ABSTRACT: In the theoretical debate on metropolitan governance, we are witnessing new discourses beyond the traditional dispute between localists and regionalists. New dichotomies emerge, for example, "jumping of scale" versus "relativation of scales"; "deteriorialization" versus "reterritorialization"; "spaces of place" versus "space of flows." These dichotomies can be interpreted as different proposals and/or diagnoses in respect to the geographic scale and functional scope of emerging institutions of metropolitan governance. The paper aims to trace the empirical question of which direction we are heading by analyzing recent metropolitan governance reforms in six West German metropolitan areas. The findings show that there is a general trend to create soft institutions of governance on a larger scale as a reaction to global competition and continental integration. Beyond this commonality, we discover quite different institutional trajectories. The regions which are strongly embedded in the global economy tend toward a "deteriorialized" form of metropolitan governance with rather weak institutions characterized by large geographic scales and functional specialization. In contrast, the regions which are not as much embedded in the global economy have been able to create strong governance institutions on a regional level characterized by a rather small geographic scope and based on a territorial logic of functional integration and geographic congruence.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, we have been witnessing a renewed scholarly interest in metropolitan governance as well as a flurry of institutional transformations and innovation in many metropolitan areas in all Western countries (e.g., Heinz, 2000; Katz, 2000; Lefèvre, 1998; OECD, 2001; Salet, Thornley, & Kreukels, 2003). In comparison with earlier debates about metropolitan governance, the “new regionalism” entails quite new features and is not just a new attempt to reach the goals of earlier waves of metropolitan governance reforms. The focus is not any longer limited to the structures of government but is much more directed toward “governance.” This terminology not only points to the official recognition and inclusion of non-governmental actors in the process of governing but also includes a move from hierarchical steering toward horizontal and voluntary
cooperation within the metropolitan region (Savitch & Vogel, 2000; Wallis, 1994a, 1994b).

There might be an even more fundamental change emerging, because the scholarly debate is shifting toward other conceptual and normative cleavages. The classic (normative) confrontation within the metropolitan governance discourse has been between “regionalists” and “localists” or between advocates of centralization/consolidation and advocates of decentralization/fragmentation (Ostrom, 1972; Parks & Oakerson, 2000). This perspective is getting superseded by a discourse about “rescaling” of governance (Brenner, 2002; Macleod & Goodwin, 1999; Martin, McCann, & Purcell, 2003). Here, the dominant positive question is whether “rescaling” means that political regulation and governance are moving toward larger scales/higher levels or whether “rescaling” means both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies at the same time. The new theoretical cleavage is getting even more pronounced if we include more recent normative contributions of the public choice school. This school of thought has always argued for polycentric city-regions. Whereas in the 1970s, polycentricity meant primarily advocacy of a multiplicity of small-scale local units of government, in the 1990s the public choice school put much more emphasis on the fact that there exist various optimal scales for the production of different public goods. The logical consequence is to propose functional specialization and single-purpose governments (Frey & Eichenberger, 1996, 2001; McGinnis, 1999, p. 19). In other words, public choice scholars have shifted their emphasis from advocating small scales and multiple territorial communities toward proposing narrow functional scopes and multiple specialized governments. In sum, positive and normative discussions about the architecture of metropolitan governance are shifting from small- versus large-scale government toward few versus many scales of governance. The newer cleavage is also a question of broad versus narrow functional scope of governance institutions.

In this paper, I do not provide any normative arguments for either side. Instead, I am asking which trend we are witnessing in recent reform approaches. I am tracing this question by looking at the metropolitan governance reforms in major German city-regions during the last ten to fifteen years. I start with a thorough overview of the theoretical discourse. In the empirical part of the paper, I scrutinize the major historical steps and the results of the latest wave of reforms in metropolitan governance in the six largest monocentric agglomerations in Western Germany. I am able to show that the 1990s brought major reform attempts in all metropolitan regions but also that the outcomes of these reforms are quite diverse. The regions which are strongly embedded in the global economy tend toward a “deterritorialized” form of metropolitan governance with rather weak and strongly differentiated institutions characterized by large and overlapping geographic scales and functional specialization. In contrast, the regions which are not as much embedded in the global economy have been able to create strong governance institutions on a regional level characterized by a rather small geographic scope and based on a territorial logic of functional integration and geographic congruence.

QUESTIONS OF GEOGRAPHIC SCALE AND FUNCTIONAL SCOPE IN METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

A first perspective on “rescaling” governance comes close to the perspectives of the “regionalist” school in the older debates, except that the major rationale for governing on a regional scale has shifted toward competitiveness and that the proposed solutions are much weaker in terms of structural change and formal institution building on the regional level. Theoretically inclined critical geographers see the major force for regionalization in
the imperatives of capital accumulation and discover a “jumping of scales” from the local to the regional and from the national to the continental level (Brenner, 1999a, p. 64; Scott, 2001; Taylor, 2000). More practically inclined scholars, planners, consultants, and journalists provide a broad variety of functional arguments why governance structures expand or should be expanded beyond current city-limits toward a regional scale (Barnes & Ledebur, 1993; Batten, 1995; Calthorpe & Fulton, 2001; Ohmae, 1993; Peirce, Johnson, & Hall, 1993; Priebes, 1999; Simmie, 2002; Storper, 1997). The scalar expansion of markets (continental and global free trade agreements) makes a parallel expansion of scales on the subnational level necessary to compete successfully. Successful competition requires regional cooperation in respect to both production and consumption. To develop a powerful export base, regional clusters of innovative enterprises need to be nurtured. Furthermore, scarce resources on the municipal level must be pooled to finance major infrastructure projects and to exploit economies of scale. Central cities and their suburbs are mutually dependent, because the city still offers unique agglomeration economics, and contains amenities for the whole region and serves as the representative marker and symbol for the region toward the outside world (Ihlanfeldt, 1995; Voith, 1998). A precondition for attracting investment from consumption industries is large consumer markets. Regional entities with larger populations can come up with more impressive numbers to catch the awareness of investors. In Europe, the strong regulatory powers and the financial programs of the European Union provide another rationale for regional collaboration. Subnational governments join forces for lobbying in Brussels, and the European Union demands regional cooperation on various scales to be able to receive money from the diverse structural funds (Conzelmann & Knodt, 2002; Tömmel, 1998).

In all those accounts, we discover the assumption that the dominant trend is geographic expansion of socio economic activities, which will be or should be accompanied by a similar scalar expansion of political regulation and governance. Nevertheless, there is another discourse which stresses quite a different tendency toward smaller scales. First, “regionalization” or the emergence of a new or strengthened layer of governance between city and state can also be interpreted as a process of state decentralization. Free trade agreements and further steps toward economic integration in Europe have reduced the capacities of central states to control and promote their economies. In parallel, the transformation toward a service and information economy and the accompanying business strategies of “flexible specialization” have made smaller entities like regions the adequate scale for regulating such a post-fordist economy (Brenner et al., 2003; Meise, 1998). A more cultural approach stresses networking and social capital as a precondition for “innovative milieus” and usually conceives the region as the adequate scale for nurturing these innovative milieus (Maillat, 1995; Morgan, 1997). These economic arguments for “regionalization” as decentralization are also accompanied by political considerations. Subnational “regionalization” is advocated as a means to strengthen democratic participation and seen as an attempt to counter the legitimacy problems of democratic states, which shift decision-making processes toward higher levels and into intergovernmental arrangements (Benz et al., 1999).

Second, within the metropolitan area, there exist various positive trends toward, and normative arguments for, decentralization. In the United States, the trend toward “suburbanization” has gone so far that the socio economic interdependencies between central cities and suburbs might be decreasing (Mitchell-Weaver, Miller, & Deal, 2000) and that “edge cities” (Garreau, 1993) can compete successfully on their own and see no need to join forces. Others argue that although there still exists economic interdependencies between cities and suburbs, the economic success of the metropolitan area does not
depend on political consolidation (Post & Stein, 2000). Furthermore, secession movements are trying to break up big cities (Husock, 1998; Sonenshein, 2004), and residential community associations are becoming a rapidly increasing element of the American system of local governance (Hawkins, Percy, & Montreal, 1997). Finally, the “neighborhood” has been rediscovered as an important scale for social integration and political participation, so that there are many attempts to strengthen boroughs, districts, or neighborhoods within larger cities (Bäck et al., 2005; Goldsmith, 2002). Even the “New Urbanists” who are primarily concerned with metropolitan-wide problems like sprawl see the neighborhood level as an important scale for fighting sprawl, complementing regulation on a regional scale (Geddes, 1997).

