

Rule-following in Context

Language is normative. The notion of the normativity of language can imply that there are rules for the usage of meaningful expressions and that there are correct and incorrect ways of using language. Traditional theories intended to show that something exists beyond the proposition, which gives the proposition its meaning. These theories founder on this “something”. Meaning cannot generally be defined as an exterior object or an inner mental representation.

The change of perspective, from a representative conception of meaning to a view that considers the normative use of language, is a central point of Wittgenstein's *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*. Thereby the governed use of language becomes an activity. It is not based on knowledge about “something”, but on the knowledge of how an expression can be used in a meaningful way. Know-how is a practice. In order to address the vast number of practices and their un-fixedness in the question of the application of expressions in language use, Wittgenstein introduces the notion of grammar. According to many interpretations grammatical rules are sufficient for sense determination.

This PhD-project strives to show, that the great rule-following-debate is missing one crucial aspect: the extension by the contextualism. Grammatically well-formed and prima facie meaningful sentences could still express no sense if they are not used in an appropriate context. Context is not a semantic concept. Rather, context performs an epistemic function. We have to know how to use language in a certain context, to make a meaningful expression.

The main aim of the project is to argue, that particular contexts (in Wittgenstein's words: certain “Umstände”, a definite “Umgebung”, a specific “Situation”) play an essential role in our understanding of the rule-governed use of expressions in practices. The extension of the normative language conception to particular contexts of use is necessary in determining the boundary between sense and nonsense.