalization*, Oxford: OUP.
- Staton, J.K., R.A. Jackson and D. Canache (2007a), 'Dual nationality among latinos: what are the implications for political connectedness?', *The Journal of Politics* 69(2): 470–482.
- Staton, J.K., R.A. Jackson and D. Canache (2007b), 'Costly citizenship? Dual nationality, institutions, naturalization, and political connectedness', 19 June. Available from the Social Science Research Network at SSRN. Retrieved 21 November 2014 from <http://ssrn.com/abstract=995569>
- Steinhardt, M.F. (2012), 'Does citizenship matter? The economic impact of naturalizations in Germany', *Labour Economics* 19: 813–823.
- Tagesanzeiger* (2014), 'Motiviert, leistungsbereit, Secondo', *Tagesanzeiger*, 15 January. Retrieved 19 May 2015 from <http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Motiviert-leistungsbereit-Secondo-Istory/15026124>
- Tajfel, H. (1981), *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*, New York: CUP Archive.
- Tsuda, T. (2012), 'Whatever happened to simultaneity? Transnational migration theory and dual engagement in sending and receiving countries', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38(4): 631–649.
- Uutiset* (2014), 'Finland to probe whether dual citizenship poses a threat to national security', *Uutiset*, 30 October. Retrieved 19 May 2015 from [http://yle.fi/uutiset/finland\\_to\\_probe\\_whether\\_dual\\_citizenship\\_poses\\_a\\_threat\\_to\\_national\\_security/7575105](http://yle.fi/uutiset/finland_to_probe_whether_dual_citizenship_poses_a_threat_to_national_security/7575105)
- Verba, S. and N.H. Nie (1972), *Participation in America: Political democracy and Social Equality*, New York, NY: Harper and Row.
- Vertovec, S. (2009), *Transnationalism: Key Ideas*, London: Routledge.
- Vink, M. and G.R. de Groot (2010), 'Citizenship attribution in Western Europe: international framework and domestic trends', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36(5): 713–734.
- Vink, M. and H. Schmeets (2013), 'Does dual citizenship matter? Naturalization, citizenship of origin and employment status of immigrants in the Netherlands'. Paper presented at the International Conference of Europeanists, June 25–27, Amsterdam.
- Vink, M., T. Prokic-Breuer and J. Dronkers (2013), 'Immigrant naturalization in the context of institutional diversity: policy matters, but to whom?', *International Migration* 51(5): 1–20.
- Wong, L. (2008), 'Transnationalism, active citizenship, and belonging in Canada', *International Journal* 63(1): 79–100.

## Appendix

### Items and question wordings

---



---

Dependent variables: identification	
Self-description	‘How much does the following statement apply to you? I am Swiss’. Minimum: 0 = applies not at all, maximum 10 = applies fully
Attachment	‘How attached do you feel to Switzerland?’ Minimum: 0 = not at all attached, maximum: 3 = very attached
Solidarity	‘People feel more or less solidarity towards others. How about you? How strongly do you feel a sense of obligation towards the following groups of people: all Swiss’. Minimum 0 = not at all, maximum: 3 = strong sense of obligation
Political participation	
Voting/vote intention	‘Did you vote in the Swiss national elections in October 2011?’/‘Do you plan to vote in the next Swiss national elections?’ 1 = yes, 0 = no
Political knowledge	‘Can you name the current Swiss minister of finance?’ 1 = right answer, 0 = wrong or no answer
Political interest	Scale constructed from answers to the following two questions: ‘How interested are you in Swiss national politics?’/‘How interested are you in Swiss local/cantonal politics?’ 0 = not at all, 10 = very strongly
Non-electoral participation	Scale constructed from answers to the following question: ‘Have you ever participated in one of the following forms of political activity: Signed a petition/Participated in a demonstration/Donated money for political cause/Contacted media/Contacted a politician/Discussed politics with family or friends/Taken part in online political forum’ and ‘Are you a member of a political party?’, Minimum 0 = none, maximum 8 = all of them
Participation in Swiss interests	‘Which interests do you take into account when you participate politically? Swiss interests’ Minimum 0 = not at all, maximum 10 = very much
Independent variables	
Only/no Swiss citizenship	Dummy variables with dual citizens as reference category
Naturalization	Dummy variable with Swiss by birth as reference category
Former/second citizenship	Dummy variables with Swiss citizenship as reference category
First generation	Dummy variable with second generation/no immigrant background as reference category
Linguistic integration	‘How well do you speak the language which is most used in the region where you live?’ Minimum: 1 = not at all, maximum: 5 = mother tongue (Swiss German in the German part of Switzerland)
Feelings of discrimination	‘Would you describe yourself as a member of a group that is discriminated against in Switzerland?’ 1 = yes, 0 = no
Male	1 = male, 0 = female
Age	Age in years
Education	Years of full-time education completed
Transnational equivalent	All dependent variables with respect to the country of origin