Finally, beyond parallel and overlapping tendencies toward larger and smaller scales, researchers acknowledge that the classic entities of governance do not disappear. The city and the nation-state do not dissolve but are only being complemented by further scales of regulation and governance. In consequence, scholars have come to diagnose a “relativation of scales” which means the proliferation of governing capacities across a variety of spatial scales—neighborhood, municipality, metropolitan, regional, national, supranational, continental, and global (Brenner, 1999a, p. 33; 2002, p. 10; Collinge, 1996, p. 1). Nevertheless, like political scientists who talk about multi level governance (Marks, Hooghe, & Blank, 1996), these geographers are looking for new “spatial fixes” and discover processes of “reterritorialization” at regional levels on a supra- and a subnational scale (Brenner, 1998, p. 3). In this, they explicitly reject notions like the “end of geography” (O’Brien, 1992) or an occurring “deteriorization” of socio economic processes and political regulations. The most prominent proponent of the “deteriorization” thesis has been Manuel Castells (1989, 1997) who describes a fundamental transformation at the turn of the millennium: the multiplicity of national/local “spaces of place” is being superseded by a single global “space of flows” characterized by flows of information through modern telecommunication technology. Blatter (2004) has pointed to the fact that it is not a single space of flows but many diverse flows that challenge the logic of spaces of place.

In political economy, there exist a long tradition and new sophisticated concepts based on club theory, which describe and propose a process of “deteriorization” of governance in a much more differentiated and precise way than Castells’. Starting with Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), most public choice proponents (e.g., Bish, 1971; Ostrom 1972) stress that the optimal scales (boundaries) of various services (e.g., police and water sanitation) are not congruent, and one large-scale government responsible for all services is not an efficient solution for metropolitan areas. Instead, the reduction of functional scope for institutions of governance and separate government units for each service are proposed to capture specific economies of scale. Frey and Eichenberger (1996, 2001) built on this idea and on economic club theory (Casella & Frey, 1992) the concept of “functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions” and proposed functional differentiation as the new cornerstone of the architecture of governance on the continental but also on the metropolitan level. Instead of multi-purpose municipalities, specialized “clubs” provide the services, and each individual consumer can pick his preferred set of services among the competing clubs which offer their services across overlapping territories. Normative proposals based on club theory are not just theoretical proposals. They find real-world expression, especially in the United States and Switzerland, the classic prototypes of federalism. In the United States, special districts and other single-purpose governments have outnumbered the number of municipalities and counties in the 1960s and have witnessed an accelerated growth during the 1990s (see Foster, 1997; Stephens & Wikstrom, 2000, p. 8). Elkins (1995) describes such a drive toward a reduced functional
scope of institutions of governance and, in consequence, toward a functionally oriented architecture of governance as “unbundling” the modern state. This represents an even more radical transformation of government systems than both formerly scrutinized developments of expansion and multiplication of territorial scales. Hooghe and Marks (2003) connect this literature with related discourses in international relations and political economy and sum this up by distinguishing two types of multi level governance. Type I is founded on traditional concepts of federalism where jurisdictions are designed around communities; they bundle competencies, are stable over time, and limited in number. Type II governance, in contrast, is based on economic theories (public choice and club theory) and is characterized by jurisdictions which concentrate on particular policy problems/public goods; they are functionally specific, fluid over time, and can proliferate in respect to number.

We can sum up the debate scrutinized above with the following questions, which will guide the empirical research.

1. Can we discover enlarged scales of governance either in the form of geographic expansion of governance institutions or in the form of shifting governing capacities to higher levels or is a multiplication of scales/levels a more adequate description of current transformations?
2. Are we witnessing a process of “deterritorialization” where the system of comprehensive, multi-functional government is being replaced by a functionally differentiated system of specialized units of governance, or are the newer scales of governance also characterized by the multi-functional and territorial logic of spaces of place?

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The following empirical analysis will focus on institutional structures and processes of metropolitan governance to find out which of the scrutinized theoretical conceptions best captures the real developments. This means that I restrict my positive analysis to institutional structures and processes. Such a focus on institutional change makes it possible to have a very differentiated look at the polity dimension of metropolitan governance. Furthermore, by looking at institutions, I follow the assumption that not only underlies the scrutinized literature on metropolitan governance but also has been widely accepted in the social sciences: “Institutions matter” in various ways (e.g., Peters, 1999, pp. 19–20). They provide rules and incentives for strategic actors and structure interactions and struggles; furthermore, they shape preferences and identities of actors, and quite often they inhibit rigidities that lead to “path dependency.” These various and fundamental consequences of institutions make it worthwhile to discuss the overall direction in which they are getting transformed. Finally, some first and preliminary observations indicate that the policy output corresponds quite well with what the theoretical concepts would predict as consequences of specific institutional forms of metropolitan governance.

The following empirical analysis is primarily a systematic comparison of current transformations in metropolitan governance and not a causal analysis. This allows for a much more detailed and differentiated view on current transformations than studies that are primarily concerned with explaining and evaluating transformations. Only at the end, a specific and tentative causal explanation for the variance in metropolitan governance in the case study areas is inductively developed.

The research goal to provide a systematic comparative description leads to the following structure of the empirical part of the paper. At the beginning, I justify my case selection
and provide some basic data on geography and population of the six selected metropolitan areas. Then I provide some brief historical and institutional context information and scrutinize the results of the most recent wave of metropolitan regionalism for the six selected regions to set the stage for the more specific analysis that follows. Next, the recent government reforms are analyzed and systematically compared in accordance with the questions we derived from the overview over the current scholarly discourse. With the help of observable indicators, I look at every case to find out (a) whether the case study region exhibits a trend toward expansion of scales of governance or a multiplication of scales, and (b) whether the governance reform in the case is characterized by territorial integration or functional specialization.

The comparative analysis is based on the following methods of data collection and analysis. From 2002 to 2004, the author collected a broad array of documents for every case. The historical record is based primarily on existing scholarly literature. In contrast, the description of the recent development is primarily based on documents that were provided by the institutions and on newspaper reports. Furthermore, the author conducted interviews with major actors in every region (about three interviews per region) and with journalists. Further insights were gained through the participation in an interdisciplinary working group on German metropolitan regions. Geographers, planners, economists, and political scientists from major think tanks and universities formed this working group to contribute to the lively political debate on the future of metropolitan regions. Whereas interviews and the working group helped to get a deeper understanding of the cases, the systematic descriptions according to the derived indicators are based primarily on official documents provided by the institutions under scrutiny. A more comprehensive documentation of the sources can be found in Blatter (2005a).

**CASE SELECTION**

To trace these theoretical questions with the help of empirical examples, I analyze the six largest monocentric metropolitan areas in Western Germany. This case selection has a twofold logic. First, it includes the Frankfurt/Rhein-Main area, a metropolitan area that has been one of the two cases which Neil Brenner used to illustrate his rescaling thesis (Brenner, 1999b, pp. 503–603). Neil Brenner has been able to direct a substantial part of the scholarly discourse on metropolitan governance in Europe and North America toward a focus on “rescaling” (first by referring to the concept of “jumping of scales” and later on by diagnosing a “relativation of scales”). In consequence, Frankfurt/Rhein-Main is seen as a paradigmatic case that is worth being reanalyzed in a focused manner. Second, to find out which one of the diagnosed forms of “rescaling” has more potential to be generalized, I add five other regions to the sample: Hamburg, Bremen, Hanover, Stuttgart, and Munich. In accordance with the Most Similar Systems Design (Przeworski & Teune, 1970, 32–4), I was looking for “comparable cases” (Lijphart, 1975) in the sense that these regions should be similar in as many aspects as possible. The decision to include only German regions allows holding constant the major institutional context variables; the decision to include only monocentric regions—which means to exclude the Rhine-Ruhr area and the Rhine-Neckar region—allows holding constant the level and type of competition and rivalry between the municipalities within the metropolitan area; and the decision to include the six largest (in terms of population) and economically strongest metropolitan areas makes them the most similar in socio economic terms. Nevertheless, I will use the remaining diversity in respect to their economic situation to develop some preliminary conclusions about the reasons for the different paths of institutional
transformation in the final section of the paper. Restricting the studied cases to German agglomerations helps to create a fine-grained analysis, but also means that the results cannot be easily applied or generalized to other countries. Nevertheless, the following case studies and their theoretical reflection provide a meaningful hypothesis that can guide international comparisons on the current transformations of metropolitan governance that go beyond a general diagnosis of processes of rescaling. Furthermore, the cases show that even under the pressures of global competition and under similar institutional contexts, variety and diversity in metropolitan governance approaches is still possible.

