

Philosophisches Kolloquium HS 2015

Dienstag, 29. September 2015, **ausnahmsweise Beginn 17.00Uhr**

What to think of group persons? A suggestion for a Hegelian turn in contemporary social ontology.

Dr. Onni Hirvonen (Universität Jyväskylä)

Dienstag, 20. Oktober 2015, 17.15 Uhr

Being moved and happiness

Prof. Dr. Julien A. Deonna (Universität Genf)

Dienstag, 17. November 2015, 17.15 Uhr

Willensfreiheit und der Sinn alternativer Möglichkeiten

PD Dr. Jacob Rosenthal (Universität Konstanz)

Dienstag, 29. September 2015, **ausnahmsweise Beginn 17.15 Uhr**

What to think of group persons? A suggestion for a Hegelian turn in contemporary social ontology.

Dr. Onni Hirvonen (Universität Jyväskylä)

Abstract

In a recent debate on the possibility of group personhood Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011) argue for a performative theory of personhood where all agents who manage to perform in the space of obligations are taken as persons. Based on this account they claim that group agents are also persons. This theory has been challenged on the grounds of its historical accuracy, lack of political relevance, and contestability of the concept of personhood (Kusch 2014). This paper aims to take a new perspective on the debate by approaching it through the Hegelian tradition of recognition. It is argued in here that the recognition theory gives us a multidimensional view of personhood, which, in turn, can be used to clarify what is at stake when we talk about collective personhood.

Zur Person

Onni Hirvonen is a post-doctoral researcher in philosophy at University of Jyväskylä. He has received his PhD in philosophy from Macquarie University, Australia, in 2014. Hirvonen's interests lie in social ontology, collective agency, and theories of recognition. His current research focuses on the interplay of identities and institutions from recognition-theoretical perspective.

Dienstag, 20. Oktober 2015, 17.15 Uhr

Being moved and happiness

Prof. Dr. Julien A. Deonna (Universität Genf)

Abstract

I argue that being moved is a distinct emotion and that this emotion has privileged links with happiness. First, I explain how emotions may generally be thought to contribute to happiness, i.e. why we may think that emotions are *finally good* for the individual who experience them. Second, I try to make it plausible that being moved is a distinct emotion, in particular that what moves us is the goodness (a *thin* value) of a particular core positive value (a *thick* value such as generosity, love, friendship, solidarity, beauty, etc.). In admiration, say, I react to the beauty of x, in being moved I react to the goodness of the beauty of x. In the third part, I explain the senses in which being moved in particular contribute to happiness. More specifically, I present reasons for thinking that, being *experiences* of the goodness of core positive values, episodes of being moved can be thought of as episodes of happiness. As such, they are finally good for one.

Zur Person

Julien A. Deonna is associate professor in philosophy at the University of Geneva and project leader at CISA, the *Swiss Centre for Affective Sciences*. His research interests are in the philosophy of mind, in particular the philosophy of emotions, moral emotions and moral psychology. In addition to many articles in the area, he is the co-author of *In Defense of Shame* (OUP, 2011) and *The Emotions: a Philosophical Introduction* (Routledge, 2012). Recently, he has been interested in discovering what we refer to by the expression 'being moved'.

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
PD Dr. Jacob Rosenthal (Universität Konstanz)

Abstract

Für einen Kompatibilisten, der die Vereinbarkeit von „Willensfreiheit“ und Determinismus behauptet, besteht – noch vor der Erörterung aller Probleme des menschlichen Wollens – eine wesentliche Schwierigkeit darin zu sagen, was alternative *Handlungsmöglichkeiten* in einer deterministischen Welt sein sollen. Was bedeutet es unter deterministischen Voraussetzungen zu sagen, jemand könne in einer bestimmten Situation so oder so handeln, oder er hätte so oder so handeln können? Der Vortrag analysiert Antwortmöglichkeiten auf diese Frage, vor allem die sogenannte Konditionalanalyse des Könnens.

Zur Person

PD Dr. Jacob Rosenthal ist Ergänzungsprofessor für Theoretische Philosophie an der Universität Konstanz. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte sind die Philosophie der Wahrscheinlichkeit und die Diskussion um Willensfreiheit und Determinismus.



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