---



---

Table A1. Comparison of means in extent of identification and political participation by status (standard deviations in parentheses)

	Dual citizens	Mono citizens	Foreign residents	Minimum–maximum
Identification				
Self-description	7.81 (2.36)	8.84*** (1.96)	4.58*** (0.170)	0–10
Attachment	2.57 (0.616)	2.67** (0.553)	2.40*** (0.711)	0–3
Solidarity	1.81 (0.755)	1.89 (0.659)	1.75 (0.780)	0–3
Political participation				
Voting	0.66 (0.476)	0.61 (0.488)	–	0/1
Vote intention	0.91 (0.283)	0.84*** (0.367)	–	0/1
Political knowledge	0.80 (0.398)	0.82 (0.383)	0.72** (0.445)	0/1
Political interest	6.74 (2.42)	6.19*** (2.61)	6.41*** (2.38)	0–10
Non-electoral participation	1.91 (1.27)	1.75* (1.24)	1.24*** (0.954)	0–8
Loyalty				
Participation in Swiss interests	7.67** (2.50)	7.14 (2.79)	5.34*** (3.69)	0–10

The asterisks indicate the degree of significance of the mean differences between mono and dual citizens (*t*-test results).

\*\*\**P* < 0.001; \*\**P* < 0.01; \**P* < 0.05; all others are not significantly different.

Table A2. Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Minimum–maximum	N
Dependent variables				
Self-description	8.13	2.29	0–10	1312
Attachment	2.60	0.599	0–3	1321
Solidarity	1.78	0.069	0–3	1255
Political knowledge	0.721	0.448	0/1	1352
Political interest	6.57	2.49	0–10	1323
Voting	0.640	0.480	0/1	1247
Vote intention	0.890	0.312	0/1	1152
Non-electoral participation	1.87	1.26	0–8	1231
Participation in Swiss interests	7.50	2.61	0–10	1289
Independent variables <sup>a</sup>				
First generation	0.354	0.478	0/1	1297
Linguistic integration	4.06	1.18	1–0	1325
Feelings of discrimination	0.108	0.311	0/1	1225
Male	0.488	0.500	0/1	1352
Age	43.9	15.5	19–83	1352
Education	13.7	3.60	1–27	1296

<sup>a</sup>For the categorical key independent variables (dual citizenship, naturalization, second/former citizenship), see Table 2.

Table A3. Multivariate analysis of identification

	Self-description		Attachment		Solidarity	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>a: without native Swiss</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.370	0.290	0.021	0.072	-0.055	0.089
Not Swiss	-2.768***	0.176	-0.140**	0.043	-0.124*	0.053
Second/former citizenship (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.330	0.212	-0.087	0.052	0.063	0.064
Kosovar	-0.330	0.228	0.194**	0.056	0.371***	0.070
First generation	-0.040	0.212	0.086	0.052	0.141*	0.065
Linguistic integration	0.621***	0.080	0.083***	0.020	0.012	0.024
Feelings of discrimination	-0.824***	0.214	-0.226***	0.053	-0.100	0.066
Male	-0.067	0.149	0.016	0.037	-0.009	0.046
Age	0.004	0.006	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.002
Education	-0.031	0.021	-0.014**	0.005	-0.017**	0.006
Intercept	6.116***	0.601	2.408***	0.148	1.716***	0.183
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.296		0.075		0.047	
N	1198		1212		1178	
<i>b: with transnational dimension</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.389	0.312	-0.003	0.070	0.052	0.067
Not Swiss	-2.704***	0.187	-0.172***	0.042	-0.083*	0.040
Second/former citizenship (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.216	0.258	-0.060	0.059	-0.094	0.055
Kosovar	-0.039	0.266	0.175**	0.061	-0.118*	0.059
First generation	0.085	0.232	0.031	0.053	0.044	0.051
Linguistic integration	0.594***	0.089	0.105***	0.020	0.036	0.019
Feelings of discrimination	-0.863***	0.235	-0.277***	0.054	-0.122*	0.051
Male	-0.100	0.172	-0.014	0.039	0.060	0.037
Age	0.007	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
Education	-0.012	0.025	-0.007	0.006	-0.015**	0.005
Transnational equivalent	-0.056	0.032	0.033	0.024	-0.634***	0.023
Intercept	5.972***	0.736	2.202***	0.160	3.364***	0.158
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.265		0.110		0.469	
N	1007		1019		989	

Method: Linear regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.