Table 1 summarizes two basic facts about geographic scale and population of the selected metropolitan areas. Because we will find two major geographic definitions of the regional scale in the cases of Frankfurt and Munich, these data are provided for both the scales.

### TABLE 1

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<tr>
<th>Territory and Population of Central City and Metropolitan Area</th>
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<td>Geographic scale of the central city (km²)</td>
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metropolitan area of the Rhine-Main region was and still is the economic backbone of Hesse, and the government of Hesse has always tried to avoid the institutional mirroring of the urban–rural cleavage in Hesse; therefore, it created overlapping planning regions in the 1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s, there was an intensive debate about metropolitan reform in Hesse. The attempts of Frankfurt to create an integrated regional city were not successful—instead, a multi-purpose district [Umlandverband Frankfurt (UVF)] was created in 1974 (Schäfer, 1979). Nevertheless, this district was institutionalized with a directly elected regional parliament. The major task of the UVF was land-use planning. Because not only regional planning but also the much more detailed task of zoning was assigned as its major competence, a second decision-making chamber was created to which the municipalities delegated their representatives (in Germany, zoning is a constitutional prerogative of the municipalities). The UVF never acquired further tasks as envisioned at the time of the set-up of this regional institution, because a landslide victory for the Conservatives in all elections at the municipal and Land levels at the end of the 1970s brought an abrupt end to all attempts to strengthen metropolitan government. The UVF survived, but only as an environmentally-oriented planning board.

At the beginning of the 1990s, a new round of intensive metropolitan reform discourse started, but it took until 2000 to create new public institutions for the Rhine-Main region. The Land government created a new and geographically enlarged zoning district (Planungsverband Ballungsraum Frankfurt/Rhein-Main) and a “Council of the Region” (Rat der Region). The decision-making body of the new zoning district is now only indirectly elected; the members are delegated by the municipal councils. The “Council of the Region” is dominated by mayors and county supervisors in the Rhine-Main agglomeration. It is supposed to facilitate the creation of single-purpose districts for providing region-wide public services in the following policy fields: water, waste, sports, regional marketing, and transportation management. Whereas in the zoning district, the Social Democratic and Green Parties have a majority, the “Council of the Region,” which was supposed to rely on the staff of the planning district, is dominated by Conservatives. The political culture in Hesse is very antagonistic; in consequence, the “Council of the Region” never really started operating. Instead, the Conservative mayor of Frankfurt started a competing association of directly elected mayors and county supervisors called the Regionalkonferenz that covers a much larger area including parts of Rhineland-Palatinate and Bavaria. This larger metropolitan area was defined by the chambers of commerce in 1991 as the Rhine-Main metropolitan region and is the scale of reference for all economic actors in the region.

**Munich**

The domains of the kings of Bavaria expanded through incremental annexation throughout the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, but only the Third Reich brought a massive expansion of city territory through state-led incorporation. After the Second World War, the state commissioner for the region of Oberbayern initiated a voluntary intermunicipal planning association for the wider economic region of Munich [Planungsverband Äußerer Wirtschaftsraum München (PV)]. After the city of Munich had created its own planning capabilities and first plans during the 1950s, it started to challenge the state dominance in the regional planning association. As a consequence, the municipalities took control of the PV in 1962, but attempts by the mayor of Munich to expand the functional scope of the PV failed because of the resistance of the conservatively dominated suburban counties. During the territorial and functional
reforms at the beginning of the 1970s, the state of Bavaria created eighteen regional planning districts but refused to adopt any further institutional solution for the problems of the city-regions. The obligatory regional planning district for the agglomeration of Munich covers a similar geographic area as the one of the voluntary intermunicipal planning association. Nevertheless, the two institutions were not merged but only loosely coupled. The secretary of the state district is at the same time the secretary of the intermunicipal planning association. The beginning of the 1980s saw an escalating conflict when a newly elected Conservative mayor of Munich demanded annexation and when the first official regional development plan took shape. The northern municipalities formed an alliance against any further problematic infrastructure, because the traditional labor sharing in the Munich agglomeration had been that the southern lakes reaching toward the Alps formed the green space of the region, and the northern part did most of the industrial production (Fürst, 1990).

The discourse changed markedly at the beginning of the 1990s, when the Common Market and German unification were on the agenda. The years 1992 and 1993 saw the founding of three initiatives for regional cooperation (Weck, 1996). Although the diagnosis for the Munich agglomeration was massive growth, the only initiative which gained momentum was the Wirtschaftsraum Südbayern—München—Augsburg—Ingolstadt (MAI) eV, the joint marketing alliance of the cities of Munich, Augsburg, and Ingolstadt. New initiatives for stronger land-use control failed. The three cities opened their private law-based association to further municipalities, counties, and also to other members. Due to steady growth, the membership includes today six counties, twenty-four municipalities, eight local banks (Sparkassen), eighteen institutional actors such as chambers of commerce, unions, universities, planning districts, as well as about eighty private corporations and individual citizens. Marketing, economic development, and tourism form the core of the activities of this new institution of metropolitan governance.

Hamburg

Hamburg was an important member of the legendary Hanseatic League and managed to keep its status as an autonomous Land in the German Reich and the Weimar Republic. After the Second World War, this status was re-established in the Federal Republic of Germany. In the meantime, the centralized structure of the Third Reich made possible what had been unsuccessfully tried during the Weimar Republic: a massive expansion of the city through the annexation of surrounding municipalities. In the mid-1950s, the neighboring Land to the north, Schleswig-Holstein, created a joint territorial planning board with Hamburg. A similar joint territorial planning board with the southern neighbor, Lower Saxony, followed. In 1960, jointly financed development funds were established. These funds financed infrastructure investments in the northern and southern suburbs outside of Hamburg. After a flurry of joint activities at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, Hamburg’s relationship with its neighbors in the 1980s was characterized by conflict and neglect.

This changed dramatically in 1990, when the European Common Market and German unification brought new awareness to the need for and the opportunities of regional collaboration. All the three Länder governments in North Germany decided to join forces, and from 1992 to 1994, a “Regional Development Concept (RDC)” was produced which provided guidelines for the common region. First, an intergovernmental group formulated a “regional vision” (Leitbild) and an orienting framework (Orientierungsrahmen) for the “Metropolregion Hamburg,” as the new space for cooperation began to be called. From
1994 to 1996, a second step occurred in which the framework received textural and cartographic specification and operationalization through a “frame of action” (Handlungsrahmen) and major “lead projects.” In 1996, the two territorial planning boards were fused, and a new organization was set up which not only includes the governments of all the three Länder but also opens up a formal role for municipalities and interest groups. Furthermore, public transport throughout the three-Länder-region was newly organized. After a comprehensive consultation process, a second “RDC” was presented in 2000, which focused much more on activities to prepare the region for economic competition (Baumheier & Danielzyk, 2002).

Bremen

The Bundesland Bremen, which consists of two cities (Bremen and Bremerhaven), has a similar historical record in regional collaboration as Hamburg, with annexations during the Third Reich and the creation of a joint planning board with the Land Lower Saxony in 1963. In 1965, this region once again followed the lead of the Hamburg region and started a jointly financed development fund for the suburban area around Bremen. In the 1980s, the joint activities took an even steeper down-turn than in the Hamburg region, because the Conservative government in Lower Saxony and the Social Democrats in Bremen had an uneasy relationship, and the government of Bremen neglected the municipalities and counties and did not accept them as equal partners for cooperation.

The situation also changed dramatically in 1990, when the Land Bremen was under massive political pressure because of its financial crises and the debate about the merger of Länder in the context of German unification. In 1991, the Länder governments revived their joint planning board. Shortly afterward, the municipalities and counties around Bremen founded an association called the Kommunalverband Niedersachsen/Bremen eV. Bremen joined this municipal organization and accepted its own municipal identity for the first time in the cross-border relationship (in addition to its Länder/state identity in the bi-state planning board). From 1992 until 1996, the planning board worked on a “RDC” with strong involvement of the municipal level (Auel, 1997). In contrast to the Hamburg region, the municipal level was strongly involved from the beginning, so that a participant in both the Bremen and the Hamburg regions classified the Bremen process as “bottom-up” and the Hamburg process as “top-down” (Budde, 1995). In contrast to Hamburg, no second RDC was developed, but the RDC produced a much larger number of projects, and in the following years, the regional institutions have been strengthened through the installation of regional offices for the municipal association and for the bi-state planning board. The bi-state planning board was renamed in the Regionale Arbeitsgemeinschaft Bremen/Niedersachsen to represent the regional intermunicipal orientation in contrast to the earlier planning board, which adopted a much more intergovernmental approach between the two Länder.

Stuttgart

Stuttgart, the capital of the current Land of Baden-Württemberg, had been rather reluctant to incorporate surrounding villages and municipalities. After a short period of municipal “imperialism” between 1905 and 1914, the city resisted the state government’s demand to incorporate its industrialized suburbs. Nevertheless, during the Third Reich, the municipal territory doubled, and in consequence, after the Second World War, the first attempts at stronger regional cooperation and territorial reform met strong
opposition. During an encompassing territorial and functional reform process in Baden-Württemberg at the beginning of the 1970s, two regional planning associations were formed: a regional planning association with the central city and the surrounding counties, and a “neighborhood association” (Nachbarschaftsverband) with the central city and those surrounding municipalities which had strong interdependencies with Stuttgart. The latter association was assigned the task of zoning for the city and the suburbs and had a federated structure, which means that the zoning plans were produced on a subregional level, whereby every plan included parts of the city and some suburban areas.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the regional chamber of commerce and the government of Baden-Württemberg promoted an institutional reform for the industrial heartland of Baden-Württemberg in the context of the Single European Market and a structural crisis of the automobile industry. In 1994, a new regional institution called the Verband Region Stuttgart (VRS) was created by state law. The VRS covers the same territory as the former regional planning association (the central city and five suburban counties). Whereas the two former regional associations were abolished, the counties were not eliminated. A directly elected parliament provides the VRS with political legitimacy and a small but dedicated staff with organizational capacity. The Land government, which helped to set up the VRS wanted to create a new instrument for promoting major infrastructure developments in the region, especially the building of a new fair facility, the enlargement of the airport, and the reconstruction of the main railway station. In 1995, an additional economic development agency for the region was created; the VRS holds the majority of the capital of this private law-based company, but the municipalities, the Land-owned development bank, the chamber of commerce, and the unions are also shareholders. In 1998, the Regional Spatial Development Plan, which is legally binding for the zoning of the municipalities, was enacted.

Hanover

When Hanover became the royal residence in 1815, the tiny city started to grow in population and, during two waves of municipal annexation at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the 1920s, expanded its territory up to 130 square kilometers. During the Third Reich, no further expansion occurred, but soon after the Second World War Hanover became a pioneer in intellectual ideas and political reforms in German metropolitan governance. Already in the 1950s, plans for a “regional city” were developed by city planners at the university and within the city administration. These ideas inspired a state law in 1963, in which the first strong metropolitan institution in a German monocentered city-region was founded. The Verband Großraum Hanover (VGH) including the central city, three surrounding counties, and 210 municipalities had its own administration and parliament (indirectly elected) and was responsible for regional planning. In 1968, public transportation was included in the competencies of the VGH. Together with encompassing territorial and functional reforms in Lower Saxony, which brought a slight expansion of the city of Hanover and a fusion of the counties into one large county surrounding the city, the political autonomy of the VGH was massively increased in the mid-1970s. More policy competencies were accompanied by the direct election of the regional parliament (Weyl, 1977). In a radical turnaround, in 1980, a new Conservative government in Lower Saxony dismantled the power of regional organizations and transformed the VGH into a bilateral (city and county as members) special district without a directly elected parliament and reduced the tasks of this district basically to public transport (Fürst, 1990).
Also in this region, the political mood changed once again in the opposite direction in the 1990s. In 1992, a first reform transformed the special purpose organization into an intermunicipal association (Kommunalverband Großraum Hanover) and assigned the task of regional planning to this organization. In the mid-1990s, a joint vision (Leitbild) was produced as a first step to a new spatial planning program which has binding force for public agencies and which includes geographic specifications of the proposed goals (Knieling, 2000). Stimulated by radical proposals for metropolitan governance reform in the Frankfurt region and facilitated by the cooperative atmosphere which emerged during the “visioning” process, the three administrative heads of the city, the county, and the metropolitan association proposed a merger of the county and the metropolitan association in 1997. This idea was taken up at the Land level, and in the year 2001, the Region Hanover was founded as a new regional government to serve as a county government for the entire region—including the central city and the former suburban county surrounding the city. In 2002, citizens from the entire metropolitan area directly elected not only the administrative head of the Region Hanover but also a regional parliament for this territorially consolidated and functionally strengthened urban county.

This brief historical overview reveals that, in Germany, we find the same waves of metropolitan governance reform that Allan Wallis (1994a, 1994b) describes for the United States. Annexation was the dominant approach until the Second World War, followed by the creation of formal planning organizations on a regional level in the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. The 1980s brought a massive retreat from all attempts to govern the metropolitan area comprehensively on a regional scale. The 1990s saw another turnaround and the creation of new institutions and instruments for regional governance. Beyond these general trends, the histories and the recent governance reforms in the six metropolitan areas are marked by pronounced institutional differences which we should not ignore if we are interested in institutional and policy options that go beyond a mere adaptation to socio economic forces. These differences will be analyzed in more detail with the help of our theoretically derived questions.

EXPANDING GEOGRAPHIC SCALES OR MULTIPLYING THE NUMBER OF SCALES?

To empirically trace the question whether we can witness the geographic expansion of scales of governance or rather a multiplication of the number of scales, I will focus on two indicators:

1. Geographic expansion of governing bodies and networks (territorial enlargement of regional institutions) or the emergence of both, larger and smaller, governing units which means an increased number of governing scales;
2. Upward movement of political decision making (assignments of competencies to higher levels of government or stronger collaboration among local units) or both upward and downward movements.

Frankfurt

1. We can see a marked scale expansion for metropolitan governance in the Frankfurt agglomeration during the 1990s. The strongest scale expansion was proposed by the chambers of commerce. In 1991, they defined the Rhine-Main region quite similarly to the “city-ring” of the 1920s, covering the entire southern part of Hesse plus the
neighboring counties in Rhineland-Palatine and in Bavaria. This large cross-border region was the focus of early political initiatives. For example, in 1991, the mayors of the large cities in this region adopted a resolution for strong cooperation in the Rhine-Main region. In 1994, the states of Hesse, Rhineland-Palatine, and Bavaria organized a conference with the same aim. Neither initiative got very far. The subsequent debates about institutional reform focused on the area within the Land of Hesse. Nevertheless, for the economic actors the encompassing region always provided the scale of reference. When, in 1995, a regional economic development association was founded (Wirtschaftsförderung Region Frankfurt/Rhein-Main eV), cities and counties as well as chambers of commerce, universities, the airport, and large public utility companies from all the three states joined this marketing institution (Planungsverband Ballungsraum Frankfurt/Rhein-Main 2003). Furthermore, the Regionalkonferenz, initiated in 2000 by the mayor of Frankfurt in competition with the state-directed “Council of the Region,” is once again bringing together the mayors of the cross-border region.

A much smaller “jumping of scale” occurred in respect to the political institutions in the region which have been reformed by state law. The UVF—which existed from 1975 to 2000, included forty-two municipalities around the central city, the newly defined Ballungsraum Frankfurt/Rhein-Main, which is the geographic base for the regional zoning district as well as for the “Council of the Region”—covers seventy-five municipalities. This scale expansion was not followed by an expansion of power on the metropolitan level—in contrast, because the directly elected parliament of the UVF was abandoned, the new planning district is politically weak. Furthermore, its competences have been reduced basically to zoning. For all other tasks, voluntary intermunicipal associations and compacts are in place or envisioned. Nevertheless, because not just general territorial planning but the much more specific and important zoning competence is assigned to the district, the zoning plan which is currently produced will be geographically by far the largest in Germany.

2. In respect to the vertical movement of decision-making power, the situation in the Region Frankfurt is characterized by many plans and an intensive struggle to massively increase the power of political institutions on a regional level in the 1990s and a final solution in 2000 that brought about the exact opposite. The Social Democrats in the region came up with detailed plans to establish a strong and geographically expansive urban county which would have replaced the smaller existing counties, the UVF, and the state-led planning association for southern Hesse. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats at the state level blocked all these plans, and when the Christian Democrats took power at the state level, they implemented a structure that serves the aims of the suburban areas by reducing the functional scope and the political clout of the regional planning district. The new planning district was supposed to facilitate voluntary intermunicipal cooperation, but has no incentives and bargaining power. The political stalemate made it even more impotent. In consequence, we can conclude that, in the Frankfurt/Rhein-Main region, the recent metropolitan governance reform brought a downward movement of political decision-making power.