Table A4. Multivariate analysis of participation I

	Voting		Vote intention		Political knowledge	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>a: without native Swiss</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.137	0.292	-0.423	0.413	0.083	0.301
Not Swiss	-		-		-0.540**	0.191
Second/former nationality (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.571	0.299	-1.410*	0.621	-0.479	0.286
Kosovar	-1.631***	0.292	-0.999	0.562	-0.656*	0.259
First generation	-0.124	0.282	0.003	0.477	-0.373	0.246
Linguistic integration	0.145	0.109	0.423*	0.197	0.139	0.096
Feelings of discrimination	0.411	0.274	-0.296	0.409	-0.279	0.226
Male	0.270	0.197	-0.357	0.340	-0.102	0.180
Age	0.046***	0.010	0.081***	0.019	0.036***	0.009
Education	0.069*	0.030	0.093	0.052	0.045	0.026
Intercept	-2.338**	0.795	-2.272	1.355	-0.564	0.719
2 log-likelihood	711.294		279.270		875.266	
Cox & Snell	0.235		0.098		0.065	
Nagelkerke	0.321		0.233		0.100	
N	674		630		906	
<i>b: with transnational dimension</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-		-		-	
Not Swiss	-		-		-0.673**	0.207
Second/former nationality (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.893**	0.336	-2.463**	0.760	-0.494	0.326
Kosovar	-1.595***	0.320	-1.076	0.653	-0.514	0.295
First generation	-0.305	0.312	-0.942	0.635	-0.366	0.282
Linguistic integration	0.127	0.120	0.249	0.272	0.216*	0.108
Feelings of discrimination	0.331	0.312	-0.247	0.538	-0.089	0.270
Male	0.308	0.216	-0.354	0.421	-0.205	0.207
Age	0.047***	0.011	0.092***	0.024	0.043***	0.010
Education	0.045	0.032	0.060	0.066	0.060	0.031
Transnational equivalent	1.181***	0.309	2.773***	0.785	0.549*	0.245
Intercept	-2.014*	0.876	-1.379	1.760	-2.069*	0.838
2 log-likelihood	592.728		180.188		665.343	
Cox & Snell	0.233		0.118		0.084	
Nagelkerke	0.322		0.303		0.132	
N	583		489		719	

Method: Binary logistic regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.

Table A5. Multivariate analysis of participation II

	Interest		Non-electoral participation		Loyalty	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
<i>a: without native Swiss</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.460	0.272	-0.184	0.145	-1.208***	0.335
Not Swiss	-1.254***	0.161	-0.624***	0.084	-2.354***	0.208
Second/former nationality (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.709***	0.196	-0.282**	0.102	-0.530*	0.243
Kosovar	-0.821***	0.211	-0.544***	0.112	-0.293	0.263
First generation	0.024	0.196	-0.110	0.103	0.133	0.244
Linguistic integration	0.165*	0.074	0.098*	0.038	0.185*	0.092
Feelings of discrimination	-0.129	0.197	0.405***	0.103	0.048	0.249
Male	0.472**	0.138	0.053	0.072	0.398*	0.173
Age	0.030***	0.006	0.009**	0.003	0.008	0.007
Education	0.103***	0.020	0.043***	0.010	0.063*	0.024
Intercept	3.623***	0.555	0.754**	0.287	5.790***	0.685
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.147		0.116		0.126	
N	1210		1138		1140	
<i>b: with transnational dimension</i>						
Citizenship (ref. dual citizens)						
Only Swiss	-0.290	0.245	-0.065	0.130	-0.704*	0.299
Not Swiss	-1.388***	0.147	-0.555***	0.077	-2.062***	0.182
Second/former nationality (ref. German)						
Italian	-0.952***	0.201	-0.608***	0.106	-1.568***	0.246
Kosovar	-1.348***	0.206	-0.837***	0.110	-1.425***	0.251
First generation	-0.251	0.183	-0.155	0.096	-0.166	0.222
Linguistic integration	0.282**	0.069	0.139***	0.036	0.366***	0.086
Feelings of discrimination	-0.354	0.186	0.222*	0.097	-0.125	0.228
Male	0.350*	0.136	-0.073	0.072	0.295	0.167
Age	0.015*	0.006	0.007*	0.003	0.008	0.007
Education	0.046*	0.019	0.017	0.010	-0.007	0.024
Transnational equivalent	0.338***	0.024	0.559***	0.042	0.472***	0.024
Intercept	3.441***	0.540	0.742**	0.282	4.347***	0.657
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.406		0.263		0.406	
N	912		908		912	

Method: Linear regression, listwise deletion. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients and standard errors.

\*\*\* $P < 0.001$ ; \*\* $P < 0.01$ ; \* $P < 0.05$ ; all others are not significant.