Munich

1. The 1990s brought a significant expansion of scale in the Munich region not by changing existing institutions but rather by adding a new institution for regional
The informal cooperation between the three Länder governments in Northern Germany for the “RDC” paved the way for the merger of the two bilateral planning boards into a trilateral organization in 1996. But it was not just this merger that brought an expansion of scale. During the development of the “RDC” the territory included was massively expanded (especially in Lower Saxony) in comparison to the territory of the planning boards. This was the case, because many counties wanted to be included in the Metropolregion Hamburg. Even counties that had more interdependencies with Bremen decided to join the Metropolregion Hamburg, because Hamburg has a much better image as the prosperous metropolis in the German North (Auel, 1997, p. 57).

2. The fusion and territorial expansion of the planning boards represent obvious elements of “scale expansion” in this region. The picture is not as clear when we ask whether or not there has been a transfer of more power to this territorially expanded level of governance. In terms of formal, legal power, nothing has changed, and the joint decisions on the metropolitan level have no binding effects either on the citizens or on the participating governments. Furthermore, no organizational nucleus (e.g., joint office with its own personnel) for an independent institutionalization of the metropolitan level was created. Nevertheless, the jointly financed development funds which dried out during the 1980s were revived in the 1990s (both the funds together spent about €30 million during this decade) and reoriented toward the goals of the RDC. Furthermore, the intergovernmental contacts between the Länder administrations have been massively improved, so that now stable trilateral networks exist on the political and the operative levels of the bureaucracies. The coordinating group meets monthly, and there are procedures for internal monitoring and external evaluation of the cooperation. Finally, the backing by the leaders of the Länder governments and an extensive public relations campaign have made the
Metropolregion Hamburg is an important point of reference in public discourse and stimulated much municipal and civic participation (GLP, 1999; Metropolregion Hamburg, 2002a).

Beyond these changes on the metropolitan-wide scale which overall confirm the “scale expansion” thesis, further changes during the 1990s point more toward multiplication of scales. First, in the second half of the 1990s, a process of decentralization began in the city-state of Hamburg. In 1997, tasks were delegated to the borough level, which has its own administration and parliament. At the beginning, this decentralization of tasks and responsibilities was accompanied by a centralization of power, because the central level received the right to choose the head of the borough administration. Nevertheless, this was soon reversed, and the borough parliament has regained this power. In 1998, elements of direct democracy were established on the borough level and strengthened the legitimacy of this level. The leeway for autonomous decision making of the borough parliament is very limited; in consequence, the main function of this process of decentralization is the creation of formal channels of interest articulation and aggregation from the neighborhood level toward the city administration (Prigge, Prange, & Zapatka, 2001, p. 151).

By contrast, the 1990s witnessed massively increased activities in Hamburg to establish contacts and cooperative relationships beyond the metropolitan area. The Metropolregion Hamburg is not the only level for strengthened cooperation with its neighbor Schleswig-Holstein. In 2003, government leaders announced the fusion of a few governmental agencies and the two Länder-owned development banks. Furthermore, in close cooperation with Schleswig-Holstein (the two Länder share a common representational office in Brussels) and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Hamburg intensified its involvement in the Baltic Sea Area. Hamburg is trying to transform the “Baltic Seas States’ Subregional Cooperation” into a common voice of the subnational units around the Baltic Sea to influence European decision making (FHH, 2002). This scale is even less strongly institutionalized than the Metropolregion Hamburg. Nevertheless, because the mayor of the city-state stresses the high priority and is investing personally in Baltic Sea diplomacy, this cross-border European meso-region is emerging as a politically relevant scale for identity and interest formation.

Bremen

1. The situation in the Bremen region resembles that in the Hamburg region. Bremen survived German unification as an independent Land and revived the metropolitan scale as the dominant level of cooperation with its neighbors. A further parallel is the fact that, during the RDC process, the territory of the region was expanded in comparison to the territorial scale of the former joint planning board, and with Wilhelmshaven, a further regional center joined the common region in 1996.
2. In respect to the transfer of decision-making power to the metropolitan level, we find the same picture as in Hamburg, with the major exception of an organizational nucleus which exists on the metropolitan level in the Bremen region. In terms of formal, legal power, nothing has changed, and the joint decisions on the metropolitan level have no binding force either on the citizens or on the participating governments. Because both the municipal association and the Länder-dominated regional association have established jointly financed offices, there are now two rudimentary organizational nuclei at the metropolitan level.
Similar to Hamburg, the intensified collaboration at the metropolitan level has been accompanied by a limited process of decentralization with the central city and by collaborative institution building on a wider transnational scale. The step toward decentralization in Bremen occurred already in 1989 when the advisory boards of the city boroughs began to be directly elected by the people. Previously, they were nominated by the city council, which is at the same time the parliament of the Land Bremen (Prigge et al., 2001, p. 153). What for Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein is micro-diplomacy with the Baltic Sea is the New Hanse Interregio (NHI) for Bremen and Lower Saxony. Facilitated by the INTERREG-Initiative of the European Commission, two German Länder and four Dutch provinces founded the NHI in 1991. With the help of the financial resources of the INTRREG-Program, cross-border intergovernmental working groups have been established; legislators as well as chambers of commerce and other private organizations have been involved in cross-border projects. For the third “INTERREG-Program,” the NHI members have successfully joined forces with further regions in France, Great Britain, Latvia, and Poland for an exchange network called Hanse-Passage and received €5 millions from the European Union.

**Stuttgart**

1. The creation of the VRS in 1994 did not mark a geographic expansion of the regional scale of governance, because this jurisdiction covers the same territory as its preceding planning association (Regionalverband Mittlerer Neckar): the central city and five surrounding counties. Nevertheless, the VRS is very active within the German and European interest organizations for metropolitan regions. In 2002, the VRS opened its own lobbying office in Brussels, which is unique for a German metropolitan region in which the central city does not have the status of a Land. The Land Baden-Württemberg, which itself has one of the strongest offices in Brussels, was not very pleased but tolerated this international activity. The institutional strength and dynamism of the VRS seemed to be an alternative to the major territorial expansion strategies of the other regions to address the challenges of enlarged scales by global competition and continental integration. Nevertheless, ten years after the founding of the VRS, criticism began to mount about the rather small geographic scale of this level of metropolitan governance (e.g., Heinz et al., 2003, pp. 40, 42). In September 2005, against the stiff opposition of the VRS, the mayor of Stuttgart invited twenty mayors and county supervisors to form a geographically much wider city network with the aim of establishing a European metropolitan region on this scale. It remains to be seen whether such a new governance scale can be successfully established.

2. In comparison to the situation before, the creation of the VRS leads to massive increase in political power on the metropolitan level. This increased power is partly due to a shift of tasks/responsibilities to this level. In addition to spatial planning, which was the sole responsibility of the former institution, the VRS is responsible for public transportation planning and partly for public transportation provision, economic development, tourism marketing, and waste management. However, the enhanced power is due to the “parliamentarization” of this level and the greatly increased sense of regional identity in this metropolitan area. One of the most remarkable aspects of the changes in governance in the Stuttgart region is that the creation of the public organization VRS has been accompanied by a broad array of municipal alliances and civic associations which “jumped scale” and have established
themselves on a regional scale. Led by the Forum Region Stuttgart, an initiative of leading business people, the municipalities have joined forces and founded formal alliances in the following policy sectors: culture, sports, and tourism. They are accompanied by regionalized organizations of the civil society: political parties, media, women, youth, and the churches (VRS, 1999).

Finally, also in this region, the reshuffling of tasks, identities, and power is not only directed upward. Through the dissolution of the “neighboring association,” the most important task of local government, zoning, has reverted to the municipalities.

**Hanover**

1. The development in the Hanover region is dominated by the elimination of a level of government through the fusion of county and metropolitan associations into an urban county named Region Hannover. The opportunity to reduce levels of government and the accompanying hope to reduce personnel and, in consequence, public expenditures was one of the most important selling points for this kind of institutional reform (Lenkungsgruppe Region Hannover, 1997, pp. 57–61; Priebs, 2002, p. 150). This fusion of levels of government was not accompanied by the geographic expansion of government entities outward toward the functionally interdependent metropolitan region. The Region Hannover includes only the territorial space of the central city and the former county—although strong functional interdependencies reach into neighboring counties (Priebs, 2002, p. 151).

In consequence, attempts at stronger collaboration on a larger scale gained momentum after the establishment of the Region Hannover. These attempts are driven by the fact that the Region Hannover has not been formally recognized as a “European metropolitan region” in the spatial development plans of the German federal government—in contrast to all other case study regions. The new “core space of Lower Saxony,” as this emerging territorial scale is called, includes all major city-regions in eastern Lower Saxony, but until now, no clear-cut geographical definition has emerged (Region Hannover, 2003).

2. The merger of county and metropolitan associations brought major reassignments of tasks and financial resources to the regional and municipal levels of governance. The Region Hannover has all the competencies which had been assigned to the former metropolitan association (especially public transport, economic development, and regional planning), no longer on a voluntary basis but delegated by Land law. The Region Hannover took over from the central city and the other municipalities’ major social policy tasks such as hospitals and social security, as well as affordable housing and educational planning. Finally, the regional level took over the municipal waste management infrastructure. This upward movement of responsibilities, mostly in the field of social policy, was accompanied by a decentralization of tasks in the field of environmental policy where the Region Hannover took over regulatory tasks from the Bezirksregierung, the regional office of the Land government. Furthermore, the municipalities received the right to take over many tasks from the Region Hannover, which has been very unevenly used (Priebs, 2002, p. 146–7).

To sum up, the Region Hannover represents an impressive example of government consolidation on a metropolitan level and a reduction of regulatory scales. Nevertheless, the geographic scale of the new metropolitan government is rather small, and just lately, this led to new plans for an additional larger scale of regional networking. The metropolitan level has been strengthened not only by the fusion of
county and metropolitan association but also by the transformation of policy responsibilities. The upward movement of important policy tasks from the municipalities to the county-region has been accompanied by a decentralization of regulatory responsibilities from the state to the regional level.

First Preliminary Summary

In four of the six metropolitan areas, the 1990s brought a massive expansion of the geographic scale of metropolitan cooperation combined with the multiplication of scales. Nevertheless, scale expansion and multiplication have not been accompanied by much shifting of formal competencies or administrative capacities to new scales (and in the cases where there were formal shifts, they tend to go into the direction of smaller scales). In contrast, the two regions that have not expanded their geographic definition during the 1990s (Hanover and Stuttgart) have been able to consolidate the number of regulatory scales and shift formal decision-making power upward to the metropolitan level. Nevertheless, also in these two regions, there is pressure to establish an additional level of governance on a massively extended scale.

GOVERNANCE SCOPE: FROM TERRITORIAL INTEGRATION TO FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION?

In this section, I try to find out how much the recent reforms in metropolitan governance have contributed to the process of “deterritorialization” of governance by strengthening functional specialization and differentiation with respect to policy programs and institution building. To trace such a transformation from territory to function in the architectures of metropolitan governance, I will focus on the following indicators:

1. Is the overall approach to metropolitan governance based on interfunctional integration (broad scope) or on functional specialization (narrow scope)?
2. What is the relationship between land-use planning (representing the logic of “spaces of place”) and transportation policy (representing the logic of “space of flows”) in the region? Is transportation policy embedded in spatial planning or not?

Frankfurt

Frankfurt is the only region in Germany in which the ideas of functional specialization and “variable geometry” have found strong political resonance and have explicitly shaped institutional reform. When the Christian Democrats came into power in Hesse in 1999, all the ideas of strong institutional consolidation of the agglomeration, which had dominated the debate during the 1990s, were abandoned. Instead, the functional scope and institutional power of the zoning district were reduced, and the “Council of the Region” was created. The main task of this council was supposedly to facilitate task- and project-specific intermunicipal coordination and cooperation—it is explicitly mentioned in the constituting law that municipalities outside the Ballungsraum Rhein-Main should be included in this intermunicipal cooperation when necessary. In fact, there already exist a flurry of single-purpose organizations with very large but non-congruent geographic scales in the fields of public transport, marketing, and water management (Bördlein, 2000).
2. The newly dominant idea of functional differentiation is especially apparent when we look at the changing relationship between transportation policy and land-use policy. During the mid-1990s, the UVF developed a strategic plan for the region, called “Region 2015.” This plan was not legally binding but did focus on the three issues which were seen as centrally important for the future of the region: the development of urban settlement, landscape, and transportation. Based on this plan, the legally binding general transportation plan and the landscape plan were produced and adopted by the UVF in the year 2000. Nevertheless, its successor, the zoning district, was no longer assigned the task of transportation planning. Instead, in 2002, the two Länder Hesse and Rhineland-Palatine, eight cities in both the Länder, and seven counties in Hesse founded, together with the regional public transportation association in Hesse, a “preparation company” to create an integrated transportation management organization for the Frankfurt-Rhine-Main region. Not only the quite different spatial scale of this institution in comparison to the zoning district but also the task and leadership signal a turn away from integrating transportation policy and land-use planning. Instead, securing mobility and integration of all modes of transportation is the goal of this institution. It is headed by the county supervisor, which represents the rich northern suburbs of Frankfurt and is the leading opponent of regional planning and institutional consolidation in the Rhine-Main area.

Munich

1. Although the “problem definition” of the Munich agglomeration at the beginning of the 1990s was how to cope with the predicted tremendous growth, the political reaction was not to strengthen the land-use planning organizations to channel the economic development and settlement patterns. Instead, a new scale of governance emerged which is specialized on marketing. In its Leitbild (vision), which was produced without much public involvement and deliberation in 1998, the MAI stated as its dominant goal the strengthening of regional economic competitiveness (MAI eV, 1998, p. 3). During the same period, the RPV regional planning district started work on a new Regional Plan, which was finished in 2002. In comparison to the first Regional Plan, enacted in 1987, the new plan is based on the philosophy of “lean planning” and much weaker in respect to guiding municipal zoning and in respect to interfunctional integration. Finally, a recent study called “Munich 2015” documented that the major players in the Munich agglomeration value voluntary cooperation more than hierarchical integration, as well as functionally specific and therefore geographically flexible institutions more than functionally integrated institutions. In conclusion, in Munich we can clearly see a similar trend toward functional specialization as in Frankfurt, but it is developing incrementally and is not based on a change in party dominance with its corresponding ideological turnaround.

2. The programmatic integration of land-use planning and transportation planning is comparatively weak in this region. Neither the first official Regional Development Plan (RDP) in 1987 nor the second RDP from 2002 emphasized the integration of land-use and transportation planning. The expert commission installed by the Bavarian government in 1972 to study city-suburban problems recommended creating a neighboring district like that in the Stuttgart agglomeration with the assigned tasks of zoning and transportation planning (Gillessen, 1975, p. 121). However, the state government decided to ignore the recommendations of its commission and has
not created any specific institutions for metropolitan areas in Bavaria. Instead, the regional planning district only met once a year with the major players in transportation policy (Fürst, 1990, p. 271) and was not able to play any significant role in the major conflicts and decisions about transportation infrastructure in the region. The 1972 Olympic Games stimulated the first step toward a regionally integrated public transportation service. In 1971, the municipal public transportation company and the national railway company founded a joint umbrella organization and introduced a common tariff for the region. In 1996, forced by federal law that demanded the decentralization of public transport in Germany, the state of Bavaria, the city of Munich, and eight counties became the shareholders of the new regional public transportation company. The geographic scale of this regionalized public transportation institution is almost but not fully congruent with the scale of the regional planning district. In sum, in the Munich region, there exists no institutional and programmatic coupling between the organizations for land-use planning and the organization for transportation planning and provision, but we can discover a trend toward territorial congruence of these institutions.

Hamburg

1. The philosophy of the RDC that dominated the cooperation process in the 1990s in the northern agglomerations is geared toward a holistic reintegration of functionally fragmented policy production (Budde, 1995, p. 120). In the Hamburg region, the RDC meant a fundamental conceptual change in comparison to the situation in the 1980s. During the 1980s, the (potentially) holistic territorial planning boards were pushed to the sidelines, and cooperation was tried through “package deals.” In 1984, for example, the government leaders signed a cooperation framework in which the Hamburg interest in a solution for waste disposal was combined with the interest of Schleswig-Holstein in the construction of new roads (Scharpf & Benz, 1990, p. 67). The implementation of this package deal failed, because in the implementation process the Länder governments could not overcome functionally or territorially based veto points. The RDC is an attempt to overcome these veto points not by creating a formal organization with hierarchical power (as the major reform study proposed, see Scharpf & Benz, 1990, pp. 120–127) but by establishing an informal network to establish a regional identity and trust as a basis for more productive interterritorial and interfunctional discussions and negotiations (GLP, 1999, p. 5). Nevertheless, if we compare the first RDC produced in the mid-1990s with the second RDC in 2000, we can see a marked shift from a program that is very broad-based and balanced in respect to economic, social, and ecological goals toward a program that stresses the economic issues, a programmatic shift that is accompanied by a clear focus on marketing and major infrastructure projects. Therefore, we can conclude that the metropolitan governance approach represents a functionally encompassing approach but one dominated by economic considerations.

2. Transportation policy in the Hamburg region has always been embedded in territorial thinking and integrative plans. Nevertheless, transportation policy has also been a source of major conflicts (especially about new highways and roads) and a functional field of institutional separation. In 1965, the Hamburger Verkehrsverbund (HVV) was created as the first metropolitan-wide organization for public transport in West Germany (Scharpf & Benz, 1990, p. 69). The HVV was established as an umbrella organization of the public transport corporations (dominated by the public transport
corporation of Hamburg and the federal railway company). In 1993, the HVV was transformed into a holding, based on private law. The members are not any longer the transport companies, dominated by the national railway company, but rather the Länder and most of the suburban counties. In 2002, the common tariff zone was massively expanded and now covers almost the entire area of the Metropolregion Hamburg, but no institutional merger or coupling between the HVV and the Metropolregion Hamburg occurred (Metropolregion Hamburg, 2002b, p. 2).

Bremen

1. The RDC in the Bremen region represents the same holistic approach to regional cooperation as the one in the Metropolregion Hamburg. The broader array of projects that resulted from the RDC and the orientation toward small-scale spatial planning are further indicators that territory, not function, is the locus for regional governance in this region. Major administrative actors in both the regions explicitly stress that they do not want functionally fragmented regional cooperation, because they see functional fragmentation and variable geometry as undermining political control (Baumheier & Danielzyk, 2002, p. 67).

2. For the integration of transportation policy in spatial planning, developments in the Bremen region come close to those described for Hamburg. There are strong efforts to steer settlements along the axis of public transport. The development plan for the regional public transport agency is based on a regional settlement concept which was worked out parallel to the RDC in the mid-1990s. The embeddedness of transportation policy in spatial planning seems to be even stronger in this region, and the spatial congruence between planning region and public transportation region is stronger, even though there has been no major expansion of the common tariff zone, as happened in the Metropolregion Hamburg (Baumheier & Danielzyk, 2002, pp. 17, 63).

Stuttgart

1. In comparison to the urban county, Region Hannover, the policy responsibilities that have been assigned to the metropolitan government, VRS, are far fewer, and the various functions are not integrated into an organizational hierarchy. Instead, there are broad arrays of legally autonomous subsidiary companies in which the VRS plays a major role but is not the only shareholder (VRS 2002). Furthermore, a flurry of intermunicipal associations and civic clubs populate the region. The VRS often participates in these regional institutions but has no formal control over their activities. As a consequence, the integration of the various sectoral institutions and policies follows much more the structural logic of loosely coupled networks. Nevertheless, the “parliamentarization” of the regional scale and the dynamic leadership of the VRS clearly make this organization the central nodal point in this regional network which serves as a platform for deliberation across all policy fields (Benz, 2003).

2. In the Stuttgart region, there were never strong attempts to integrate territorial planning and transportation policy. In comparison to the programs and plans in Hamburg, Bremen, and Hanover, the RDP in the Stuttgart region does not put as much emphasis on the integration of land-use and transportation policy. The central wording is “securing mobility” and not “integrated land-use and transportation
planning” as in Hanover (both regions name the automobile industry as their primary industrial cluster). In 1996, triggered by federal law, a new institution for public transportation was created in the Stuttgart agglomeration. Its geographic scale is not congruent with the geographic scale of the VRS, because one of the five counties is not included. Nevertheless, the VRS has become responsible for regional transportation planning, and in 2001 the first regional transportation plan was adopted by the regional parliament. Furthermore, the VRS is trying hard (but yet unsuccessfully) to obtain full responsibility for regional public transportation provision (Ensslin, 2002, p. 295). In conclusion, in contrast to Frankfurt, there exists a tendency toward integration of land-use planning and transportation planning. This integration is programmatically weaker than in Hamburg and Bremen but institutionally stronger, because a regional parliament decides on the strategic planning in both policy fields.

Hanover

1. The new urban county Region Hannover combines major functions in the fields of social, economic, and environmental policy, and the proponents have insisted on the need for functional integration in metropolitan governance. In contrast to the regional collaboration in the metropolitan areas of Hamburg and Bremen, this interfunctional integration is anchored in Hanover not only programmatically (in the Leitbild produced in 1996) but also organizationally in a classic bureaucratic hierarchy.

2. Hanover is not only the most institutionalized case of metropolitan governance but also the metropolitan region in Germany where the integration of spatial planning and transportation policy has always been the strongest. Already in 1968, the first metropolitan organization, founded in 1963 with the task of spatial planning, decided to take over public transportation service. After the Conservative government discarded this strong metropolitan institution in 1980, city and county fought against full abolition and saved public transportation as the main task of the surviving district. Furthermore, city and county decided voluntarily to delegate the task of regional planning to this regional entity to keep transportation policy and territorial planning together. In addition, the “joint vision (Leitbild)” and the “RDP” which gained binding force in 1996 gave priority to such an integration of these policies (Knieling, 2000, p. 169). In sum, the Region Hannover integrates land-use planning and transportation planning not only programmatically but institutionally.

Second Preliminary Summary

Two regions (Frankfurt and Munich) are heading toward a functionally differentiated system of metropolitan governance. Those governing institutions that are oriented at “spaces of flow” (marketing association: global trade and investment; public transportation district: regional commuting) are getting institutionally, programmatically, and geographically disembedded from the governing institutions that are oriented at “spaces of place” (land-use planning). The other four regions examined are aiming at interfunctional integration but with different goals and quite different means. In Hamburg and Stuttgart, the overall approach is dominated by economic considerations; in Bremen and Hanover, this is much less the case, and instead a classic territorial planning logic prevails which aims at a balance between social, economic, and ecological goals. In respect to the means for combining interterritorial integration with interfunctional integration, we can discover
very different institutional approaches: supra-local deliberation in the two northern city-state regions, network management in Stuttgart, and hierarchical integration in Hanover (Table 2).

**SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER IMPLICATIONS**

I will briefly summarize the major features of the six case study regions to give a final answer to the questions posed at the end of the theoretical part. In addition, I provide some evidence that the different institutions of metropolitan governance produce different outcomes, and I will address the theoretical question whether the recent transformations in metropolitan governance can be interpreted as an adaptation to economic imperatives and transformations.

In the metropolitan areas of Frankfurt and Munich, the reforms in the 1990s basically followed the recent prescriptions of the public choice school. They were characterized by functionally specialized cooperation, variable geometry, and a dominant ideology that prefers decentralization and voluntary cooperation. Both have expanded the geographic definition of the metropolitan region massively in the 1990s to get the critical mass for European and global competition. There is a striking functional paradox in that these two regions have been the economically strongest regions in Germany during the 1990s but nevertheless focused their cooperation on economic marketing. In respect to other fields of cooperation, they have not been very active (Munich) or not very successful (Frankfurt). In consequence, rescaling governance in these cases means a transformation of regional governance toward governing arrangements with very large scales and very narrow scopes.

Therefore, these two regions reflect a trend toward a parallel “jumping” and “relativation” of scale and therefore confirm the diagnosis offered especially by Neil Brenner. Furthermore, they represent areas where we actually see the proposed trend toward “deterritorialization” of governance, because institutions of governance are organized around specific functions and no longer on the basis of a specific territory. Furthermore, the institutions that represent the logic of spaces of flows (Castells, 1989,

| TABLE 2 |
| Functional Scope of the Metropolitan Governance Approach |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>General direction: functional differentiation or integration</th>
<th>Land-use planning and transportation policy: separation (−) or integration (+)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Programmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurt</td>
<td>Differentiation (programmatically induced)</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Munich</td>
<td>Differentiation (practically emerged)</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg</td>
<td>Integration but functionally asymmetric (economic dominance) and very low degree of formal institutionalization</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen</td>
<td>Integration with a clear territorial focus and a low degree of formal institutionalization</td>
<td>−</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stuttgart</td>
<td>Integration but functionally asymmetric (economic dominance) and a medium degree of formal institutionalization</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanover</td>
<td>Integration with a clear territorial focus and a high degree of formal Institutionalization</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1997) are getting disembedded from and more powerful than the institutions that embody the logic of spaces of place. Nevertheless, the other four regions do not as effectively confirm those transformation theses.

The two regions that most clearly follow a different path of metropolitan governance, Stuttgart and Hanover, are characterized by strong structural change and a directly elected parliament on the metropolitan level which provides political clout and legitimacy for this governing scale. The Hanover metropolitan area now has a strong regional government with broad-based competencies and large administrative capacities; Stuttgart has a regional institution that serves as a dynamic network manager and as a platform for strategic deliberation. In sum, political governance in both the regions has “jumped scale” in a way that allows us to talk about “reterritorialized” governance on a larger scale. Nevertheless, they have done this in quite different ways; Hanover is a showcase for classic “regionalists,” and Stuttgart entails many more elements of the “new regionalism.” It seems that the new “spatial fixes” that took root in the 1990s are not stable, and in these regions there is also pressure to add a new layer of governance on a massively increased scale. This would strengthen the diagnosis that the multiplication and relativation of scales is the more dominant trend in comparison to what the neo-Marxist scholars have termed “jumping scales.”

The reforms in metropolitan governance in both the Hamburg and the Bremen agglomeration are characterized by the expansion of the geographic scale and by massively strengthened networks on a metropolitan level. These cases do not represent instances of a “reterritorialization” of governance on a metropolitan scale, because no strong regional organizations and governance capacities have been created. They do not represent instances of “detrimentalization” and functional specialization either, because holistic, multifunctional development plans have characterized the regional collaboration. Instead, their development is best captured by the phrase “relativation/multiplication of scales,” because deliberation, regulation, and decision making are now taking place on various scales (borough, city-state, metropolitan, interstate, national, and transnational). Multiplication of scales does not go along with functional specialization as in the cases of Frankfurt and Munich. Instead, we are witnessing a multiplication of identities of the central city-states and concentric circles of cooperation and joint decision making (always covering many functional fields). Hamburg and Bremen no longer define themselves only as Länder and go beyond the former cooperation with their neighboring Länder governments. They now accept their identity as municipalities and cooperate directly with their suburban counterparts. Furthermore, as international actors, they strive beyond the national boundaries to create transnational alliances among cities and regions. Finally, they created institutions for articulation and aggregation of interests on the district level within the city-states. But in all these cases, the administration of the city-states is playing the dominant role and is not delegating any formal or substantial decision-making power to other levels of government or to autonomous and functionally specialized agencies.

Next, I will give some evidence in that these differences in the forms of governance matter before I turn to the question of how to explain the differences. Hanover is the only region where the reform has been able to reduce the unequal burdens of central city and suburban areas. Because many social services have been shifted to the metropolitan level, this reform must be seen as the most progressive in terms of social equality. In all other cases, there are no attempts to reduce the disparities within the metropolitan region. Another field where differences in policy output can be observed is the highly controversial issue (because of its distributional consequences) of regulating large retail centers to preserve the attractiveness of inner cities. Whereas the Region Hannover and the VRS
managed to pass ordinances that strictly regulate large retail stores outside the major cities (Ensslin, 2002, p. 296; Kommunalverband Großraum Hannover, 2001; Priebs, 2003), the regulations in the Munich area changed in the opposite direction. The regional planning district cannot regulate this issue by itself—it is the new “Land Development Plan (LDP)” of the Land government which contains the regulations. In 2003, the new LDP gained force, and against the will of the RPV Munich, a new clause allows municipalities which directly border on the central city much more leeway for allowing large retail stores than before. In Bremen, an attempt was made to tackle within a more encompassing spatial planning process, but it did not result in geographically precise and binding plans as in Hanover and Stuttgart. This Metropolregion Hamburg increasingly pushes the territorial planning approach to the sidelines, and in the Frankfurt region, the political stalemate makes a regional steering of retail stores impossible. Finally, the metropolitan areas of Frankfurt, Munich, Hamburg, and Stuttgart have established resourceful economic marketing organizations on a large regional scale, whereas the record of the two other regions (Bremen and Hanover) is much less impressive. In sum, the metropolitan areas show characteristic strengths and weaknesses in respect to redistributive, regulatory, and developmental policies. This paper did not aim at a thorough evaluation of the policy outputs or outcomes of the different governance approaches, but the few presented observations point in the direction of what institutional theory would predict; the more integrated and institutionalized metropolitan governance is, the more we can expect redistributitional policies and policies that help to fight urban sprawl. The more differentiated and institutionally weak a metropolitan governance approach is, the more it is geared toward the promotion of economic growth.

The analysis of the metropolitan governance transformations in Germany has aimed at a theory-led and detailed comparative description and not at the development or test of a causal theory. Nevertheless, the results provide evidence for a preliminary causal hypothesis which is in line with the structuralist logic that characterizes neo-Marxist and functionalist approaches scrutinized at the beginning of this paper. Nevertheless, it specifies and conditions the influence of socio economic transformations embodied in the process of globalization in a way that corresponds to the world-city hypothesis which was developed by John Friedman (1986) and which spurred a formidable empirical research program lead by P. J. Taylor. The Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network around Taylor have produced an Inventory of World Cities. Among the studied German metropolitan regions, there exists a striking correspondence between the ranking in this inventory and the trajectory of metropolitan governance reform during the 1990s. This correspondence provides some preliminary evidence for the following hypothesis: The higher the city-region is located in the hierarchy of World Cities, the stronger the governance approach is geared toward functional differentiation and deterritorialization; and correspondingly, the lower a city-region is located in the hierarchy of World Cities, the stronger the governance approach contains functional integration and represents the logic of spaces of place. Correlation is not causation—to get to a causal explanation we have to modify the world city hypothesis of John Friedman. Friedman, and later on Saskia Sassen (1994), argued that globalization leads to differentiation and specialization among and within city-regions. Whereas they pointed mainly to economic specialization and concentration and to social segregation and polarization, our findings imply a similar consequence for political governance structures. The more city-regions are embedded in the global economy the more they are forced to follow the basic process of modernization: functional differentiation. The causal mechanisms that lead to these political-administrative adaptations are similar to the ones that produce economic
concentration and social polarization. Global companies and their employees produce political pressure to disentangle the institutions that serve the logic of spaces of flows from the institutions that represent the logic of spaces of place. These pressures are stronger the more the metropolitan area is embedded in the global economy. Of course, this explanation is only a preliminary hypothesis derived from a very limited sample of cities. To strengthen or weaken its explanatory power, we need further studies that look at other countries, and we need to confront it with other causal models—models that emphasize the influence of domestic cultures and institutions.

ENDNOTES

1 This change is much more pronounced in Europe than in the United States, but especially Neil Brenner (1999b, 2002) has been able to inject the concept of “rescaling” into the North American scholarly debate (e.g., Hamilton, Miller, & Paytas, 2004, p. 157; Martin et al., 2003).

2 Neo-Marxist geographers and regional economists who introduced the “scaling” terminology use the term “regulation” because of their affinity with the French Regulation Approach (Macleod, 2001, pp. 820–821; Brenner 2002). I prefer the term “governance” because it not only is more often used in political science and public administration but also implies a more autonomous role of the politico-administrative system, whereas the regulation approach leans toward an economic determinism at least in the sense that the restructuring processes of the economy are the most important factors that influence political and economic modes of regulation.

3 The few attempts at radically dissolving traditional political entities, such as the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, were thoroughly rejected by the populations concerned (Brenner, 1999b, pp. 467–468).

4 The metropolitan regions in Eastern Germany are excluded, because their institutional transformation is being strongly determined by the specifics of the German unification process.

5 The data are compiled by the author from various documents provided by the institutions of metropolitan governance in the six case study regions.

6 The inventory of “world cities” produced by the “Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network” (www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc) is also used and presented by the German Federal Office for Housing and Regional Planning (Adam & Gödecke-Stillmann, 2002).

7 Frankfurt is listed among the Alpha World Cities; Munich and Hamburg are categorized as Gamma World Cities; Stuttgart is listed as showing evidence of World City formation; and Bremen and Hanover are not mentioned at all. The argument is partly based on the correlation between the ranking of the city-regions in this list and the characteristics of the city-regions shown in Table 2, but also on a fine-grained comparison of the pairs that have very similar context factors and show fairly but not fully similar features in their metropolitan governance forms: Frankfurt and Munich are the dominant cities within their Länder, both regions show massive socio economic growth—nevertheless, the trend toward “detrimentalized” governance is more pronounced in Frankfurt. Next, the institutional development of metropolitan governance in Hamburg and Bremen is strongly determined by the fact that both cities have the status of Bundesländer—nevertheless, the Metropolregion Hamburg is programmatically and institutionally clearly more oriented toward the global economy. Finally, Stuttgart and Hanover have a similar status within their Bundesländer and a similar economic structure (characterized by clusters of the automobile industry)—nevertheless, programmatically and institutionally Hanover follows more strongly the logic of spaces of place.

8 A similar conclusion can be drawn from the work of Newman and Thornley (2005), who studied the transformation in urban governance and planning in major World Cities around the globe (Blatter, 2005b).
REFERENCES


